Arvut: The Responsibility to Ensure that Other Jews Observe Mitzvot

In the previous two issues, we discussed the responsibility of parents and others to ensure that children observe positive and negative commandments.  In this issue, we will discuss the concept mentioned in the Gemara, Sanhedrin 27b, that each Jew is responsible for the observance of mitzvot of other Jews.  The concept is known as arvut, from the word areiv (guarantor), and it means that every Jew is considered a guarantor for the observance of the mitzvot of others.

Arvut for Negative Commandments

The Torah (Vayikra 19:17) records a mitzvah to rebuke one's friend for any transgression he might violate.  This is known as the mitzvah of tochachah.  How does the mitzvah of tochachah relate to the concept of arvut?  R. Eliezer ben Shmuel of Metz (d. 1175), Sefer Yerei'im no. 223, writes that the mitzvah of tochachah is more expansive than arvut because arvut only applies when one has the ability to prevent someone from violating a prohibition.  The mitzvah of tochachah applies even if one cannot prevent the violation.  Rabbeinu Yonah (d. 1263), Sha'arei Teshuva 3:72, assumes the opposite approach in writing that the mitzvah of tochachah is a function of the broader concept of arvut.

R. Avraham Yitzchak Kook (1865-1935), Tov Ro'i 1:176, notes an important difference between the approach that arvut is included in tochachah and the approach that tochachah is included in arvut.  If arvut is included in tochachah, there is a positive commandment to prevent the violation of transgressions and one who has the ability to prevent a violation and fails to do so only violates the commandment passively.  If tochachah is included in arvut, one who has the ability to prevent a violation and doesn't do so is tantamount to one who violates the transgression personally.  It is considered an active violation.  R. Kook notes that the practical difference between the two approaches is in a case where trying to prevent the transgression will cause embarrassment to the violator.  The Gemara, Berachot 20a, states that kavod habriyot (respect for human dignity) is a factor with regards to passive violations but not active violations of biblical law.  If failure to prevent a violation is passive, kavod habriyot overrides the mitzvah of tochachah.  If failure to prevent is an active violation, kavod habriyot is not a factor.

R. Yosef Teomim (1727-1793), Teivat Gomeh, Chakirah no. 4, alludes to another difference between the two approaches.  Rama (1520-1572), Yoreh De'ah 157:1, writes that one may not violate a negative commandment even if it is to prevent losing one's entire fortune.  There is a discussion among the Acharonim (see R. Akiva Eger's glosses to Rama ad loc.) whether Rama's ruling distinguishes between negative and positive commandments or whether it distinguishes between active and passive violations.  R. Teomim notes that if one assumes the latter, one must then discuss whether failure to prevent someone from violating a transgression is considered a passive violation or an active violation in determining how much money one must spend to prevent another from violating a transgression.

Arvut for Positive Commandments

There are a number of areas where arvut has ramifications for positive commandments.  First, R. Avraham Gombiner (c. 1633-1683) seems to be of the opinion that the obligation of arvut is more important than fulfilling one's own mitzvah in a preferred manner.  R. Gombiner, Magen Avraham 671:1, rules that if one has the exact amount of oil to fulfill mehadrin on Chanukah and one's neighbor doesn't have any oil, one should give some oil to the neighbor and both will fulfill the basic mitzvah.  R. Chaim Sofer (1822-1886), Machaneh Chaim 3:19, explains that Magen Avraham's ruling is based on the concept of arvut.  Magen Avraham 658:12, also rules that if one owns an etrog in a place where the community has one available for everyone to use and there is another community that doesn't have any etrogim, he should send his private etrog to the other community and fulfill his obligation with his community's etrog.  R. Shammai Gross, Shevet HaKehati, Orach Chaim 5:108, explains that Magen Avraham's ruling is based on the idea that the etrog owner's obligation of arvut demands that he forgo the preferred method of fulfilling the mitzvah in order that other people should be able to fulfill the basic requirement.  R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad (1834-1909), Torah Lishmah no. 182, contends that one should only forgo the preferred method of fulfilling a mitzvah if it will enable an entire community to fulfill a mitzvah.  Therefore, he rules that the owner of the etrog should send the etrog to the community that does not have one.  However, one should not give up one's oil that is designated for a mehadrin fulfillment in order to allow someone else to fulfill the basic mitzvah.

Second, the Gemara, Shabbat 4a, rules that one may not violate a minor transgression in order to prevent someone else from violating a greater transgression.  Based on this principle, some Acharonim (see Magen Avraham 655:1) rule that if one was negligent in obtaining an etrog before Sukkot and a friend who lives outside of the techum (the Shabbat and Yom Tov boundary) has the ability to send him the etrog on Yom Tov via a non-Jewish messenger, the friend should not send the etrog and violate the rabbinic prohibition of amira l'nochri in order to benefit someone else in fulfillment of a mitzvah.  Mishna Berurah, Sha'ar HaTziyun 655:5, questions this ruling.  He posits that the obligation of arvut demands that one should view the friend who owns the etrog as being in the same position as the one who has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah.  Since one may ask a non-Jew to bring an etrog from outside the techum in order to fulfill one's own mitzvah (see Mishna Berurah 655:2), one may also ask a non-Jew to bring the etrog in order to allow someone else to fulfill the mitzvah.

Reciting a Beracha on Behalf of Someone Else

The most popular application of arvut is the concept mentioned in the Gemara, Rosh HaShanah 29a, that one who already fulfilled a mitzvah may recite a beracha on behalf of someone who has not yet fulfilled a mitzvah.  Rashi, ad loc., s.v. Af Al Pi, and Chutz, explains that this is based on the concept of arvut.  Employment of arvut is necessary in order to satisfy the principle in the Mishna, Rosh HaShanah 29a, that one who is not obligated to perform a mitzvah cannot perform the mitzvah on behalf of others.  Without the concept of arvut, one could have argued that someone who already fulfilled the mitzvah is no longer obligated to perform the mitzvah and therefore, cannot perform it on behalf of others.  The concept of arvut states that if this individual is needed to assist someone else in the performance of a mitzvah, he is indeed obligated to perform the mitzvah.

If the mitzvah is not obligatory, one cannot assist someone else by reciting the beracha on his behalf.  One application of this idea is stated by the Gemara, Rosh HaShanah 29a, that one who is not eating may not recite a beracha on food for someone else.  Rashi, ad loc., s.v. Chutz, explains that while there is an obligation to recite a beracha if one eats, there is no obligation to eat.  Therefore, one cannot employ arvut.  Another application of this idea is provided by Rama, Orach Chaim 589:6, regarding mitzvot of an optional nature.  According to Ashkenazi tradition a woman may recite a beracha on a time-bound positive mitzvah even though women are exempt from these mitzvot.  However, Rama writes that because she is not obligated to perform the mitzvah, there is no arvut and someone who already fulfilled the mitzvah cannot recite the beracha on her behalf.  As such, a woman who missed listening to shofar at the Rosh HaShanah services should recite the beracha herself if someone who already fulfilled the mitzvah blows shofar on her behalf.