Tochachah: Reinforcing the Observance of Mitzvot of Others

In the previous issue, we discussed the concept of arvut, that each Jew is responsible for the observance of mitzvot of others.  We discussed how this concept relates to the mitzvah of tochachah, the mitzvah recorded in the Torah (Vayikra 19:17) to rebuke someone else for wrongdoing.  One approach is that tochachah is more expansive than arvut.  The other approach is that tochachah is one application of arvut.  In this issue, we will discuss the parameters of the mitzvah of tochachah.

 The Sensitivity of the Mitzvah

There are a number of Talmudic statements that reflect the sensitive nature of rebuking someone and the potentially negative consequences that might ensue.  First, the Gemara, Erchin 16b, quotes a Beraita that notes that after the Torah introduces the mitzvah of tochachah, it states "and you shall not bear iniquity because of him."  The Beraita deduces from this verse that if the person receiving the rebuke will be embarrassed from the rebuke, one should not rebuke him.  Second, the same Beraita quotes R. Tarfon who wonders if there are people in his generation who are capable of receiving rebuke.  R. Elazar ben Azariah wonders whether there are people in his generation who are qualified to rebuke others.  Third, the Gemara, Yevamot 65b, states that just as there is a mitzvah to provide rebuke that will be accepted, there is also a mitzvah to refrain from rebuke in a situation where it won't be accepted.  Fourth, the Gemara, Shabbat 34a, states that when instructing the members of one's household to complete the last minute Shabbat preparations, one should do so in a peaceful manner so that they listen.  R. Eliezer ben Shmuel of Metz (d. 1175), Sefer Yerei'im no. 223, states that this principle applies to all forms of tochachah.  One should only offer rebuke in a peaceful manner that will discourage the violator from engaging in the transgression.

The Gemara, Erchin 16b, records a discussion among the Amoraim regarding the extent of one's obligation to rebuke one's friend.  All opinions agree that one must continually rebuke the violator.  They dispute whether one may cease the rebuke when the violator is prepared to strike the rebuker or whether one may cease when the violator is prepared to curse the rebuker or whether one may cease when the violator gets angry at the rebuker.  The Rishonim ask: At the point where the violator is agitated by the continual rebuke, isn't it readily apparent that the violator is not prepared to accept the rebuke?  Why then is there a mitzvah to rebuke?

The Rishonim provide a number of different answers to this question.  First, R. Yosef Ibn Chabib (14th-15th century), Nimmukei Yosef, Yevamot 21b, s.v. Davar, distinguishes between an individual, where there is a mitzvah to continually rebuke and the public, where one should not continually rebuke if the message is not going to be heard.  Second, R. Menachem Meiri (1249-1306), Beit HaBechirah, Yevamot 65b, suggests that the mitzvah of tochachah only applies to someone who will potentially accept the rebuke.  If it is known that the person will not accept the rebuke, there is no mitzvah of tochachah.  Shita Mekubetzet, Baba Metzia 31, quotes Ramach who is of the same opinion and explains that the violator is assumed to be someone who is willing to accept rebuke until he gives an indication otherwise.  Therefore, when he gets agitated, that is the indication that he is not willing to accept rebuke and there is no obligation to continue to rebuke him.  Third, Sefer HaChinuch, no. 239, writes that when deciding whether one should rebuke another, one must assess the impact the rebuke will have on the violator as well as the impact it will have on the rebuker.  If the violator will not accept rebuke or the rebuker will be embarrassed by the situation, there is no obligation to rebuke.  Otherwise, one should rebuke.

Rama, Orach Chaim 608:1, codifies the opinion of Nimmukei Yosef and rules that one must rebuke an individual continually.  R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi (1742-1815), Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Orach Chaim 608:5, seems to have a different version of Nimmukei Yosef (that states b'rabim instead of l'rabim) and notes that the distinction is between a private area and a public area.  If one is in a public area, one should not continually rebuke another individual because it is counterproductive.  However, in private, one should continually rebuke.

 Informing Someone of a Transgression

There are times when an individual sees or knows of another individual committing a transgression and the violator is not aware that he is violation a transgression.  Does the mitzvah of tochachah require one to inform the violator of the transgression?

R. Aryeh Leib Ginsburg (1695-1785), Sha'agat Aryeh no. 58, writes that there is a biblical obligation to inform the violator of the transgression.  R. Chaim C. Medini (1833-1904), S'dei Chemed Vol. V, page 1952, explains that the biblical obligation is based on the mitzvah of tochachah.  R. Yoel Sirkes (1561-1640), Bach, Yoreh De'ah no. 303, rules that the obligation to inform the violator of his transgression is only rabbinic in nature.

There are two significant discussions relating to informing someone about a prohibition.  First, the Gemara, Beitzah 30a, states that in certain situations, it is preferable not to inform the community about a prohibition that the people won't follow because they are currently violating the prohibition unintentionally and by informing them, they will violate the prohibition intentionally.  According to Rama, op. cit., this only applies to the public.  However, one should inform an individual about a transgression, even if there is a concern that he may not listen.  Mishna Berurah, Bei'ur Halacha 608:1, s.v. Aval, explains that the mitzvah of tochachah requires that one inform the violator of his transgression.  The exception to the rule (based on the distinction of Nimmukei Yosef) is informing the public of something that will not be heard.  R. Eliezer of Metz, op. cit., has a different explanation of why we don't inform the public of a transgression when there is a concern that they will not listen.  He follows the opinion that there is no obligation of tochachah in a situation where the rebuke will not be accepted.  As such, there is no distinction between informing an individual and informing the community.  According to Bach op. cit., there is no mitzvah of tochachah when the violator is not aware of the violation.  As such, the rule that we don't inform the violator when we suspect that he won't listen is based on practical considerations.

Second, the Rishonim discuss situations where the violator will surely listen when informed of the transgression, but informing the violator of the violation at the current moment will place him in an uncomfortable situation.  One example is informing a person who is walking in public that he is wearing sha'atnez, where the violator will have to remove his clothing in public.  Another example is informing a kohen who is not fully dressed that there is a corpse in the building.  The kohen will be forced to exit the building before getting dressed.

Rabbeinu Asher (c. 1250-1327), Hilchot K'la'ei Begadim no. 6, rules that one should not inform an individual in public that his clothing contains sha'atnez.  Rather, he should wait until the individual is in his own home and inform him there.  Based on Rabbeinu Asher's ruling, R. Yisrael Isserlin (1390-1460), Terumat HaDeshen 1:285, rules that one should not inform the kohen about the corpse until he is dressed.  However, Rambam (1138-1204), Hilchot K'layim 10:29, seems to disagree with Rabbeinu Asher's principle.  Rambam rules that if one sees someone else wearing sha'atnez in public, he should personally remove the clothing from the violator, even if it is in a public area.  [In the previous issue, we discussed why kavod habriyot might not be a factor in this situation.]  If one must personally remove the clothing, it follows that one should at the very least inform the violator of the violation.

Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 303:1, codifies the opinion of Rambam regarding the removal of sha'atnez in public.  Rama codifies the opinion of Rabbeinu Asher (Yoreh De'ah 303:1) and the opinion of R. Isserlin (Yoreh De'ah 372:1).  Sha'agat Aryeh, op. cit., contends that Rabbeinu Asher's opinion is a minority opinion and therefore, one must inform another individual of a transgression, even in a situation where the timing of the information will place the violator in an uncomfortable situation.  Bach, op. cit., contends that even Rambam's ruling only applies to someone who is intentionally wearing sha'atnez.  If the person is unaware that he is wearing sha'atnez, Rambam agrees that one should not inform him until he is in a private location.