The Kashrut Status of Inedible Non-Kosher Food Items

Part II

In the previous issue, we introduced the discussion about ingestible products that contain inedible non-kosher ingredients.  We presented the basic principle that if something non-kosher is inedible or imparts an undesirable taste to a mixture (where the non-kosher comprises minority of the mixture), it does not present a kashrut problem.  We also presented a dispute as to whether inedible food is inherently permissible or whether it is permissible due to the leniency to eat food in an irregular manner.  In this issue, we will continue this discussion and provide some practical applications.

May One Eat Inedible Non-Kosher Food?

The entire discussion about the permissibility of inedible items implies that one may actually eat a non-kosher item that is rendered inedible.  However, there are two comments of the Rishonim that indicate that it is nevertheless prohibited to eat the item.  First, Rabbeinu Asher (c. 1250-1327), Pesachim 2:1, writes that if chametz became inedible and unfit for the consumption of a dog, it is nevertheless prohibited to eat that item on Pesach.  Rabbeinu Asher explains that although the item is inedible, when one decides to eat it, it becomes prohibited.  Second, Rambam (1138-1204), Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 14:11, writes that one is patur (exempt) if one eats non-kosher food that is inedible.  The term "patur" generally connotes an exemption from a biblical prohibition and a violation of rabbinic prohibition.

R. Yonah Landsofer (1678-1712), Kanfei Yonah no. 103, rules that Rambam's opinion is that there is a rabbinic prohibition against eating inedible non-kosher foods and the reason is based on Rabbeinu Asher's prohibition against eating inedible chametz.  When one eats the inedible item, he has indicated that he personally considers it significant and it is now rendered prohibited.  This concept is commonly known as achsh'vei (one has established it as significant).

R. Chizkiah de Silva (1659-1698), P'ri Chadash, Yoreh De'ah 103:1, rules that from a kashrut perspective, it is permissible to eat an inedible non-kosher food item.  The reason why Rambam prohibits eating it is that there is a prohibition against engaging in repulsive activities, including eating or drinking foods that most people would refrain from eating (Rambam, Hilchot Ma'achalot Asurot 17:29).  Eating inedible food is included in the prohibition against engaging in repulsive activities.

P'ri Chadash, Orach Chaim 442:10, does not distinguish between chametz and other prohibitions.  He notes that Rabbeinu Nissim (1320-1380), Commentary to Rif, Pesachim 5b, s.v. Gemara, disagrees with Rabbeinu Asher and maintains that it is permissible to eat chametz that is unfit for the consumption of a dog.  Mishna Berurah 442:43, rules that the concept of achsh'vei is applied to chametz and therefore, it is prohibited to eat inedible chametz.

R. Ya'akov Betzalel Zolty (1920-1982), Mishnat Ya'avetz, Orach Chaim no. 61, provides a distinction between eating inedible chametz and eating inedible non-kosher items.  R. Zolty suggests that the prohibition against eating inedible chametz is not a function of the prohibition against eating chametz, but rather the prohibition against benefitting from chametz.  When one has intent to eat inedible chametz, it regains its status of chametz, even though it is still not considered food.  Since it is prohibited to benefit from chametz, one may not eat it.  Other non-kosher foods that one is permitted to benefit from are not subject to this prohibition.

Exceptions to the Achsh'vei Concept

The concept of achsh'vei may not apply in all situations.  One possible exception is a situation where the inedible food comprises a minority of the mixture.  R. Yehuda L. Graubart (1862-1937), Chavalim BaNe'imim 5:4, rules that achsh'vei does not apply in this situation.  R. Chaim Ozer Grodzenski (1863-1940), Achiezer 3:33:5, presents a similar leniency.  R. Aharon Kotler, Mishnat Rabbi Aharon, Yoreh De'ah no. 17, rules that if the inedible item was intentionally mixed into the food product, the achsh'vei concept is applicable.  [The dispute between R. Grodzenski and R. Kotler is one aspect of their dispute regarding the permissibility of foods containing gelatin that was derived from a non-kosher animal.]

Another possible exception is the situation of one who ingests the inedible item for purposes other than eating it.  R. Yisrael Isserlin (1390-1460), Terumat HaDeshen 1:129, rules that it is permissible to use ink on Pesach that contains chametz because it is not fit for the consumption a dog.  He further states that there is no concern that someone may place the pen in his mouth and ingest some of the ink because we don't apply the concept of achsh'vei when does not have intent to eat the item.  R. Isserlin's ruling is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 442:10 and Mishna Berurah 442:45.

There is a dispute among the poskim whether one can apply R. Isserlin's logic to someone who ingests an inedible item for medicinal purposes.  R. Avraham ben Yehuda Leib (1788-1848), Yad Avraham, Yoreh De'ah 155:3 rules that if someone ingests an inedible non-kosher item for medicinal purposes, the achsh'vei concept does not apply.  R. Aryeh L. Ginsburg (1695-1785), Sha'agat Aryeh no. 75, rules that achsh'vei applies even if one ingests an item for medicinal purposes.  Chazon Ish, op. cit., 116:8, rules that one may ingest pills on Pesach that contain an inedible chametz ingredient.  He claims that the achsh'vei concept does not apply because one's intent is to ingest the medicine and not the chametz.  [The implication of Chazon Ish's statement is that if the active ingredient is chametz, achsh'vei would apply.]  R. Moshe Feinstein, Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:92, rules that achsh'vei does not apply to anything that one ingests for medicinal purposes.

The Concept of not Fit for the Consumption of a Dog

We noted in the previous issue that when something is not fit for human consumption, it is permissible.  Yet, the Gemara, Pesachim 45b, cites a Beraita that states that spoiled bread that is not fit for human consumption, but is still fit for the consumption of a dog must be destroyed before Pesach.  Rabbeinu Nissim (1320-1380), op. cit., 13b, s.v. Tannu Rabanan asks: Why is there a requirement to destroy the spoiled bread?  Shouldn't the fact that it is not fit for human consumption render it permissible?  Rabbeinu Nissim answers that spoiled bread can still be used to ferment dough and therefore, even if it is not fit for human consumption, it must be destroyed before Pesach.

Chazon Ish, op. cit., 116:2 and 116:7, notes that Rambam, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:11, codifies the Beraita that spoiled bread requires destruction if it is fit for canine consumption.  Yet, Rambam, Hilchot Chametz U'Matzah 4:12, rules that an inedible item that contains a chametz ingredient does not have to be destroyed.  He does not require that the item is unfit for canine consumption.  Chazon Ish explains that the requirement that an item be unfit for canine consumption only applies to items that can be used to ferment dough.  Rambam is of the opinion that when the chametz is only a minority of the inedible mixture, it cannot be used to ferment dough and therefore, there is no requirement that it be unfit for canine consumption.

Chazon Ish then queries regarding what is accomplished when the item is not fit for canine consumption:  Does unfit for canine consumption signify that the item can no longer be used to ferment dough or is unfit for canine consumption the standard by which the item is no longer considered food, even if it can produce a positive effect for another food?  Chazon Ish rules that may follow the more lenient latter approach if there are other mitigating factors.

R. Chaim Soloveitchik (1853-1918), Chiddushei HaGrach Al HaShas no. 409, presents an explanation of the concept of unfit for canine consumption that is similar to Chazon Ish's latter approach.  He notes that when a food is unfit for human consumption, the item is inherently prohibited, but there is no (biblical) prohibition against eating it.  When an item is unfit for canine consumption there is no inherent prohibition on the item.  [R. Chaim's comments shed further light on his disagreement with Chavot Da'at's opinion (mentioned in the previous issue) that when something is unfit for human consumption, it is inherently permissible.]