The secular school of determinism seeks to absolve humans of blame by claiming that all their actions, whether good or evil, are inevitable. One can easily imagine a counter-position that indicts humans for all their actions, overextending the dictum that “humans are perpetually warned [and therefore responsible], whether [they act] accidentally or purposefully, awake or asleep … unwillingly or willingly.”1

Halacha does not subscribe to either of these unilateral positions; rather, it views the realm of human responsibility from a wide range of perspectives. At times, we acknowledge that a sinner had no alternative, and we do not punish him.2 Thus, if one were forced to commit a sin upon pain of death, he would be entirely guiltless according to halacha. In contrast, one who wantonly transgresses is fully punished for his actions, either by death, lashes, or fines.

Between these two poles lies the category of shogeg, accidental transgression, whose penalty can be either exile (for murder) or the obligation to bring a chattos sacrifice. This in-between level of responsibility perplexed the Ramban, who wondered, how could we hold someone liable for an accident? This question is especially difficult when applied to sins between man and G-d, where others’ rights to restitution do not override the sinner’s innocence.

Ramban3 responds that the accidental sinner “did not guard himself. He did not sufficiently fear Hashem so as not to eat or act without careful investigation” into the halachik status of his actions. Each person is obligated to perceive his own actions within a moral and ethical framework. Failure to conform to this obligation is itself considered a sin, and therefore necessitates the offering of a chattos sacrifice.4

According to Ramban, one must consider both halacha and reality before acting. Thus, when confronted with an unidentified piece of meat, any diner must be familiar with the rudimentary laws of kashrus. He must know that cows are kosher while pigs are non-kosher. Moreover, he must be able to differentiate between cow meat and pig meat. Failure to research these facts can lead to a shegagah, an accidental transgression. The diner may accidentally eat pork because he thought it was halachically kosher, or because he thought it was really veal. Ultimately, however, he will be punished for his failure to perform proper research rather than for his actions. Ignorance – whether of halacha or reality – is thus considered a crime. A master halachist cannot plead ignorance of reality to obtain pardon for his unwitting misdeeds. Similarly, an expert scientist cannot excuse his accidental transgressions by pleading ignorance of halacha. Rather, accurate knowledge of both the law and of the world is necessary to practically avoid sin.5

Although it is impossible to learn enough to fully avoid crimes of ignorance, R. Yonah of Gerondi provides a ray of hope to us finite-minded and fallible humans. The Mishnah6 says that “wisdom will be preserved in anyone whose actions exceed his wisdom.” R. Yonah asks: if someone lacks knowledge of what to do, how can he do it? He answers that once one wholeheartedly resolves to heed the sages’ instructions and to not willfully disobey them, all of his actions are treated as mitzvos. Thus, despite the specter of ignorance that hangs daily over our heads, we preserve our actions’ purity by displaying a steadfast commitment to living and constantly upgrading our halachik lifestyle.

1. Bava Kamma 26a-26b
2. Sifrei, Devarim 22:26
3. Toras ha-Adam, Sha’ar ha-Gemul
4. Ramban also suggests that each sinful act has inherent potential to ‘soil’ the soul, and that the chattos offering is brought to combat this dirtying. For further discussion of this alternative, see “Ma’asim ke-Mechalkim le-Chata’os,” Beis Yitzchak 37, pg. 176.
5. The relative importance of halachic knowledge and knowledge of reality is disputed by Rashi and Tosfos. See “Hakdamah le-Inyanei Shegagos,” Beis Yitzchak 37, pg. 168.
6. Avos 3:9