Shechitah: Is it is Mitzvah?

The process of slaughtering an animal or bird so that it may be eaten is known as shechitah.  Shechitah is the slicing of the trachea and the esophagus.  The source for the concept of shechitah is from the verses (Devarim 12:20-21) that state that if one desires to eat meat, it must be slaughtered as commanded.  In this issue, we will discuss whether shechitah is simply a means of rendering the meat as kosher or whether there is a mitzvah of shechitah.

The Nature of Shechitah

Rambam (1138-1204), in his introduction to Mishneh Torah, provides a list of the 613 mitzvot of the Torah.  In Aseh no. 146, Rambam writes that there is a mitzvah to slaughter animals and birds and to eat their flesh.  Ra'avad (c. 1125-1198), ad loc., disagrees and maintains that there is no positive commandment to slaughter.  Rather, there is a prohibition against eating non-slaughtered meat that is implied from the positive directive to slaughter.  R. Yosef Karo (1488-1575) ad loc., explains that Ra'avad does not consider shechitah to be a mitzvah because there is no requirement to eat meat and shechitah is only necessary if one desires to eat meat.  R. Karo asserts that Rambam, who disagrees, is of the opinion that there is a mitzvah to perform shechitah in a situation where there is an interest in eating meat.

A similar dispute appears in Tosafot, Sh'vuot 24a, s.v. Ha'Ochel, but with a slightly different analysis.  Tosafot assert that the Torah's directive to slaughter implies a prohibition against eating meat that was not slaughtered (above and beyond the negative commandment against eating non-slaughtered meat).  They then quote Ritzba who is of the opinion that the directive to slaughter does not imply any type of mitzvah, positive or negative.  Rather, it is a means of rendering the meat of the animal or bird as kosher.

The Beracha as an Indicator of the Nature of Shechitah

One area where the nature of shechitah is relevant is regarding the beracha that is recited upon performing Shechitah.  Rambam, Hilchot Shechitah 1:2, writes that the beracha that is recited is "asher kid'shanu b'mitzvotav v'tzivanu al hashechitah."  This implies that it is the standard beracha that one recites before performing a mitzvah (birkat hamitzvah).  R. David HaLevi Segal (c.1586-1667), Taz, Yoreh De'ah 1:17, suggests that the beracha recited at the performance of shechitah is not a birkat hamitzvah because there is no obligation to perform shechitah.  Rather, the beracha is a beracha that praises G-d for giving us the ability to eat meat.  Taz compares this beracha to the beracha of "L'hachniso B'vrito" that is recited at a b'rit milah, which, according to Taz, is not a birkat hamitzvah, but rather a beracha of praise.  While Taz does not take a direct stand on the nature of shechitah, his position is important in understanding the role of the beracha for those who do not view shechitah as a mitzvah.

In a previous issue, we noted the opinion of R. Yosef D. Soloveitchik (1903-1993) that the beracha of "L'hachniso B'vrito" is not a beracha of praise, but rather a beracha that is recited when there is a change in status.  R. Soloveitchik, Shiurei HaRav, Inyanei Shechitah no. 9, notes that one can apply the same logic to shechitah and suggests that perhaps the beracha can be viewed as a beracha on the change of status from an animal or bird that was previously not kosher and now is kosher.

Taz notes an important difference between the approach that the beracha is a birkat hamitzvah and the approach that it is a beracha of praise.  R. Yitzchak ben Moshe (1180-1250), Ohr Zarua Vol. I no. 367, writes that another person cannot recite the beracha on behalf of the slaughterer unless the other person is also slaughtering at the same time.  Taz explains that one can only recite a birkat hamitzvah on behalf of someone else if the mitzvah is obligatory in nature.  [This was discussed in a previous issue.]  Since shechitah is not obligatory, one may not recite a beracha on behalf of someone else.  However, Taz notes that Ohr Zarua's ruling assumes that the beracha is a birkat hamitzvah.  If it is a beracha of praise, anyone who observes shechitah being performed may recite the beracha.

Another area where the nature of the beracha is relevant is regarding the timing of the beracha.  Rambam, Hilchot Berachot 11:6, writes that if one does not recite a beracha before the performance of shechitah, the opportunity to recite the beracha is forfeited and one may not recite the beracha afterwards.  For this reason, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 19:1, rules that one must recite the beracha on shechitah before the shechitah.  Rama (1520-1572), ad loc., contends that if one is slaughtering an animal that requires a post-mortem inspection to determine whether it is kosher (because of a concern for treifah), one should slaughter without reciting a beracha and then recite the beracha after the inspection determines that the animal is in fact kosher.  R. Shabtai Kohen (1621-1662), Shach 19:3, questions Rama's ruling based on Rambam's principle (Hilchot Berachot 11:5) that one can never recite the beracha after the performance of the mitzvah.  R. Chaim Elazar Shapira (1871-1937), Minchat Elazar 1:19, suggests that Rama's leniency may be specific to the beracha on shechitah, which according to Taz, is a beracha of praise and not a birkat hamitzvah.  Therefore, there is no requirement to recite the beracha prior to the performance of the mitzvah.

Other Practical Differences

There are a number of other practical differences between the approach that shechitah is a mitzvah and the approach that shechitah is simply a means of rendering meat as kosher.  First, the Gemara, Chullin 27a, notes that although the Mishna ad loc., validates certain types of shechitah where the esophagus and trachea were not completely sliced, one must try to slice both tubes in the process.  Rashi, ad loc., s.v. A'Echad, is of the opinion that this requirement is rabbinic in nature.  Ramban, ad loc., s.v. Matnitan, questions whether this requirement is actually biblical in nature.  R. Soloveitchik, Shiurei HaRav no. 10, suggests that the issue may be contingent on whether shechitah is a mitzvah or simply a means of rendering the meat as kosher.  If shechitah is simply a means of rendering the meat as kosher, one cannot entertain the possibility of having a preferred performance and a valid performance on a Torah level.  However, if there is a mitzvah to perform shechitah, it is possible that the Torah demands a preferred level, but validates shechitah if it is not performed in an optimal manner.

Second, the Gemara discusses the permissibility of performing shechitah with a knife that was used for idol worship.  Normally, it is prohibited to benefit from items used for idol worship.  However, the Gemara notes that depending on the health of the animal, slaughtering an animal may not provide a net benefit (slaughtering a healthy animal can decrease its value).  Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 10:1, rules that one may slaughter a healthy animal with such a knife, but one may not slaughter an unhealthy animal.  R. Yonatan Eibeschitz (1690-1764), Kreiti U'Pleiti 10:3, suggests that the entire discussion in the Gemara may depend on a discussion in the Gemara, Rosh HaShanah 28a, whether one is considered to be benefiting from a prohibited item when using that item for performance of a mitzvah.  According to the opinion that it is not considered a form of benefit (mitzvot lav leihanot nitnu), one may even slaughter an unhealthy animal with a knife that was used for idol worship.  R. Shlomo Z. Auerbach (1910-1995), Minchat Shlomo 2:59, suggest that R. Eibeschitz's idea may depend on whether there is an actual mitzvah to slaughter or whether it is simply a means of rendering the meat as kosher.  However, he notes that it is possible that the concept of mitzvot lav leihanot nitnu may even apply to a religious act, even if it is not considered a mitzvah.

Third, the Mishna, Chullin 14a, states that if one slaughters on Shabbat, the meat is kosher.  R. Yehuda Leib Alter (1847-1905), Sefat Emet, Menachot 64a, s.v. V'Afilu, asks: why isn't the shechitah invalidated based on the concept of mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah that states that if one fulfills a mitzvah by violating a transgression, the mitzvah is invalid?  He answers that shechitah is merely a means of rendering the meat as kosher and therefore, the shechitah is not invalid.  R. Natan Gestetner, L'Horot Natan 7:84, suggests that even if there is a mitzvah of shechitah, it is possible to invalidate the mitzvah component without invalidating the resulting permissibility of the meat.  Therefore, if one slaughters on Shabbat, there is no fulfillment of the mitzvah because of mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah, but the meat is nevertheless kosher.