The Aseret HaDibrot (10 commandments) are prominently featured in this week’s parashah. There are many pertinent and crucial mitzvot included in the list. Belief in G-d, honoring one's parents, keeping Shabbat, and the prohibition of murder are all present. The third of the 10 is “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav” (Shemot 20:7), which, loosely translated, means “thou shalt not swear falsely using the name of Hashem”. It’s clear that this mitzvah’s main function is to prohibit swearing falsely in Hashem’s name. Does the prohibition extend beyond that? Does simply mentioning Hashem’s name without any context whatsoever constitute a violation? What about making a berakhah l’vatalah (an unnecessary berakhah)? Upon examination, the Halakhic evidence regarding both of these questions is, on the surface, a bit enigmatic. 

The Talmud (Temurah 4a) discusses the violation of hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah—simply reciting Hashem’s name in vain. The Talmud makes it clear that reciting Hashem’s name in vain constitutes a biblical violation of the positive commandment (Devarim 6:13) “et Hashem Elokecha tirah” (“thou shalt fear Hashem thy G-d”). Reciting Hashem’s name in vain is seen as an affront to Hashem and his honor. Elsewhere, the Talmud (Berakhot 33a) records a similar prohibition regarding reciting a berakhah l’vatalah (an unnecessary berakhah). What’s fascinating is that the prohibition cited in that context seems to be of greater weight than the one stated in Temurah regarding reciting Hashem’s name in vain. Reciting a berakhah l’vatalah is said to constitute a violation of “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav” (Shemot 20:7; loosely translated, “thou shalt not swear falsely using the name of Hashem”). As noted, this is the third of the 10 commandments recorded in this week’s parashah. This leads to an interesting, and unexpected, hierarchy. Reciting an unnecessary berakhah constitutes a violation of a Torah level prohibition (issur lav). Reciting Hashem’s name in vain “only” constitutes a failure to perform a positive commandment (bitul mitzvat aseh). Obviously both of these are violations; however, at first glance the hierarchy here seems to be off. How is it possible that reciting Hashem’s name in vain constitutes a bitul aseh, but making a berakhah l’vatalah constitutes a violation of an actual prohibition?  How can blessing Hashem while reciting his name in vain be seen as any worse than simply reciting his name in vain, without the blessing?

Rabbeinu Tam (cited in Tosafot, Rosh Hashana 33a) doesn’t deal with this question directly, but his solution to another problem presents a solution to this one as well. Based on other evidence, Rabbeinu Tam maintains that the passage in Berakhot is not to be taken literally. Recitation of a berakhah l’vatalah does not actually constitute a violation of “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav”. The Talmud does cite this verse as the source for this prohibition, but legally it is merely an asmakhta (rabbinically assigned allusion). In reality, reciting a berakhah l’vatalah constitutes a rabbinic violation, not a biblical one. The biblical prohibition of “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav” is reserved for swearing falsely in Hashem’s name. Rabbeinu Tam’s suggestion can be used to answer our question as well. Reciting Hashem’s name in vain constitutes a biblical violation, whereas reciting a berakhah l’vatalah is “merely” a rabbinic infraction. Indeed, the Tosafists cite the passages in Temurah and Berakhot which implicitly serve as support for Rabbeinu Tam’s proposition. It is illogical to assume that a berakhah l’vatalah would be worse than hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah, and therefore the passage in Berakhot must be reinterpreted as referring to a rabbinic violation and not a biblical one.

The issue with this suggestion is that it does not seem to have been accepted by all. The Rambam seems to have taken the passage in Berakhot at face value - reciting a berakhah l’vatalah really does constitute a biblical violation of “lo tisa”. The Rambam says this quite clearly in both Hilkhot Berakhot (1:15) as well as in Hilkhot Shevuot (12:9). He makes this clear in a responsum as well (Teshuvot Harambam Pe’er HaDor 105). The Rambam’s view necessitates another explanation of this strange phenomenon. How can it be that reciting Hashem’s name in the context of a berakhah l’vatalah is somehow worse than reciting his name without any context whatsoever? Isn’t praising Hashem better than reciting his name, sans the praise? This question puzzled several later authorities (see Minchat Chinukh 30:8, Nishmat Adam 1:5:1, Sdei Chemed ma’rekhet bet 115). Some went so far as to propose that the Rambam’s opinion needs to be altogether reassessed, and that he must agree to Rabbeinu Tam that a berakhah l’vatalah “only” constitutes a rabbinic violation (see Nishmat Adam and Sdei Chemed ibid). While this solution would solve the problem, it is almost certainly not representative of the Rambam’s opinion (see specifically Hilkhot Shevuot and Teshuvat Harambam ibid). 

Another potential solution might be suggested using the She’iltot D’rav Achai Gaon (She’eilta 53) as a base. Rav Achai seems to upgrade the violation of hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah beyond what we have seen thus far. He explains that the prohibition of “lo tisa” includes not only swearing falsely in the name of Hashem, but hotza’at shem shamayim as well. In doing this, Rav Achai essentially proposes the opposite of what Rabbeinu Tam proposed several centuries later. Whereas Rabbeinu Tam downgrades the prohibition of berakhah l’vatalah from a biblical prohibition to a rabbinic one, Rav Achai upgrades hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah from a mitzvat aseh, and includes it in the prohibition of “lo tisa”. If this is the case, our question is resolved. Making a berakhah l’vatalah does not constitute a more serious infringement than hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah.

However, there are at least two potential problems with proposing this suggestion to resolve the problem in the Rambam. For one, there is no indication in the Rambam that hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah constitutes a violation of “lo tisa”. The Rambam makes it clear that only berakhah l’vatalah, and not hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah is included in this prohibition. A more general problem exists as well. The simple reading of Rav Achai seems to directly contradict the passage in Temurah (4a) with which we began. Indeed, some acharonim suggest that Rav Achai Gaon must be read in light of the passage in Temurah, and that he too never meant to suggest that one violates the biblical prohibition of “lo tisa” through hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah (see Ha’amek She’alah there). Accordingly, the violation of “lo tisa” in this context is rabbinic, along the lines of Rabbeinu Tam. It is also possible that Rav Achai had an alternative text to Temurah 4a (see Rashi there), which would allow for hotza’at shem shamayim to be included in the prohibition of “lo tisa”. Whereas it’s possible to suggest this for Rav Achai, it’s evident from the words of the Rambam quoted above that he either didn’t have this alternative text, or that at the very least he didn’t think it was authoritative. 

This leaves the quandary that emerges from the Rambam’s opinion unresolved. What is behind the Rambam’s somewhat mysterious opinion? The Chayei Adam (Nishmat Adam ibid) uses a pithy formulation to highlight the crux of this question. According to the Rambam, if one were to say “atah Hashem Elokeinu melech ha’olam borei pri ha’etz” (“you are Hashem our G-d who creates the fruit of the tree”), using the name of Hashem, they would not be in violation of any prohibition, rabbinic or biblical. However, if one were to use the exact same formulation and append the word “Baruch” to the beginning, they would violate a biblical prohibition of “lo tisa”! How can that be? What are we to make of this perplexing halakhic phenomenon?

Rabbi Akiva Eiger (Shu”t Rabbi Akiva Eiger, kama, OC 25) notes this hierarchy and uses it to argue that there is another area in which berakhah l’vatalah is treated more stringently than hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah, namely, the usage of kinuim (names which are used to refer to Hashem, but are not strictly speaking defined as names of Hashem). Rabbi Akiva Eiger argues that the prohibition against making a berakhah l’vatalah applies to kinuim just like it does to Hashem’s name itself. Accordingly, one would be prohibited from saying “barukh atah Hashem Elokeinu melekh ha’olam…”. Even though the words “Hashem” and “Elokeinu” are not strictly speaking names of Hashem. Because they are used as references to Hashem they are included in the prohibition. Rabbi Akiva Eiger proves this from the fact that kinuim are included in the prohibition to swear falsely, which is the primary prohibition that is derived from “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav”. He notes that there seems to be evidence that kinuim are not included in the prohibition of hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah, which would in effect mean that, at least with respect to kinuim, halakhah views berakhah l’vatalah more stringently than it views hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah. This isn’t problematic though, notes Rabbi Akiva Eiger, as we do find evidence that the laws of berakhah l’vatalah are treated more stringently than those of hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah. According to the Rambam one violates “lo tisa” for making a berakhah l’vatalah, but for saying Hashem’s name for nought one “merely” violates the positive mitzva of “et Hashem Elokecha tira”! While Rabbi Akiva Eiger notes that this hierarchy exists, he doesn’t explain its basis. Why is berakhah l’vatalah seen as a more severe sin than hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah?

R. Shlomo Kluger (Chochmat Shlomo OC 215:4) offers one suggestion to explain this phenomenon. He first asserts that, in broad terms, a berakhah is a “tashlumin” (payment). Obviously G-d doesn’t need anything from us; still, by making a berakhah we are essentially “paying” him for the right to do whatever it is that the berakhah relates to. When we make a berakhah on an apple, we are “paying” Hashem for the apple. Once we have “paid”, we can eat. Similarly, when we make a berakhah before the performance of a mitzvah we are “paying” Hashem, and thereby thanking Hashem, for the ability to perform the mitzvah at hand. With this backdrop, R. Shlomo Kluger suggests the following analogy. Say one were to approach the king, offer a favor or gift, and say “this is a gift for you my king, in return for what you did for me.” If the king has indeed done something for his subject, he will find nothing wrong with what the subject has done. However, if the king hasn’t ever actually done anything for the subject, the subject’s words come across as rude and disrespectful. It would appear as if the subject were making a mockery of the king, implying that he hasn’t done what he perhaps should have. R. Shlomo Kluger applies this to his analysis of berakhah l’vatalah. As was mentioned above, the berakhah is halachically viewed as “payment”. Using the particular text that our sages have laid out for us, we have the ability to “pay” G-d for the goodness that he has given us. If we attempt to use a berakhah when it is inappropriate, we are in effect offering G-d a thank you card, even though we haven’t taken anything that would necessitate a “thank you”. Being that this is the case, reciting a berakhah l’vatalah is viewed as more of an affront to the King than simply saying his name in vain. R. Shlomo Kluger uses this to address the question raised by the Chayei Adam (see above). Reciting “ata Hashem Elokeinu…”, is viewed as praising G-d. Adding the word “baruch” to the beginning of the sentence turns it into a “tashlumin” (payment) for something G-d has given them. In short, it is what making a berakhah implies that causes it to be so destructive when used improperly. This can be applied to our question regarding hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah as well. If one says Hashem’s name in vain, it shows that they don’t fear G-d as much as they should. Making a berakhah l’vatalah is viewed as a cynical assault on G-d’s kingship, because of what making a berakhah implies, and is therefore a more severe violation than simply saying his name in vain.

Perhaps another suggestion can be made to explain this phenomenon (see Rav Asher Weiss, Minchat Asher Shemot 47:1, who may be saying this). As we noted above, the pasuk that is cited in the passage in Berakhot is “lo tisa et shem Hashem Elokecha lashav”. We noted that this is loosely translated to mean “thou shalt not swear falsely using the name of Hashem”. This isn’t really an accurate translation though. The word “tisa” connotes elevation. The pasuk is really saying “thou shalt not elevate Hashem’s name for falsehood”. We saw earlier that the basic prohibition which is derived from this pasuk is the prohibition to swear falsely in Hashem’s name. 

The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvot, Aseh 7; Hilkhot Shevuot 11:1) emphasizes the great honor that one affords the name of Hashem when one swears in his name. The Rambam goes so far as to say that this is “midarki ha’avodah” - swearing in Hashem’s name under the right circumstances constitutes service of Hashem. The Rambam actually invokes this great opportunity to serve Hashem immediately after he emphasizes the just how negative swearing falsely in the name of Hashem is - “kisheim sheshvuat shav v’sheker b’lo ta’aseh, kakh mitzvat aseh sh’yishava…” (“just as it is prohibited to swear falsely in Hashem’s name, it is a positive mitzvah to swear in his name [under the correct circumstances]”). Perhaps it can be suggested that part of what contributes to the violation here is the opportunity that shevuat emet (a truthful oath) confers. Specifically because swearing truthfully in Hashem’s name constitutes a kiddush Hashem (sanctification of his name), swearing falsely in his name constitutes a grave chilul Hashem (desecration of his name). Simply saying Hashem’s name in vain emphasizes a lack of yirat shamayim (fear of heaven) and constitutes a chilul Hashem. However, acting in a way which can be conceived as service of Hashem, when it’s really the opposite of what Hashem wants, is even worse than something which doesn’t even approximate the service of Hashem.

Perhaps the same thing can be suggested with regard to berakhah l’vatalah. With the institution of berakhot the Torah allows for us to thank Hashem for what he has given us. Chazal furthered this mission by applying berakhot to more cases and circumstances. Berakhot provide an opportunity to sanctify Hashem’s name in all areas and aspects of our lives. When one makes a berakhah l’vatalah, it may appear as though they are sanctifying Hashem’s name, but in reality, they are profaning it. Perhaps specifically because a berakhah l’vatalah can be misconstrued as a sanctification of Hashem’s name, it is a more serious violation than hotza'at shem shamayim l'vatalah, which doesn’t even approximate a service of the Ribono Shel Olam. 

As we go about our lives we should take time to contemplate the immense opportunity that the world of berakhot provides. The tremendous downside that accompanies a berakhah l’vatalah may very well stem from the tremendous upside that the world of berakhot supplies, and the spirit it allows us to infuse into the otherwise mundane moments of each and every day.