The Mishnah counts the fifteenth of Av among the happiest days of the year, when the daughters of Jerusalem would go out to dance in the vineyards in borrowed white garments, so that those who had none would not be embarrassed (Ta'anit 26b). The Talmud adds that they called out to the young men in competing voices, each group urging a different quality upon them (Ta'anit 31a). Some qualities were put forward as significant, then, while others were equalized by design. What must be presented, and what may be left unsaid, in the making of a match is a question the halakhic literature takes up at length.

The Obligation to Speak

One of the most consequential, controversial, and complex aspects of the laws of lashon hara (harmful speech) is the one known as to'elet, or "purpose." This notion indicates that when information is necessary to a third party for that individual's protection, it is not only permissible to relate the information, it is obligatory. Consequential, then, in that with the presence of this idea, an action flips from forbidden to mandatory. Controversial, not in its existence, which is undisputed, but in its application, which is resistant to generalized legislation and is often dependent on painstakingly considered judgment.

One of the *dayanim* (rabbinical judges) in nineteenth-century Vilna, R. Yisrael Isser Isserlein (*Pitchei Teshuvah, Orach Chayim* 156), wrote that while so many spoke forcefully about the prohibition of *lashon hara*, an equally important issue is neglected: the failure to speak when innocent people are at risk of harm. Similarly, R. Moshe Shternbuch (*Resp. Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot* I, 558) expresses in forceful terms the pressing need to be well versed in the intricate details of *lashon hara* regulation; as severe a prohibition as *lashon hara* is, he observes, neglecting to inform when necessary can be a violation of equal or greater severity. Thus, as well, the complexity.

This is all particularly relevant when the question of a potential *shiddukh* (match) is raised. The stakes are unusually high: on the one side, failing to disclose relevant information can wreak extreme and ongoing harm upon an unknowing marriage partner; on the other, inaccurate or irrelevant information can unfairly derail not only the match currently under discussion, but all future possibilities for this individual. Two planes are involved: how much must one reveal to a potential spouse prior to marriage, or even earlier, and how much must be revealed by a third party, if the one being dated does not directly reveal it, or if the third party is asked first? While the principle of *to'elet* is undisputed, judgment is called upon in order to decide what enters that category, considering the risk of passing on information that is false, subjective, exaggerated, outdated, or irrelevant.

The Question of Timing

The dating process adds a further element: timing. Even where certain data should be conveyed, it may be unclear when. To do so too early may place undue emphasis on an item which, considered within a broader perspective, would diminish in importance. In the language of many *poskim* (halakhic decisors), premature revelation is dangerous because before the couple has had a chance to meet, *kol davar katan mekalkel*, any small matter will damage the prospect (see *Kehillot Ya'akov, Yevamot* #38; *Resp. Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim* IV, 118, and *Even HaEzer* IV, 32:4; R. Tzvi Shpitz, *Mishpetei HaTorah* I, 91). The potential date may assume, why should I go out with this "flawed" person, when there are so many "perfect" people out there awaiting me? Once the two have had the opportunity to see the appealing qualities each has, negative information can be evaluated in a wider context, whether or not that context is more objective being open to debate, though it is certainly different.

Even the familiar yardstick of *ve-ahavta le-re'akha kamokha* (love your fellow as yourself) is difficult to apply here. One might think, if it were me, or my daughter, I would demand all the information in advance, and thus I owe that information to others. Many happily married people, however, are deeply grateful that certain facts were not relayed too early, as they would have interfered with a very successful *shiddukh* to the detriment of all involved; such people would argue that treating others as they would want to be treated would mean *not* revealing information too soon. Timing is also affected by the cultural norms for the pace of a relationship and the nuances of an individual *shiddukh*, and it is only relevant where delay might make a difference; if the issue is one that will almost definitely interfere, delay will only cause pain to all involved and incur egregious violations of *ona'at devarim*, verbal mistreatment (see R. Yitzchak Eizik Silber, *Mishpetei HaShalom*, p. 251). A related complexity: a third party who does not appreciate that a legitimate delay is under way may assume the subject is failing to disclose when that is not the case, and may interfere in a very damaging way (see *Zera Chaim*, p. 337; R. Binyamin Cohen, *Chelkat Binyamin* to *Chafetz Chaim*, p. 364, who distinguishes between one who is asked and one who is not).

Prevention of harm is certainly enough reason to mandate disclosure, and there is a further consideration particular to the transactional nature of the marriage commitment. Nondisclosure can constitute a violation of *geneivat da'at*, the creation of a false impression, even where the information would not have stopped the *shiddukh*. If the information is material to the point that one party would have refused the marriage had it been known, then together with the violation of *ona'ah* (misrepresentation) there is the possibility that the marriage itself is a *mekach ta'ut*, a mistaken transaction, and is null and void (see *Kiddushin* 50a; *Sefer Chasidim* #507, with *Mekor Chesed* of R. Reuven Margoliyot; *Even HaEzer* 61:1; *Resp. Achiezer* 27:3).

What follows makes no claim toward comprehensiveness or authority. The hope is that in surveying some of the conclusions of the *poskim*, a background will be created to give context to the questions that need to be asked. Perhaps more than in other areas of *halakhah*, judgment and situational assessment will often determine whether a discussion is mandated, encouraged, allowed, or resolutely forbidden.

General Principles

The *Chafetz Chaim*, in determining the standards for *to'elet*, mentions direct applications to *shiddukhim* (*Hilkhot Rekhilut, Klal* 9, *tziyur* 3). Addressing a third party, he writes that if a couple is about to marry, it is appropriate to inform one of them of a major flaw in the other, including in this category heretical beliefs and hidden illnesses. He is quick to note traits clearly outside the grouping, offering as an example one who is naive and unaware of the guile of others; such a characteristic is apparently not sufficiently objectively problematic to merit an unsolicited revelation. Further, it is wrong to relate that the young man is an inferior Torah scholar: it is the burden of the young woman's family to research this area, to have him tested by competent scholars, and if they fail to do so, they accept responsibility for the consequences, *ihu afsid anafsheih*, he brought the loss upon himself (see R. Moshe Kaufman, *Zera Chaim*, p. 436).

Some general guidelines emerge. A clear negative impact on an unwitting potential spouse mandates unsolicited intervention by a third party. Not all attributes that could be viewed negatively meet that threshold. And if an attribute could be investigated by the potential mate, or by the advocates of that mate, and is not, the responsibility falls on them and the third party need not volunteer involvement.

That last point requires adjustment in the modern context, since a young woman concerned about Torah scholarship does not necessarily have the ability to have a young man "tested" as was once the practice. (See *Zera Chaim*, ibid., who also notes that where the parents were charged with the research and did so inadequately, it may not be fair to assign responsibility for accepting the loss to the young woman herself.) Alternatively, as many authorities have perceived, one who is asked about this quality should understand what the family is genuinely concerned with: a future *posek* or *rosh yeshivah*; one respected by his peers; one who takes his religious obligations seriously; one who establishes time for Torah studies; one who is analytically gifted; or all of the above. If the question is properly understood, sometimes a daunting task, the one being asked can answer appropriately (see R. Nissim Karelitz, *Chut HaShani, Shemirat HaLashon* 7:1).

From the perspective of the questioner, the *Chafetz Chaim* confirms that it is his or her prerogative to ask, despite the fact that this may prompt the respondent to say negative things (*Hilkhot Lashon Hara, Klal* 4:11, with *Be'er Mayim Chaim*), to ask about whatever they consider important without limitation, and to ask multiple people if doing so contributes to clarity (see *Zera Chaim*, p. 442). He further requires that the questioner make clear that his motives are for the *to'elet* of a *shiddukh*, asserting that otherwise the justifiable intent may not attach to the third party, who may then relay negative information without the validation of necessity. (That assumption is questioned by R. Shternbuch, *Resp. Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot* III, 479. As to the answerer, R. Ovadiah Yosef, cited in *Yalkut Yosef, Hilkhot Kibbud Av va-Eim*, p. 495, held that where the inquiry is not about an issue of consequence, the license to alter the truth for the sake of peace, *Yevamot* 65b, would apply; whether that is wise bears determination, and some note it may risk *geneivat da'at*, see *Mishpetei HaShalom*, p. 249, and *Sefer Chasidim* #388.)

Medical Matters and Related Issues

The responsa literature addresses a wide range of medical questions, and while the rulings vary considerably, the reasoning tends to turn on a few recurring criteria: the likelihood that the condition will actually affect the marriage, the likelihood of recurrence where a condition has receded, the risk of transmission to children, and whether the matter is one that would trouble most people or only some.

R. Baruch Reuven Shlomo Shlesinger assumes the standard to be that anything the spouse could conceivably never have to confront over the course of a marriage need not be disclosed (*Resp. Birkat Reuven Shlomo* IV, 69). R. Nissim Karelitz, noting how difficult recurrence is to predict, holds that an illness likely to return must be revealed, and states as a principle that any condition that may interfere with *shalom bayit*, domestic harmony, must be disclosed (*Chut HaShani* 7:1, p. 372). R. Moshe Shternbuch requires disclosure of emotional and psychological problems, excepting an issue rooted in a cause no longer present that carries no risk of recurrence, as attested to by outstanding doctors (*Resp. Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot* II, 624); R. Meir Brandesdorfer adds that any lingering doubt about recurrence makes concealment deceptive, and that conditions not serious enough to invalidate a marriage often merit disclosure regardless (*Resp. Keneh Bosem* I, 121). Elsewhere R. Shternbuch works through a long list of ailments, ruling variously that a third party must reveal even if unasked; that revelation is required only if asked; that only the potential spouse need reveal; or that nothing need be revealed (*Resp. Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot* I, 879; see also *Resp. Shevet HaLevi* VI, 205, and *Resp. Mishneh Halakhot* V, 254). On fertility, R. Moshe Feinstein held that a condition likely to resolve need not be revealed (*Resp. Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer* III, 27, a debatable point, and see *Mishpetei HaShalom*, p. 251), while R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg was emphatic that definite infertility must be revealed by a third party even if unasked (*Resp. Tzitz Eliezer* XVI, 4; a doctor's professional obligations of confidentiality raise separate questions outside the scope of this treatment, and see R. Ya'akov Breisch, *Resp. Chelkat Ya'akov, Even HaEzer* 79). A condition with an even chance of transmission to a child must likewise be revealed (*Resp. Iggerot Moshe* IV, *Even HaEzer* 73:2).

As a general guideline, Drs. Yoel and Chana Katan cite R. Menashe Klein that one need not volunteer a condition that would not bother the majority of people, and R. Yitzchak Zilberstein's advice to be *megaleh tefach u-mekhaseh tefachayim*, revealing a handbreadth and concealing two: reveal a little at first, and, having indicated that there is more to know, allow the potential mate to probe further (*Techumin* XXV, pp. 47-58).

Outside the medical realm, other issues considered by *poskim*, subject to the same range of responses, include whether either party is a convert (*Resp. Minchat Yitzchak* VII, 4; *Resp. Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot* II, 627; *Resp. Tzitz Eliezer* XVII, 49:3); considerations of halakhic status not sufficient to prohibit the relationship (*Resp. Shevet HaLevi* IV, 162; *Resp. Minchat Yitzchak* VII, 107; *Resp. Imrei Yosher* 114:8); the moral history of the young man or young woman (*Resp. Chavatzelet HaSharon* 63; *Resp. Maharsham* VII, 152; *Resp. Iggerot Moshe, Orach Chayim* II, 118) and of the parents (*Resp. Minchat Yitzchak* V, 44); and the past medical history of the parents (R. Chanina Yisrael Rotenberg, *Divrei Chayil* 23:2; R. Chaim Kanievsky, quoted in *Ma'aseh Rav* I, ch. 7, #12; *Beit Chatanim*, p. 17, n. 1). R. Yitzchak Ya'akov Weiss (*Resp. Minchat Yitzchak* VI, 139) addresses a young man who committed a major sin in his youth: if he did so only once, nothing has been heard recently regarding any such behavior, he now leads an exemplary life, and he has repented, it need not be revealed; if he sinned repeatedly, it must be disclosed, and even if he has repented, caution is necessary and the sin should be revealed. The evaluation of whether another person has repented is itself, of course, a difficult assessment.

Solicited and Unsolicited Information

In many of the above cases, a distinction is drawn between whether or not the third party is asked. If the justification to reveal is premised on the mandate to protect the innocent from harm, that would seem irrelevant; the information is either necessary for protection or it is not.

One approach assumes there are objective problems, requiring proactive revelation, and subjective problems, which need first to be defined as problems before discussion is justified; the inquiry expressed by one side defines the subjective issue as relevant. A related approach is advanced by R. Shlomo Rozner (*Resp. Le-Chafetz BaChayim* I, 19): as long as the subjective issue is not raised, its damaging impact is uncertain, *safek hezek*, and discussion is therefore not justified in light of the definite damage it will wreak upon the subject. Alternatively, R. Nissim Karelitz (*Chut HaShani*, ibid.) suggests, in interpretation of the *Chafetz Chaim*, that only definite harm falls under the mandatory rubric of *lo ta'amod al dam re'ekha*, do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow; more subjective issues are revealed under a different mandate, that of providing good advice and avoiding bad advice, triggered only by an affirmative inquiry (see also R. Moshe Faniri, *Beit Chatanim*, p. 16).

Further Considerations

Among the *Chafetz Chaim*'s criteria for a conversation justified by *to'elet* is that the speaker not be a *sonei*, literally a hater, someone with a bias against the subject. Beyond the speaker's transgression, there is the serious worry that the listener will receive skewed reports. In the environment of dating, even while avoiding the extreme label of *sonei*, many people have reason to be biased against an individual under consideration; the speaker may be someone themselves interested in dating either party, or an embittered former date. It is incumbent on the one making inquiries, both for halakhic reasons and for functional personal ones, to ensure that those they turn to have no alternative agendas, even subconsciously. A less blatant concern is that the responder may hold no bias yet also may not genuinely know the person well. Families often inquire with the one person they know with any connection to the potential date, regardless of how tenuous; as this is their only source, they accord that person more authority than would be deserved, and form misimpressions, again contrary both to their personal interests and to *halakhah*.

It is also crucially important that inquirer and responder speak the same language. Questions and answers are often imparted in vague generalities or idioms that miscommunicate either what the inquirer wants to know, or what the responder wishes to say, and in either event the goal that justifies the conversation can be missed (see *Mishpetei HaShalom*, p. 246; *Zera Chaim*, p. 445). Where parents are doing the inquiring, they and the child may not be in complete agreement as to what is desired, which poses a responsibility on the responder to evaluate what kind of response is truly a *to'elet* (see *Chut HaShani* 7:1; *Zera Chaim*, pp. 446-447; R. David Ariav, *Le-Re'akha Kamokha* VII, p. 302).

Another point requiring particular sensitivity is when a relationship does not work out. There is often a tendency then to discuss why the *shiddukh* failed, and doing so is fraught with risk. Unless the former date poses a danger to others, it is generally wrong to relate to uninvolved parties what was undesirable about the individual, and this applies even when talking with parents or with a *shadchan* (matchmaker). While those individuals are tasked with finding an appropriate match, and could benefit from constructive feedback that sharpens the picture of the right one, it is crucial that the conversation be limited to that constructive content, preferably in general terms, and not needlessly disparage the former date (see *Yalkut Yosef*, ibid.; *Chut HaShani* 7:1, p. 371; R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, cited in *Mevakshei Torah*).

Conversely, there is a serious risk in the opposite situation, when a relationship does work out, or has reached the point where it seems unlikely to be derailed by further information. At that stage, sharing negative information may be counterproductive; it will not deter the parties from marrying, and it may nonetheless affect their respect for each other, so that at moments of tension down the line they will see their relationship suffer as they recall disparaging items they were told (see *Chut HaShani* 7:1, p. 372). In this vein, it is worth remembering the opinion of Hillel (*Ketubot* 17a), who advised praising a bride even in an exaggerated manner, once the relationship is already a committed one (see *Mishpetei HaTorah*, ibid.).

Business or Personal?

It is instructive to return to one of the issues referenced above. An overwhelming concern in this area has been avoiding a *mekach ta'ut*, where one party enters a commitment unaware of information that, had they known, they would not have gone forward. It is universally agreed that any information in that category must be revealed prior to marriage. There is a secondary issue, however, that is harder to avoid: *geneivat da'at*, addressing information which, while not crucial to the decision to proceed, creates by its nondisclosure a false impression. The party marries someone who they would have married regardless, while doing so thinking the spouse is more "perfect" than they actually are.

The parallel in the business world would be as follows. If one sells an item under false pretenses, such that the buyer would not have made the purchase had he known the truth, this creates a *mekach ta'ut* and voids the sale, and, if the sale is not voided, constitutes *ona'ah* and monetary theft. If the purchaser would have bought the item anyway, and at the same price, while the seller conveyed the misimpression that it was worth more, the seller violates *geneivat da'at*.

That second scenario, transferred to the world of *shiddukhim*, seems impossible to avoid. Granted, any issue that would have invalidated the marriage would be disclosed. It will not be the case, though, that every lesser flaw is disclosed. No person will reveal every imperfection, no matter how minor, before marriage, and if they did, that person would never get married. How, then, can any marriage take place without a serious violation of *geneivat da'at*? (For an extremely thorough analysis, see R. Yisrael Weinman, *Mishnat Yisrael*, ch. 21, pp. 359-383.)

One approach was suggested by R. Yisrael Ya'akov Kanievsky, the Steipler Gaon (*Kehillot Ya'akov, Yevamot* #38). The comparison of marriage to the business world is imprecise. When dealing with merchandise, the purchaser has no attachment to the individual unit he purchases; if the unit is flawed, while he may not regret the purchase, he would happily trade it in for a perfect model if given the opportunity. This has no parallel in marriage, or in human relationships generally. Any happily married person, meaning one who does not regret marrying their spouse, would not seek to trade that spouse in for a "perfect model." There is no such thing; every human being is unique, and being happy with one's mate means accepting them in totality, the pluses and the minuses.

A different approach appears in the writings of the Klausenberger Rebbe, R. Yekutiel Yehudah Halberstam (*Resp. Divrei Yatziv, Even HaEzer* 15). He notes the statement of the Rama (*Even HaEzer* 1:3, citing Rivash) that in later generations the custom has not been to be too exacting, *medakdek*, in matters of *shiddukhim*, as long as there is no halakhic impediment to the couple marrying. He interprets this to mean there is a custom to look the other way from certain imperfections, and, following the merchandise model, compares it to a trade policy enacted for the betterment of the community: while strictly speaking there may be potential issues of *geneivat da'at*, or even *mekach ta'ut* in some cases, those who enter the *shiddukh* market agree to suspend their right to demand full disclosure, in the interest of allowing harmonious marriages to take place (see also R. Yitzchak Shmuel Shechter, *Resp. Yashiv Yitzchak* XXV, 44).

Both approaches are helpful in gaining perspective. Marriage is a deeply serious commitment with lifetime consequences, and no material information should be concealed when it is necessary to make a responsible decision, or certainly when necessary to protect an innocent party from one who may cause them harm or misery. In the context of investigating the other party, however, it is often too easy to get lost in the details, and to approach marriage like a business investment, assessed in terms of objective profits and losses. It is necessary sometimes to be reminded that we are dealing with unique human beings, who are not interchangeable, and cannot be reduced to numbers and value assessments. Failing to deviate from a merchandise approach will often affect one's perspective to such an extent that a person cannot see beyond the details to what could be a wonderful lifelong marriage.

In a broad sense, the laws of *lashon hara* serve to protect the individual from losing his or her uniqueness in a blur of gossip and disconnected detail. It is hoped that the proper appreciation of these laws, and their careful application, will go hand in hand with the mutual respect and esteem that allow two individuals to truly come together as one.