Shittas Rashi Regarding Kim Lei For A Ben Noach

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May 21, 2019

לזכות ידיד נפשי האהוב ר' שמחה דן גיסינג'ר שליט"א לברכה והצלחה בכל מעשי ידיו יחד עם כל בני ביתו!!

We already saw in a recent article that Rashi holds [as explained by Tosfos עבודה זרה ע"א: ד"ה בן נח] that there is קים ליה בדרבה מיניה for בני נח. We can explain that he holds like the Nemukei Yosef we mentioned previously that executing בני נח also has the status of formal דיני נפשות [just that there is a leniency that he may be killed with one witness and one judge] and according to this קלב"מ applies to a בן נח as well as it does to all דיני נפשות. 




However, it would appear that a בן נח doesn't have the same דין as a Jew. With respect to the דין that we require kosher witnesses when the ox of an עכו"ם gores the ox of a Jew, Rebbe Akiva Eiger [בתוס' למשניות ב"ק פ"א מ"ג] writes in the name of the Maharshal in the Yam Shel Shlomo: 

"היינו אף דבדיניהם דנין ע"פ עדות עכו"ם, מ"מ כשבאין לפנינו לדון אין דנין אלא בעדות כשרים". 

"Even though according to their laws they judge based on the testimony of an עכו"ם, nevertheless when they come for judgment before us, we only judge with the testimony of kosher witnesses".

We see from this a חידוש: This דין that we require kosher witnesses is also a halacha pertaining to the COURTS, because this דין of על פי שנים עדים [requiring two kosher witnesses] includes two elements - A] The litigant requires two kosher witnesses for his case. However that only applies to a Jew but a בן נח doesn't require to witnesses because of the קל וחומר of the N"Y: If for their bodies [i.e. capital punishment] one witness suffices, the most certainly for their money. B] The courts have to judge based on kosher witnesses. Regarding this element it doesn't matter who the litigant is. Because this is a דין that devolves on the בית דין that they must judge based on two witnesses. Therefore, when the ox of an עכו"ם gores the ox of a Jew, they have to judge with two kosher witnesses. 

With this line of thought we can explain the approach of Rashi regarding קלב"מ - He definitely holds that that this פרשה was stated regarding Jews alone and not Gentles. But this is only with respect to the litigants, that they have an exemption from paying monetary obligations when there is a death penalty. This exemption applies only to Jews and not Gentiles. But then we have a pasuk "לא יהיה אסון" -  if there is no "tragedy" i.e. killing, then there is a monetary obligation. And Chazal expound that if there IS an אסון and someone dies then he need not pay, which includes another חידוש with respect to the courts, that they don't give a double punishment. In that case there is no distinction who the litigant is but rather it is a דין that applies to the courts that they only mete out one punishment and not two. Because of this, Rashi holds that the דין of קלב"מ applies to an עכו"ם, that stems from the fact that בית דין doesn't require a monetary obligation where the litigant is killed. 


The Acharonim asked two questions on the opinion of Rashi that the דין of קים ליה בדרבה מיניה applies to בני נח. Rashi holds [סנהדרין נ"ד. ד"ה דינו ומכות ט. ד"ה לפיכך] that a בן נח is executed even if he is a complete שוגג [against the Rambam Melachim 10-1 who holds that when he is שוגג, he is exempt]. If so, it emerges that the דין of קלב"מ for a בן נח is always subsumed under the rubric of עבדינן ביה החומרא  - we carry out the more severe punishment, because whether he was מזיד or שוגג, he is executed. And where עבדינן ביה החומרא, the Maharshal writes [cited in the Ktzos 28-1] that there is no need to pay even to fulfill a heavenly mandate - לצאת ידי שמים, nor is תפיסה [forcibly taking the item] effective. 

According to this, the definition of קלב"מ for a בן נח is that no obligation at all applies [which is why there is no obligation לצאת ידי שמים or תפיסה] and not merely that he need not pay. If so, we can ask from two places: 


1] The Maharal Diskin asked from what Rashi wrote [בבא קמא קי"ג ד"ה היכי] that the דין of קנין שינוי applies to בני נח. Now the Nesivos [351-1] writes that if someone stole and the rule of קלב"מ applies then there is no קנין בשינוי because this קנין is learned from the pasuk "והשיב" [as the Gemara in Bava Kamma 66a says  'והשיב את הגזלה אשר גזל'... - אם כעין שגזל - יחזיר, ואם לאו - דמים בעלמא בעי שלומי"] and if קלב"מ applies, there is no דין of והשיב. It is clear that he is talking about a case of חייבי מיתות במזיד where we carry out the more severe punishment, because in that case there is an exemption from the primary obligation and thus והשיב doesn't apply. But when someone does an עבירה בשוגג for which he would be חייב מיתה had he done it במזיד where we don't carry out the more severe punishment, even though the בית דין doesn't punish him, since there is a חיוב of והשיב that exists in principle, we say that the קנין שינוי would take effect. If so, Rashi is difficult to understand - Where do we find a קנין שינוי for a בן נח?? When it comes to a בן נח we always carry out the more severe punishment [whether שוגג or מזיד] so his דין of קלב"מ creates a situation where he is not included in the דין of והשיב and if so he has no קניני גזילה and should not acquire with a שינוי??!  



2] The Pri Yitzchak [of Rav Itzele Blazer ztz"l 1-58] asks from the Gemara in Avoda Zara [59b]:

אמר רב אשי האי עובד כוכבים דנסכיה לחמרא דישראל בכוונה אע"ג דלזבוניה לעובד כוכבים אחרינא אסור שרי ליה למישקל דמיה מההוא עובד כוכבים מאי טעמא מיקלא קלייה

Rav Ashi says: In the case of this gentile who intentionally poured a Jew’s wine as a libation in order to render it prohibited, even though it is prohibited to sell it to another gentile, as one may not derive benefit from it, nevertheless, it is permitted for him to collect its monetary value from that gentile. What is the reason for this? It is considered as though the gentile burned the wine and destroyed it.



Explained the Ran: The Jew is taking the money as payment for damages and not as a sale. 




But this is puzzling!! He is killed for performing this ניסוך even if he is שוגג, so why should he have to pay?? When a Jew does the ניסוך we say that from the moment he lifts it up he acquires it and  becomes a thief, if so when an עכו"ם who gets capital punishment for stealing shouldn't be obligated to pay money according to Rashi who holds that we apply קלב"מ to an עכו"ם and even בשוגג he is executed according to Rashi, so he should never be liable as a מזיק??! 




However, according to what we explained there are no questions on Rashi. The Acharonim understood Rashi to mean that even בשוגג he is executed because שוגג is like מזיד. But based on our explanation of his opinion, the opposite is true. We don't find regarding a עכו"ם the פטור of עבדינן ביה החומרא [we carry out the more severe punishment], which is founded on the exemption of a person in relation to the basic obligation [the "עיקר חלות חיוב"]. And did we not explain that Rashi agrees with Tosfos that an exception that applies to the litigant is relevant for a Jew only and not for a Gentile. The whole דין of קלב"מ for an עכו"ם is only the other דין that devolves on the court, not to give a dual punishment. That even though the primary punishment applies to him, the court cannot carry it out. It emerges according to this that EVEN a מזיד only receives the דין of קלב"מ like a שוגג where we DON'T carry out the more severe punishment because his קלב"מ is not an exemption from the primary obligation but is rather directed to the בית דין who is not allowed to implement two punishments. So Rashi was correct in saying that the קנין שינוי is relevant to an עכו"ם. Since he is included in the obligation of והשיב, he is considered a גזלן with respect to קנין שינוי. And for the same reason money may be taken from him for the ניסוך, because bottom line, he has a חיוב מזיק. [Beis Din doesn't collect the money because they may not carry out two punishments. But the damaged party may because there is a חיוב מזיק in principle - ד"ע.]   

We can resolve the question the Maharil Diskin asked on Rashi in a different fashion as well: 


It is clear from a number of places that the primary לאו of גזילה is not because of the very act of גזילה  but rather the foundation of the איסור is a prohibition against acquiring an object in the context of קנייני גזילה


The proof is from what we asked in Temurah [6a] in the sugya of אי עביד לא מהני. 

והרי גזל דרחמנא אמר (ויקרא יט, יג) לא תגזול ותנן הגוזל עצים ועשאן כלים צמר ועשאן בגדים משלם כשעת הגזילה

The Gemara objects: But there is the case of robbery, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “You shall not oppress you neighbor, and you shall not rob him” (Leviticus 19:13), and we learned in a mishna (Bava Kamma 93b): One who robs another of wood and fashions it into vessels, or one who robs another of wool and fashions it into garments, pays the victim according to the value of the goods at the time of the robbery, but he need not return the vessels or garments, since by changing the stolen items he acquired them. 

In other words, we learn from this that that the thief acquires with a שינוי and we don't say "לא מהני" - that what he did sinfully is not effective. Asked the Yad Hamelech: Even if we say "לא מהני" the איסור won't be rectified and the Maharit [and other Acharonim] taught the rule that we only say אי עביד לא מהני if the איסור will be rectified. It appears from this that the איסור גזילה is not on the very act of stealing but rather on the קנייני גזילה that he has on the stolen object, and because of this the Gemara asks correctly that we should say "לא מהני" and the קנין shouldn't take effect. This way, the איסור of גזילה will be rectified. That is what the Gemara means when it asks why the person is קונה בשינוי and that we should say לא מהני and there is no קנין. 


With this insight in hand we can understand the sugya in Bava Metzia [10b] that teaches according to one opinion that wherever the שליח is not obligated [a בר חיובא] we say יש שליח לדבר עבירה - he is a valid agent and his act relates back to the sender. Asks the Gemara:



אלא מעתה האומר לאשה ועבד צאו גנבו לי דלאו בני חיובא נינהו הכי נמי דמיחייב שולחן


The Gemara asks: If that is so, then in a case of one who says to a woman or a slave: Go out and steal for me, is the one who sent them indeed liable, since they are not subject to liability? [Married women and slaves have no property of their own from which one could collect payment].

אמרת אשה ועבד בני חיובא נינהו והשתא מיהא לית להו לשלומי

The Gemara answers: You can say in response: A woman and a slave are not comparable to a courtyard, as they are subject to liability if they steal; and only now, in any event, they do not have the means to pay.

Asked Rebbe Akiva Eiger, what is the hava amina of the מקשן [questioner]? For even if we say that the reason she doesn't pay is NOT because she lacks the means but because she is exempt, nevertheless she is definitely included in the איסור of גזילה and is thus considered a בת חיוב in the איסור גזילה and cannot be a שליח?!


Based on the foregoing we can explain based on the principle of the Nesivos, that if the גזילה was done in such a way to incur קלב"מ then there is no קנין בשינוי. Since it is not included in the obligation of והשיב [because of קלב"מ] and there is no obligation to pay, there is also no קנין גזילה and thus he can't be קונה with a שינוי. According to this we can say that since in the hava amina we assumed

that a woman is exempted from payment and not just that she doesn't have what to pay, she will then have no קנייני גזילה [no "והשיב" - no קנייני גזילה] and the questioner correctly assumed that a woman is not included in the לאו of לא תגזול. Because as we explained, the לאו relates to קנייני גזילה and not to the גזילה itself and since she has no קנייני גזילה in the object, she is also not included in the איסור גזילה.


Now we can answer the question of the Maharil Diskin on Rashi - He asked why there is a בקנין שינוי when a בן נח steals when according to the Nesivos if קלב"מ applies and there is no והשיב, there is no קנין שינוי. And for a בן נח where קלב"מ always applies and there is no דין of והשיב, the קנין בשינוי shouldn't apply. But based on what we explained, it emerges that if we say that there is no קנין בשינוי then there is no איסור גזילה at all because the whole לאו is not to make קנייני גזילה in an object, and we are thus compelled to say that a בן נח IS קונה with קנייני גזילה [because we know that he is included in איסורי גזילה as the Gemara learns in Sanhedrin 56b] and thus is also קונה בשינוי.


To summarize: The question was that a בן נח shouldn't be קונה בשינוי according to the rule of the Nesivos that if there is no והשיב, there is also no קנין. The answer is that the only way that an איסור גזילה can apply is if there are קנייני גזילה and since a בן נח has an איסור גזילה, he must also have קנייני גזילה. This undermines the rule of the Nesivos and we must say against his view that even when there is no והשיב, there are קנייני גזילה. 


[עפ"י תורת הגאון רבי חיים שמואלביץ זצ"ל]  



[עפ"י תורת הגאון רבי חיים שמאלביץ זצ"ל]




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