Is there a Place for Logic in Torah?

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February 19 2006
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The Midrash1 states that the torah was given at dawn, while the mishpatim, laws, were given in the evening. This symbolizes the symbiosis between torah and laws.2 Just as we cannot easily claim that dawn precedes evening or that evening precedes dawn, we cannot accord primacy solely to torah or to mishpatim.


Clearly, the Midrash is treating torah and mishpatim as subcategories of the Torah value system given to Moshe at Mount Sinai. The Midrash does not, however, clarify the distinction between torah and mishpatim. Indeed, the classical commentaries remain mysteriously silent about this distinction, even when both torah and mishpatim are written in the same verse.3 In light of the symbiosis discussed by the Midrash, I will homiletically discriminate between torah and mishpatim, leaving a discussion of the words’ simple meaning for a later date.4


R. Eliyahu Meir Bloch5 eloquently articulates one of the largest intellectual problems that confront serious Torah scholars. He points out that at one extreme the Torah often presents laws with details and distinctions that seem beyond the grasp of human intelligence. At the same time, we find many Torah laws that are tasteful and appealing to our common sense and to our logic-oriented minds. These two extremes seem to provide us with a mixed message: do human logic and common sense really have any place in explaining the significance of Torah laws, or is it the fine details that seem beyond our grasp that are really out of place?


These two extremes, says R. Bloch, spawn two faulty approaches to Torah study. Adherents of the first extreme refuse to acknowledge parallels between Torah and common sense; consequently, they are unable to decide any matter with certainty, since subjective certainty relies on its appeal to common sense. In contrast, adherents of the second extreme attempt to explain the entire Torah in terms of economics, law, sociology, etc.; however, they fail to adequately explain the fine distinctions that are so integral to halakha. R. Bloch names the second approach higgayon ha-mishpati, legal thought.


The correct approach to Torah study, taking into account the existence of both extremes, is a synthesis of appreciation for the Torah’s transcendence with awareness of its innate sensibility. Just as mishpatim were given after torah, we cannot impose our preconceived legal schemata upon the corpus of Torah literature. However, just as night precedes dawn, we cannot ignore the crucial contribution of human logic and law towards our true understanding of torah.


A second homiletic interpretation can be suggested based on the writings of R. Shimon Shkop.6 R. Shkop is bothered by an apparent contradiction between two laws. On the one hand, we are instructed to act stringently when uncertainty arises regarding prohibitions of biblical origin.7 However, we are also instructed to rule leniently in monetary matters. For example, when one litigant claims that he definitely owns the disputed object, and the second litigant says that he perhaps owns it, we award the object to its present holder even if he is the uncertain one. R. Shkop asks if indeed the awardee is uncertain, shouldn’t the possibility of violating the biblical prohibition of theft mandate us to rule stringently and force him to cede the object to his opponent?


R. Shkop suggests that “monetary mishpatim are unlike all the mitzvos of the Torah. Regarding all mitzvos, our main obligation is to fulfill the mitzvah. However, in monetary matters our obligation to fulfill the mitzvah is preceded by a legal obligation to clarify who legally deserves the money. Thus, our lenient rulings in monetary matters stem from their legal, rather than halakhic, status. Once a person legally possesses an object, he cannot be halakhically treated as a thief, even if he is uncertain about his rights to that object.


There is a parallel between the ideas of R. Bloch and R. Shkop. Both suggest that there is a synthesis between legal logic and the transcendence of the Torah. On the intellectual plane, R. Bloch notes that certainty is linked to a logical appreciation of the Torah, while practically, R. Shkop points out that halakhic laws are based on an already present legal status. Both agree, however, that the Torah is the primary determinant of our ultimate values.


1. Shemos Rabbah 30:11, based on Shemos 19:16


2. R. Shlomo Kluger, in his introduction to Sefer Mili d-Nezikin


3. See, for example, Bamidbar 15:16 and Devarim 17:11.


4. R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, in Horeb, defines torah as “fundamental principles relating to mental and spiritual preparation for life,” and mishpatim as “declarations of justice towards human beings.”


5. Shiurei Da’as, vol. 1, p. 7


6. Shaarei Yosher 5:1


7. Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 1:5

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Einayim L'Torah Parshas Mishpatim 5766.

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