Among the Ten Commandments given at Sinai stands a deceptively simple directive: “Remember the Sabbath day to sanctify it” (*zachor et yom ha-Shabbat l’kadsho*). This single verse has generated centuries of halakhic discussion about the precise nature and requirements of the mitzvah of kiddush.

Kiddush today involves many components - wine, blessings, presence at the table. R. Shlomo Zalman Shmaya catalogs at least fifteen different opinions on what exactly is included in the biblical commandment (*Iyunim B’Halakhah* I:20; see also II:46), reflecting the complexity beneath what appears to be a straightforward directive.

Biblical or Rabbinic? The Core Debate

Medieval authorities debated what aspect of kiddush, if any, is biblically mandated, and what is rabbinic enactment.

According to one school of thought, both the requirement of kiddush itself and the specific requirement to recite it over wine are biblical in origin. This appears to be the position of the *mefaresh* (Pseudo-Rashi) on Tractate Nazir (4a), as well as the Rosh (Pesachim 106a) and the Ran (Shabbat 23b).

Tosafot, however, takes a different approach. In their view, while kiddush itself may be biblical, the wine is merely an *asmachta* - a rabbinic institution supported by biblical allusion rather than explicit commandment (Tosafot Shabbat 23b, Pesachim 106a; Responsa Rashba I:614). The Sha’agat Aryeh (60) endorsed this position.

Tosafot in Pesachim presents another view, an unusual and intriguing position that may play a significant role in understanding the structure of kiddush: perhaps the wine is indeed biblically mandated, but the requirement that the one reciting kiddush actually taste from the cup is rabbinic in origin.

Two Models of Remembrance

The Moznayim LaTzedek (I:19) offers an analysis of these divergent views by proposing two fundamentally different understandings of what “zachor” - remembering - means in this context.

One possibility is that the commandment to “remember” Shabbat functions like other biblical remembrances such as the Exodus from Egypt, Miriam’s punishment, Amalek’s attack. The obligation is simply not to forget Shabbat’s significance, to keep it in mind throughout the week. This seems to be Nachmanides’ understanding when he writes: “According to the plain meaning, the sages said that this is a commandment to remember continually, every day, the Shabbat, so that we do not forget it and confuse it with other days… and the reason for ‘to sanctify it’ is that our remembrance should emphasize that it is holy” (Commentary on Exodus 20:8).

Alternatively, the commandment might specifically be to “remember *in order to* sanctify” - that is, to perform an act of sanctification through verbal declaration. This appears to be Maimonides’ view: “It is a positive commandment to sanctify the Shabbat day with words, as it states ‘Remember the Shabbat day to sanctify it’ - meaning, remember it with a verbal remembrance of sanctification and praise” (Sefer HaMitzvot). The Sefer HaChinuch similarly understands the mitzvah as one of active sanctification through speech.

These two interpretations, the Moznayim LaTzedek argues, explain the controversy about wine. If “remembering” means keeping Shabbat in mind generally, then on Shabbat itself, when the day is immediately present, this remembrance must take a concrete form: kiddush over wine. Just as wine evokes memory elsewhere in Scripture (“his remembrance shall be like the wine of Lebanon” - Hosea 14:8; “we will recall your love more than wine” - Song of Songs 1:4), so too the act of making kiddush over wine creates the requisite “remembrance” of Shabbat’s sanctity.

In contrast, if the commandment is specifically to sanctify through speech, then wine is not inherently required from the Torah; it’s simply the rabbinic vehicle chosen for the biblical requirement of verbal sanctification.

This analysis also explains another debate, concerning whether one can fulfill the biblical obligation through mental contemplation alone. According to the second interpretation - that the mitzvah is to sanctify - verbal articulation is essential, just as we find that dedicating a firstborn animal requires verbal declaration: “the male you shall sanctify” (Deut. 15:19, per Nedarim 13a). According to the first interpretation, perhaps mental remembrance would suffice biblically, with verbal expression being a rabbinic enhancement.

Is the Blessing Over Wine Part of Kiddush?

Building on this foundation, later authorities debated the conceptual status of the wine itself within kiddush. Blessings over wine are recited in various ritual contexts, such as before *birkat hamazon* and similar settings. The question is whether kiddush follows the same pattern, with the wine-blessing functioning simply as a standard blessing of benefit that happens to precede the sanctification formula. Alternatively, is the blessing *borei pri ha-gafen* integrated into the mitzvah of kiddush itself, forming part of its essential structure?

This question has practical ramifications. The general rule in Jewish law is that because of *arevut* (mutual responsibility), one can discharge the obligation of another even if one has already fulfilled the mitzvah. However, this is limited to actual mitzvot, not blessings on food and the like that are blessings of benefit. The Talmud (Rosh Hashanah 29a-b) suggests that matzah and kiddush are exceptions to that rule - one who has already fulfilled the obligation can still recite them for others, because these are *obligatory* blessings tied to the mitzvah itself.

The Ritva offers the following explanation: The blessing over bread for matzah and *borei pri ha-gafen* for kiddush are ordinarily blessings of benefit. Normally, if one has already fulfilled his obligation, he cannot discharge others’ obligations with such blessings. The question is whether the situation differs here. Perhaps we should treat these blessings as we normally would, such that one who has already fulfilled his obligation cannot discharge others, since the blessing itself is normally not obligatory. Alternatively, perhaps the situation changes because now eating matzah or making kiddush is obligatory, and whenever one eats one must bless. In that case, each of these blessings becomes like the blessings recited over mitzvot - they are obligatory. The Talmud concludes that even one who has already fulfilled his obligation can discharge others’ obligations, and there is no need for him to taste at all (Ritva, Rosh Hashanah 29b).

Rav Soloveitchik taught that the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel over the order of blessings revolves around precisely this question (see Pesachim 114a). Beit Shammai holds that one first blesses the sanctification of the day, then the wine. Beit Hillel maintains the opposite: wine first, then the sanctification. If *borei pri ha-gafen* is merely a blessing of benefit (because we may not derive benefit from wine without blessing), then the sanctification of the day takes precedence, and we should bless it first. If, however, the wine-blessing forms an integral part of the kiddush structure itself, then we begin with it. Since we follow Beit Hillel in blessing the wine first, it emerges that *borei pri ha-gafen* is indeed an essential component of kiddush itself (Shiurim L’Zecher Abba Mari, vol. 2, p. 134).

Rashi’s comment on the Talmud (Eruvin 40b) provides further support for this understanding. The Talmud discusses the requirement that “the one who blesses must taste.” Rashi comments that “it is inappropriate for a ‘cup of blessing’ (*kos shel brachah*) that a person not derive immediate benefit from it.” The Rashash questions Rashi’s formulation. The reasoning should be simpler - if one doesn’t drink from the cup, there was no purpose to the blessing in the first place, and we need the blessing to permit drinking. Rashi, however, seems to be saying that the tasting is required *because of* the blessing rather than the other way around. Rashi’s language suggests something deeper; that the blessing itself has intrinsic significance beyond merely permitting consumption. This indicates that the blessing of benefit is itself part of the mitzvah structure.

The Talmud (Berachot 41b-42a) further supports this. Ben Zoma explains that while most foods eaten during a meal don’t require separate blessings (because the blessing over the bread covers them), wine is different - “wine causes its own blessing” because “in many contexts it comes and we bless over it even though we didn’t need to drink it.” Rashi elaborates, detailing kiddush, havdalah, and wedding blessings. This indicates that in these ritual contexts, the wine-blessing isn’t merely utilitarian but constitutive of the ritual itself.

Kiddush and Havdalah - A Revealing Contrast

This understanding helps explain a curious ruling. The Magen Avraham (296:10) cites a responsum of Rashi regarding someone listening to another person recite havdalah. If the listener intended to fulfill the obligation of havdalah but did not intend to fulfill the obligation of *borei pri ha-gafen*, he nonetheless fulfills the havdalah obligation. The Pri Megadim explains that the blessing “Hamavdil” is what matters. The wine-blessing is merely necessary to permit tasting, but it’s not an intrinsic part of havdalah itself.

R. Chaim Soloveitchik distinguished between havdalah and kiddush in this respect (see also *Moadim U’Zemanim*, Likutei Ha’arot vol. 3, 243; *Knesset Avraham* 24:4:4). This applies only to havdalah, not to kiddush; regarding kiddush, one would not fulfill his obligation without including the blessing on the wine.

Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik explained this through the introduction of another point. We may recite kiddush over bread, but for havdalah, *chamar medinah* is the possible alternative to wine, yet many authorities hold one cannot use *chamar medinah* for kiddush. These different rules reflect different underlying structures.

For havdalah, the role of wine is that the blessing must be recited over a cup. Therefore we need a cup (not bread), though *chamar medinah* suffices. The essence of kiddush is different. The Talmud (Berachot 43a) teaches that eating is established as significant only with bread and wine. Kiddush over wine functions to establish the meal as a formal Shabbat seudah. For this purpose, only bread or wine, the two foods that create formal meal-status, are appropriate (Shiurim L’Zecher Abba Mari; see also Tosafot Pesachim 106b).

This also explains why, according to some authorities, one sits for kiddush but may stand for havdalah (Rama, OC 271:10 and 296:6). For havdalah, the wine-blessing is merely preparatory to drinking, and sitting isn’t required. Kiddush comprises both the sanctification formula and the wine-blessing as a unified whole, and therefore one should sit, giving the entire ritual the gravity of a formal occasion (see *Eretz HaTzvi* 4:3).

Fulfilling the Obligation with Prayer and the Impact on Husbands Reciting Kiddush for Their Wives

There is a debate as to whether one who simply recites the evening prayer on Friday night, and thus makes mention of Shabbat, fulfills the Torah mandate of making kiddush. Given the uncertainty as to what kiddush requires on a biblical level, there is much to debate regarding this question.

The Magen Avraham (271:1) rules that the Torah’s requirement can be fulfilled through prayer. The biblical verse states “Remember the Shabbat day,” and one has indeed remembered it through the liturgical references to Shabbat in the evening service. The requirement to make kiddush at the place of the meal over wine is rabbinic.

The Dagul MeiRevavah, authored by R. Yechezkel Landau (author of the *Noda B’Yehuda*), identified a problem with this position. The Talmud (Berachot 20b) establishes that women are equally obligated in kiddush alongside men. The scenario this creates is that a man who has already prayed recites kiddush to discharge his wife’s and household’s obligation, while the women have not prayed evening services. If the man’s biblical obligation was fulfilled through prayer, he now has only a rabbinic obligation (to recite kiddush over wine), while the women who haven’t prayed still have a biblical one. This would seem to impact his ability to discharge their obligation.

The problem hinges on the principle of *arevut* (mutual responsibility). The Talmud (Rosh Hashanah 29a) states that even one who has fulfilled an obligation can discharge others’ obligations in all blessings, “because all Israel are responsible for one another” (Rashi ad loc.). The Rosh (Berachot III) indicates that women are not included in *arevut*. If this is correct, a man who has already fulfilled his obligation should not be able to recite it again on behalf of his wife.

There are various ways to address this issue. The Chatam Sofer (OC 17, 21) proposed that one who will later make kiddush at home should intentionally not fulfill the obligation through prayer (the question of whether negative intent operates this way is subject to dispute, but many accept it). In his glosses to Shulchan Aruch, the Chatam Sofer presents this as practical advice. However, in the two cited responsa, it sounds like he sees this as the default assumption that does not require active strategizing on the part of the individual. Even beyond the question of disparity between husbands and wives, it is not ideal to split the fulfillment into biblical and rabbinical portions, and therefore this approach is proper anyway.

Another answer emerges from the Minchat Chinuch (Mitzvah 31), based on his own position. Since the evening prayer service doesn’t mention the Exodus from Egypt, and kiddush requires this mention, prayer alone cannot fulfill the biblical requirement. This answer would not help if kiddush is actually recited in synagogue, which does include the Exodus reference.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Commentary to Shulchan Aruch and Responsa 7) fundamentally redefines the issue by offering a different reading of the Rosh. There’s no reason to exclude women from *arevut* regarding commandments in which they share the same obligations as men. The Rosh was only discussing commandments where men and women have different levels of obligation. Regarding kiddush, where men and women are equally obligated (as established in Berachot 20b), *arevut* operates fully. According to Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s analysis, the question does not begin.

Kiddush in the Place of a Meal

The debates above touch on another fundamental question: the scope of the requirement that kiddush be recited *b’makom seudah* (in the place of a meal). Is this a fundamental component of kiddush, part of the core biblical obligation? If it is, then a kiddush in a different location would be useless. However, if it is not a fundamental component of the obligation, it might be that a kiddush lacking *makom seudah* might be at least a partial fulfillment of the mitzvah.

The nature of the *makom seudah* requirement is subject to debate among the rishonim and later authorities. According to Rabbenu Yonah (cited in Rosh, Pesachim 10:5), the biblical mandate of kiddush does not require recital in the location of the meal, which is a rabbinic enhancement. Accordingly, one who hears kiddush elsewhere fulfills the Torah obligation, despite the omission of the rabbinic component. If so, there is value in the public recitation of kiddush, in that there may be individuals present who will not be reciting kiddush at their meals, and will at least fulfill the basic Torah obligation by hearing kiddush in the synagogue.

The Rosh, however, disputes Rabbenu Yonah’s recommendation, and his position implies that he believes *makom seudah* to be a fundamental component of the obligation, such that synagogue kiddush would be completely ineffective.

Different interpretations of the Rosh’s position exist. Some maintain that the Rosh holds there is a Torah obligation of *makom seudah* (R. Akiva Eiger, OC 273). However, others disagree with this reading. The Rosh himself writes elsewhere (Commentary to Nazir 3b) that the obligation to use wine is rabbinic, making it implausible that there could be a Torah obligation of *makom seudah*. Rather, the Rosh’s position is that both wine and *makom seudah* are rabbinic obligations, but the result is still that the synagogue kiddush is ineffectual, because it only contributes the wine without the location. Rabbenu Yonah, by contrast, would maintain that wine is a biblical obligation independent of the location, and thus the synagogue kiddush will at least accomplish that (see R. Tzvi Kushelevsky, *Sha’arei Binah* 10, and R. Shmuel Neiman, *Avnei Choshen: Kiddush V’Havdalah* 44; see also R. Raphael Schapiro, *Torat Raphael*, Hil. Shabbat 10).

R. Yaakov of Karlin (*Mishkenot Ya’akov*, OC 106) offers another approach to the synagogue recitation, also assuming that the location requirement is a secondary obligation. Kiddush, paralleling havdalah, has a core obligation that is performed during prayer, and an element that is ideally recited over wine. Since some in the community may not have wine, the custom developed that kiddush was recited over wine on their behalf in the same place as the kiddush in prayer was realized. Nonetheless, the attendees would have to recite kiddush again at home, perhaps over bread, in order to fulfill the location-of-the-meal requirement, and also to discharge the obligations of their family members. R. Yaakov adduces proof from a passage in the Talmud (Ta’anit 24a). The Vilna Gaon, in his commentary to Shulchan Aruch, also cites this passage in this context.

The Meal Connection: Why Wine?

The discussions surrounding kiddush reveal a strong connection between that obligation and food. This is evidenced in numerous laws: the prohibition against tasting anything before kiddush (see Magen Avraham 235:4 regarding the unusual astringency of this prohibition); the requirement of kiddush *b’makom seudah*; and the very use of wine or bread as the medium.

The Rashbam (Pesachim 101a) offers two explanations for the requirement of kiddush in the place of eating. According to the verse “And you shall call Shabbat a delight,” in the place where you “call” to Shabbat (make kiddush), there shall be “delight” (the Shabbat meal). Alternatively, since they established kiddush over wine, and wine is significant at the time of the meal, that’s where it was established.

R. Natan Gestetner, in *Responsa Lhorot Natan* (III:26), notes that these two explanations yield different understandings. According to the first, the law should really be a function of the meal - the “delight” must be where kiddush was recited. According to the second, it should be a function of kiddush - the sanctification over wine must occur where wine is significant, namely at a meal. Practically, according to the first view, kiddush without a meal may still be valid as kiddush, though it fails to create the required delight in the right place. According to the second, kiddush not at a meal location is fundamentally defective.

What emerges is that kiddush doesn’t merely commemorate Shabbat abstractly, but rather it sanctifies and establishes the eating itself as Shabbat activity.

Rav Soloveitchik explained this as follows. There is a thematic parallel between Shabbat and blessings recited over food. In both cases, we are recognizing that while the world is made available for human benefit, this can only happen if it is first acknowledged that God created it. Shabbat does this on behalf of all of creation, while a blessing does so more directly regarding the food that prompts it. Through these acknowledgements, human use becomes permitted. These two permissions combine in kiddush into one unified entity. The mitzvah of kiddush over the cup thus works on two levels. First, it removes the prohibition that would apply to the cup of wine; then the blessing sanctifying the day permits all objects of the world to a person in honor of Shabbat. Both parts of kiddush involve gratitude to God, acknowledging His role in creation and in sanctifying time, which in turn permits enjoyment of the physical world (Shiurim L’Zecher Abba Mari, vol. 2, p. 134).

Living the Commandment

These layers of understanding enrich practice. Kiddush is not merely a perfunctory ritual preceding the Friday night meal. It is a complex halakhic-theological statement about sanctity, memory, permission, and obligation.

Lifting the cup and beginning “*Borei pri ha-gafen*” means entering a carefully structured ritual in which blessing as benefit and blessing as sanctification merge into a single act. It means creating formal meal status for eating, elevating it from mere consumption to sacred seudah. It means fulfilling a biblical command whose precise contours the sages debated, and connecting to centuries of discussion about the interplay of wine, words, and holiness.

It means taking the abstract sanctity of Shabbat and translating it into permission - permission to enjoy the physical world, to eat and drink and delight, but all within the framework of sanctification. It is a remembrance of creation that in turn becomes a sanctified creation of its own.