Doubts Relating to Fulfillment of a Mitzvah

The previous two issues discussed doubts relating to Torah law and doubts relating to rabbinic law.  As we noted, the general rule is that one must be stringent on matters relating to Torah law and one may be lenient on matters of doubt relating to rabbinic law.  In this issue, we will discuss matters of doubt relating to the fulfillment of a mitzvah.

Are Positive and Negative Commandments Fundamentally Different?

The Gemara, Berachot 21a, states explicitly that if one has a doubt regarding fulfillment of a biblical mitzvah, one must be stringent and if one has a doubt regarding the fulfillment of a rabbinic mitzvah, one may be lenient.  Yet, a number of Acharonim contend that this rule is not exactly parallel to the rule regarding doubts relating to prohibitions.  We noted in the issue on doubts relating to Torah law that there is a dispute between Rambam and Rashba regarding these doubts. Rambam (1138-1204), Hilchot Tumat Meit 9:12, writes that on a Torah level, one may be lenient in all cases of doubt.  It was the rabbis who instituted that one should be stringent on matters of Torah law and lenient on matters of rabbinic law.  Rashba (1235-1310) Kiddushin 73a, disagrees and maintains that on a Torah level one must be stringent on matters of doubt.

R. Ya'akov Lorberboim (1760-1832) and R. Yosef Teomim (1727-1793) both assume that the dispute between Rambam and Rashba does not apply to positive commandments, but with opposite approaches.  R. Lorberboim, Chavot Da'at, Beit HaSafek (addendum to Yoreh De'ah no. 110) is of the opinion that Rambam agrees that if one is in doubt whether he fulfilled a biblical mitzvah, there is a biblical obligation to be stringent.  He explains that Rambam's opinion is that when the Torah states a law, it does not refer to cases of doubts.  Therefore, when the Torah states to avoid a prohibited item, only items that are certainly prohibited are included in the biblical prohibition.  Similarly, when the Torah states to fulfill a mitzvah, one must fulfill the mitzvah with certainty and not rely on a doubt.  R. Teomim, P'ri Megadim, Eshel Avraham 17:2, assumes that even Rashba agrees that the obligation to be stringent on matters of doubt relating to fulfillment of a biblical mitzvah is only rabbinic in nature.  He notes the statement of the Gemara, Yevamot 7a, that the violation of a negative commandment is more severe than lack of fulfillment of a positive commandment.  For this reason, he suggests that the biblical requirement to be stringent on matters of doubt may only apply to negative commandments, not positive commandments.

The Requirement to Fulfill a Mitzvah with Certainty

The premise of R. Lorberboim's idea is similar to an idea expressed by R. Meir Simcha of Dvinsk (1843-1926), Meshech Chochmah, Shemot 13:10.  R. Meir Simcha notes that if there is a possibility that a certain item contains a prohibition, there is a statistical threshold known as miut hamatzui that exempts one from checking for the prohibited item if the probability of the existence of the prohibition falls below that threshold.  [This was discussed in a previous issue.] If one were to assume that this principle applies to positive commandments, one would be permitted to assume that one's mezuzot are valid as it is very unlikely that something happened to the mezuzot that would invalidate them.  Yet, the Gemara, Yoma 11a, states that one must check one's mezuzot twice every seven years.  R. Meir Simcha explains that if one does not check for a prohibition because the probability of violating the prohibition is below the statistical threshold and one ends up violating the prohibition, one is exempt from all punishment.  However, if one's mezuzot are invalid, one does not fulfill the mitzvah.  Therefore, one should try his utmost to make sure a mitzvah is fulfilled with certainty.

R. Lorberboim's idea is also relevant to a discussion about doubts that are not resolvable.  R. Gershon H. Leiner (The Radziner Rebbe 1839-1891), wrote an essay, Ein HaTecheilet, advocating the use of what he considered to be the authentic techeilet (the blue dye for the tzitzit).  One if his arguments is that even if the techeilet might not be authentic, it is at least a matter of doubt.  Since it is a matter of doubt relating to Torah law, one should be stringent and place the techeilet on one's garment.  He also quotes (page 171) a "famous great rabbi" who remains anonymous who disagreed and felt that one only employs the rule that one must be stringent on matters of doubt in situation where stringency will resolve the doubt.  For example, if one is unsure if he recited Birkat HaMazon, reciting it another time will resolve the doubt and one will know with certainty that the mitzvah was fulfilled.  However, if one places questionable techeilet on one's garment, the doubt is not resolved and there may in fact be a different dye that is the authentic dye for techeilet.  R. Leiner writes a lengthy response defending his position that the rule still applies if the doubt is not resolvable.

The opinion of R. Leiner's challenger seems to be predicated on R. Lorberboim's idea that being stringent on matters of doubt relating to fulfillment of mitzvot is a function of the need to ensure that one fulfills the mitzvah with certainty.  When that is not possible, there is no need to be stringent.  It is interesting to note that R. Teomim, Pri Megadim, Introduction to the Laws of Berachot no. 16, assumes the same position as a R. Leiner's challenger.  It is possible that R. Teomim accepts R. Lorberboim's premise but that it still does not translate to a biblical requirement that one must be stringent on matters of doubt relating to the fulfillment of a mitzvah.

Sfek-Sfeikah and Other Practical Considerations

 There is a concept known as sfek-sfeikah (double doubt), which means that when there are two independent doubts whether one may be lenient, those two doubts can be combined to produce a leniency.  R. Ya'akov Yehoshua Falk (1680-1756), P'nei Yehoshua, Ketuvot 9a, explains that according to Rambam, sfek-sfeikah is based on the fact that after a single doubt, the requirement to be stringent is only rabbinic in nature.  Therefore, the second doubt produces a doubt on rabbinic law and one may be lenient.  Rashba himself, in a responsum (1:401), writes that sfek-sfeikah is based on the principle of rov (one follows the majority of possibilities).

R. Ya'akov Alfandri (c. 1620-1695), Mutzal Me'Eish no. 13, writes that one cannot employ sfek-sfeikah to exempt one from a mitzvah because one must be certain that he fulfilled the mitzvah and sfek-sfeikah does not provide the requisite certainty.  R. Shneur Z. Fradkin (1830-1902), Torat Chesed, Orach Chaim no. 3, writes that R. Alfandri's position is contingent on the dispute between R. Lorberboim and R. Teomim.  According to R. Lorberboim, there is a Torah law that one must be stringent regarding the first doubt and therefore, the second doubt does not allow one to be lenient.  According to R. Teomim, one may be more lenient in applying sfek-sfeikah to fulfillment of a mitzvah than one may be in applying it to prohibitions.  [The laws of sfek-sfeikah are complex and R. Fradkin provides a number of examples where the laws would not apply to fulfillment of a mitzvah.]

There are other issues that may be contingent on the dispute between R. Lorberboim and R. Teomim.  First, R. Yosef Babad (1801-1874), Minchat Chinuch 10:26, notes that for the fulfillment of biblical mitzvot, intent is critical and for rabbinic mitzvot it is not (see Mishna Berurah 60:10).  R. Babad then addresses the case of someone who is fulfilling a mitzvah because of a doubt and did not have proper intent.  Without referencing R. Lorberboim or R. Teomim, he writes that it is contingent on their dispute.  According to R. Lorberboim, the mitzvah performed because of a doubt is biblically mandated and intent is critical.  According to R. Teomim, it is a rabbinic mitzvah and intent is not critical.

Second, there is a principle that one who is involved in a mitzvah is exempt from other mitzvot (Sukkah 25a).  R. Meir Auerbach, Imrei Binah, Orach Chaim no. 13, discusses the case of someone who is involved in a mitzvah because of a doubt and whether it exempts him from a mitzvah that he is certainly obligated to perform.  At first, he notes that it is contingent on whether the obligation to perform mitzvot based on a doubt is biblical or rabbinic in nature.  However, he notes that there are other considerations.