The goal of this essay is to outline the basic premises and practical halachic ramifications of the melacha (division of forbidden labor on Shabbos) of zoreah (planting).
Perhaps the most fundamental issue with regards to zoreah is precisely when the transgression occurs. According to the Rashash , zoreah is completed when a seed has taken root, which occurs three days after the initial planting. Therefore, by simply covering a seed with dirt a person does not complete the melacha on Shabbos itself. This being the case, a person is only retroactively obligated for transgressing zoreah, after the seed takes root. A person becomes obligated on Tuesday for the action he performed on Shabbos. According to the Rashash, there is a separation in zoreah between the performance of the melacha and its completion, which is not true by nearly all the other melachos (with the exception of bishul [cooking].) In fact, this fundamental difference caused the Maharal of Prague to say that the stringency of p’sik reisha (when a melacha will definitely be caused by your actions although that might not be your primary focus ) is not applicable by the melacha of zoreah.
The Sefer HaChinuch and the Iglei Tal argue that since at the time of planting one has intention for the seed to take root, one is obligated right now for his action, even if the seed is uprooted after Shabbos. The intention and action of an individual plays more of a role according to this school of thought than the actual completion of the melacha.
The Minchas Chinuch explains along the lines of the Magen Avraham that for all melachos, one is obligated for the way that action was performed in the Mishkan (Tabernacle). Since in the Mishkan they would plant the seeds on Shabbos itself, we look only at that action; it doesn’t matter when the seeds actually take root. One is obligated from the moment of planting. In contrast, when it comes to the melacha of baking bread, we look at the end of the process. Since it took a long time to bake bread in the Mishkan, the obligation only comes upon the completion of the baking process. Even though it would appear that the perpetrator is not directly causing the bread to bake , since in the Mishkan baking the bread was done in this fashion, he is liable for his actions. The melacha of tzod (trapping) is also accomplished via an “indirect” action, namely that only after one has finished the action of spreading the trap can the animal be caught and the actual melacha performed. Were it not for the fact that the Jews trapped in this manner during the time period of the Mishkan, one would not have been obligated for trapping on Shabbos .
This idea is also expressed by Rashi in Shabbos 74b where he says that there is no makeh b’patish (final hammer blow) in the case of making an oven, because the oven is finished on its own and not as the direct result of human intervention. In the Mishkan, makeh b’patish was only performed via direct action, and the melacha must be similar to the way it was done in the Mishkan in order for one to be held culpable.
One of the differences between the above ways to understand the nature of zoreah is a case where one started to bake bread on Shabbos, and the completion of the baking process occurred after Shabbos. According to the Minchas Chinuch, he would be exempt from bringing a sin offering, because the melacha of baking is determined by its completion, a fact that we learn from the Mishkan. According to the Rashash, however, there would still be a sin offering obligation in this case.
A practical application stemming from the nature of zoreah is found in the Biur Halacha O.C. 336:8. He writes that the law of the Mechaber (author of the Shulchan Aruch, Rav Yosef Karo) enumerated elsewhere that it is forbidden to move a flowerpot from the ground to the table or vice versa is only referring to a flowerpot that has been there for more than a day or two since only after that amount of time is it considered to have taken root. However, with regards to wheat lying on the ground that has not yet taken root (the case discussed in O.C. 336) one is not considered to have cut it off from its source of nutrition by moving it. This psak is in line with the view of the Rashash.
Next week we will discuss the essence of the melacha of zoreah, and the types of intentions that determine one’s obligation.