The Subject of the Beracha

In Maseches Pesachim daf 7a, Rav Yehudah teaches us “habodek tzarich sheyevarech”, that we say a birkas hamitzvah on bedikas chametz. Why would we have thought otherwise? The Ritva explains that we would have surmised that no beracha is said on bedikas chametz because bedikah itself is not a mitzvah, but merely a hechsher mitzvah for the subsequent bi’ur chametz, which fulfills the mitzvas aseh of “tashbisu”. Bedikah would then be comparable to other hechsherei mitzvah, such as making tefillin or tying tzitzis, for which we do not say a beracha, based on the rule that any mitzvah action which does not actually fulfill the mitzvah (“lav gmar mitzvasah”) does not require a beracha (Menachos 42b). A similar conclusion would arise from the machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos at the very beginning of Maseches Pesachim, where Rashi explains that the purpose of bedikas chametz is to prevent a violation of bal yera’eh and bal yematzei, and Tosfos holds that it is to forestall any possibility of violating the issur of achilas chametz. According to both Rashi and Tosfos, bedikas chametz is not inherently a mitzvah, but is merely a preparation undertaken in order to avoid violating an issur at a later time, and as such, should certainly not require a beracha.

Given this strong formulation of the ‘havah amina’ not to say a beracha on bedikas chametz, we must examine the maskana of Rav Yehuda – why do we say a beracha on bedikah if the act of bedikah is merely a hechsher mitzvah? Rabbenu David, in his commentary to this sugya, suggests two fundamentally different understandings of this halacha. His first explanation is that the beracha in fact relates not to the bedikah per se but rather to the biur chametz, which is “gmar mitzvasah”. We say the beracha before the bedikah not because the bedikah itself requires a beracha, but rather because it serves as the beginning of the process of biur. The Rosh likewise explains that the beracha is made on the bedikah qua the beginning of a process which culminates in bi’ur. As noted by Rabbenu David, the language of the beracha, “al bi’ur chametz”, seems to support this understanding, indicating that the true subject of the beracha is the ultimate bi’ur and not the immediate bedikah.

However, Rabbenu David offers a second possibility as well, suggesting that the beracha indeed applies to the bedikah qua bedikah. Although the bedikah is not a kiyum mitzvah med’oraysa, he suggests that on the derabanan plane, bedikas chametz was enacted as an independent mitzvah. Bedikas chametz is thus indeed “gmar mitzvasah” - of the mitzvas aseh mederabanan of bedikas chametz. According to this understanding, we might explain the language of “al biur chametz” in accordance with the Maharam Chalavah (Pesachim 7a), who interpreted the word “biur” as referring not to destruction but to bedikah and cleaning, as the word is used in Devarim 26:13.

Practical Ramifications

A clear nafka mina between these two understandings would be the appropriateness of a beracha in a scenario in which bedikah was done properly but no chametz was found and the process did not culminate in an act of biur chametz. According to Rabbenu David’s first explanation, any beracha recited on such a bedikah would be a beracha levatalah, and we would be required to take pains to avoid being trapped by such a scenario. Indeed, the Riaz (Rif daf 4a) quotes the opinion of the Sefer HaPardes, who holds that one should not recite the beracha until one actually finds a piece of chametz. Alternatively, many Rishonim record a minhag to hide chametz in the house before the bedikah in order to insure that the beracha is not being said in vain. This minhag is codified by the Rema (Orach Chaim 432:2), and is common practice. Either of these two strategies stems from the understanding that the true subject of the beracha is the ultimate biur chametz, and therefore the beracha is only justified if chametz is actually found and destroyed. However, Maharam Chalavah, whom we have quoted above as following Rabbenu David’s second understanding, rejects the aforementioned custom of setting out chametz to be discovered during bedikah. He argues that the beracha relates to the very act of bedikah, and regardless of whether any chametz is actually found, the act of bedikah is itself a mitzvah.

There is some ambiguity regarding which of these understandings is accepted halacha lemaaseh. The Rema concludes that although the minhag is to set out chametz before the bedikah, this is not required me’ikar hadin, and the beracha would still be valid if no chametz was found. This would seem to imply that the beracha relates to an independent mitzvah of bedikah, and this is in fact the first explanation offered by the Mishnah Berurah (432:13). However, the Mishnah Berurah also quotes the explanation of the Taz (432:4), who assumes that the beracha must relate to an actual biur chametz, and explains that even if no hidden chametz is found during the bedikah, the beracha is justified because one sets aside the known chametz to be burned on Erev Pesach morning (after taking some for breakfast). We thus cannot conclusively rule out either understanding of the nature of the beracha on bedikas chametz.

Two types of Bedikas Chametz

Rambam (Hilchos Chametz Umatzah 3:6) holds that one who neglected to do bedikah until after Pesach is obligated to do bedikah then, but without a beracha. The Rambam then holds that bedikah performed before or on Pesach is worthy of a beracha, but bedikah done after Pesach is not. What is the logic behind this distinction? At the outset of our discussion, we pointed to the birkas hamitzvah as a litmus test for distinguishing a kiyum mitzvah from a hechsher mitzvah. An act performed with a beracha must itself be a mitzvah (or an integral part of a mitzvah), while an act performed without a beracha would be characterized as a mere preparation for fulfillment of some future mitzvah or avoidance of some future issur. Applying this insight to the Rambam, we would conclude that there are ‘two dinim’, two qualitatively different types of bedikas chametz. Bedikah performed before or on Pesach is an integral part of the mitzvah of bi’ur or an independent mitzvah (depending on which of Rabbenu David’s two formulations we accept). After Pesach, however, neither the mitzvah of tashbisu nor any other of the mitzvos hachag are applicable, and the bedikah performed then is not a maaseh mitzvah, but rather a hechsher for avoiding the issur of chametz she’avar alav hapesach, and is therefore not worthy of a beracha.

Similarly, the Meiri (Pesachim 6a) and other Rishonim hold that one who leaves home before the night of the fourteenth of Nisan and performs the bedikah early must omit the beracha. This opinion is accepted as halacha lemaaseh by the Rema (436:2). The Rema’s commentators explain that this position likewise assumes the existence of two types in bedikas chametz. The Mishnah Berurah (436:4), based on Rabbenu David’s first understanding, explains that on Erev Pesach we view bedikah as the beginning of bi’ur, because whatever chametz is discovered will be destroyed the next morning. When bedikah is done early, however, any chametz discovered will probably be eaten in the significant time remaining before Pesach, and therefore the bedikah cannot be viewed as a part of the mitzvah of bi’ur, but merely as a strategy to avoid the future prohibition of owning chametz on Pesach. Alternatively, the Shulchan Aruch Harav (436:1) interprets this psak based on Rabbenu David’s second understanding, and explains that bedikah on the night of the fourteenth of Nisan is considered a mitzvah derabanan because it is being done in the way the Chachamim decreed. Bedikah earlier than the night of the fourteenth is certainly obligatory, but since it is not being done in the manner prescribed by Chazal, it would be seen as merely a hechsher mitzvah for the prohibitions of Pesach and not a maaseh mitzvah. While the Mishnah Berurah and the Shulchan Aruch Harav disagree in their understanding of the nature of bedikah in its proper time, they agree in characterizing timely bedikah and early bedikah as two qualitatively different halachic performances.

Another example of two types of bedikas chametz is found in the Magen HaElef (436:9), who holds that one who has no living quarters on the night of the fourteenth of Nisan must do a bedikah of his pockets, but without a beracha. He assumes that bedikah of a home is a maaseh mitzvah (see below for further elucidation of this assumption), but a bedikah which does not focus on a particular location is merely a hechsher mitzvah of destroying that chametz or avoiding the possibility of averah.

The Effect of Bedikas Chametz

We mentioned earlier Rabbenu David’s second opinion, which posits that bedikas chametz represents a kiyum mitzvah mederabanan regardless of whether or not it leads to the destruction of any chametz. The simplest way to understand this opinion is that although bedikas chametz without actually finding chametz has no effect, one has fulfilled a mitzvah by performing a maaseh bedikah. However, we can suggest a different understanding of the function of bedikas chametz, based on an enigmatic comment of the Magen Avraham. Rema (Yoreh Deah 127:3), referring to a scenario in which it is unclear whether bedikah has been done, characterizes this situation as one without a chezkas issur. Magen Avraham (437:8) disagrees, arguing that since we know that bedikah was certainly not yet performed before the night of the fourteenth of Nisan, and there is a chezkas issur. The Mekor Chaim (end of Siman 437) rises to the defense of the Rema, and argues that bedikas chametz is only required because of the possibility of hidden chametz, but since it is also possible that there is no chametz in the house, there is certainly no chezkas issur of chametz. How would the Magen Avraham respond to this argument? Perhaps he would have us focus not on the chametz which may or may not be found in the home, but on the home itself. The mitzvah of bedikas chametz is not to destroy chametz, nor is it to perform a maaseh bedikah, but rather it is to convert the home into a “bayis baduk”, a home which is certified chametz-free. Chazal required us to live on Pesach in a home which has been checked for chametz, and therefore until we know that the house has been searched, the house has a chezkas issur, a status quo of eino baduk. If so, perhaps the “gmar mitzvasah” which justifies the beracha on bedikas chametz is not merely the maaseh bedikah, but the effect of changing the status of the home and creating a “bayis baduk”.

Further support for this understanding could be brought from the opinion, quoted above from the Magen HaElef, that a beracha is only made on searching a home. If the cheftza of bedikas chametz is the home rather than the chametz, then it is understandable that the kiyum mitzvah would not be present when there is no home to search. This understanding also seems to underlie the opinion quoted by the Ran (Rif Pesachim daf 4a) that one who has multiple homes and speaks after searching the first home must recite another beracha on the second home. The Ran himself rejects this opinion, arguing that even if one has many homes, searching them is only one mitzvah. The first opinion must assume, then, that each home is an independent mitzvah. This is assumption is unjustifiable if the focus of the mitzvah of bedikas chametz is the status of the chametz or the action of the gavra. If, however, the focus of the bedikah is the home, then each home represents an independent obligation of bedikah, and requires its own birkas hamitzvah if the previous birkas hamitzvah has been interrupted.

We may suggest that this possible understanding of bedikas chametz as focused on the home finds its roots in the Torah’s description of the Pesach experience. The original Pesach was exclusively about the home. We were commanded to accentuate the unique status of a Jewish home with the dam korban pesach demarcating the boundary between the home and the world, and we were required to maintain exclusive focus on the home throughout – “ish lo yetzei mepesach beiso ad boker.” The halachos of pesach doros continue this theme. The korban pesach represents the family unit of the home (“seh leveis avos”), and we eat it while focusing on the home (“lo totzi min habayis min habasar chutzah”). Pesach represents the very core of our identity as Jews, and this identity is rooted in the unique values and atmosphere of the Jewish home. Every year, we commence the observance of Pesach by doing a bedikah of the home, by removing all that which chametz represents, and creating a status of a true Jewish home, certified free of base values and corrupting influences. We then bring the korban pesach into our house, which transforms our home into a mikdash me’at, and we celebrate the glorious kedusha of a Jewish home and the Jewish people. May we be zocheh to see this beauty manifest in our homes and communities, and to offer the korban pesach, the korban of the Jewish home, in the rebuilt Yerushalayim.

Notes:
1 See also Rabbenu David there, who adds a second explanation for the havah amina not to say a beracha on Bedikas Chametz. He suggests that since bedikah is a mitzvah derabanan, the beracha on bedikah is subject to the machlokes amoraim in Maseches Succah (45b-46a) as to whether we say a beracha on a mitzvah derabanan, and Rav Yehudah is deciding in favor of the opinion that a mitzvah derabanan requires a beracha. (Rav Yehuda is then consistent with his opinion, in Succah daf 46a, that we make a beracha on netilas lulav for all seven days.)
2 The question of whether Rashi and Tosfos would agree that there is a positive mitzvah of bi’ur chametz (in the absence of bitul) is a complex one, which we cannot properly address here. See Rashi Pesachim 4b s.v. bebitul be’alma, Tosfos there s.v. med’oraysa, Ramban there with the comments of Rav Issar Zalman Meltzer, Rosh there siman 10, and Mordechai siman 533.
3 Rabbenu David would explain the gemara in Menachos 42b as saying only that we do not recite a beracha on a hechsher mitzvah in addition to saying a beracha on the mitzvah, but it is perfectly acceptable to say the beracha on the mitzvah itself before beginning the preparatory stages, so long as that stage is not distant from the culmination of the kiyum.
4 One might also suggest that the subject of the beracha is primarily the maaseh bedikah, but the language of biur is used to include the bittul chametz which follows (or preceeds – see Rambam Hilchos Berachos 11:15) the bedikah.
5 The Riaz rejects the suggestion of the Pardes on similar grounds.
6 In a scenario where one possesses no known chametz, or sets aside chametz but plans to eat it all for breakfast on Erev Pesach, the Taz would seemingly not allow the beracha to be said. The language of the Rema himself is intriguing – “dedaas kol adam im haberacha leva’er im nimtza.” This may indicate that he holds like neither explanation offered by his commentators, but rather that although the subject of the beracha is indeed the biur chametz, it is permissible to make a beracha upon attempting to fulfill a mitzvah even if that attempt may turn out to be unnecessary. However, this is not consistent with our general assumptions about hilchos berachos, and therefore it may be more reasonable to assume that the Rema held like one of the explanations given by the Mishnah Berurah, and this phrase is merely explaining why the words “al biur chametz” are justified, and not why the beracha itself is justified.
7 Although generally the omission of a birkas hamitzvah indicates a doubtful obligation, in the cases we will analyze, the Rishonim are dealing with obligations which are clearly spelled out in Shas, and their formulations imply that we are omitting the beracha not out of doubt, but because we are dealing with a qualitatively inferior obligation.
8 This possibility is assumed by the Noda Beyehudah (Tinyana Orach Chaim 60).
9 The Ritva (Pesachim 6a) holds that a beracha is recited when the bedikah is done within thirty days before Pesach, but not if done earlier. This stance could not fit the Mishnah Berurah’s explanation, as even within thirty days of Pesach there remains plenty of time to eat chametz, but could easily be explained by a slight modification of the Shulchan Aruch Harav’s logic. Within thirty days, since the de’oraysa obligation of learning hilchos Pesach applies, the mitzvah derabanan of bedikas chametz is also in force. Before this time, however, the mitzvos hachag do not yet apply, and bedikah is obligatory only as a strategy for avoiding the pitfall of having chametz in one’s house when Pesach arrives.
10 This approach may be relevant in understanding the sugya in Pesachim daf 9 – 10. See the Ravad there (Rif daf 5a). The tension between the chametz and the home as the focus of bedikas chametz may be a factor in many sugyot in the first perek of Maseches Pesachim.
It should be noted that an entirely different approach to understanding the effect of bedikas chametz emerges from the Yerushalmi in the beginning of Maseches Pesachim. Rabbi Mana explains that bedikah is done on the night of the fourteenth of Nisan based on the pasuk “ushemartem es hayom hazeh”, which he interprets as “aseh sheyehu hayom vehalayla meshumarin”. According to this Yerushalmi, the purpose of bedikas chametz is none of the possibilities we have mentioned (to destroy chametz, to merely perform a maaseh bedikah, or to effect the status of a searched home) but rather a kiyum med’oraysa of shemirah, active vigilance, which characterizes the entire day. This Yerushalmi may also be relevant for understanding the opinion of the Ravad (Rif daf 1a) who requires bedikah to commence just before nightfall.