As explored in Part I, two competing theories animate the question of hiddur mitzvah’s purpose: does beautification express personal devotion and relationship with God, or does it create public impact for kiddush Hashem? This fundamental divide bears directly on whether hiddur functions as a technical detail embedded within each mitzvah’s halakhic structure, or as a meta-principle of religious devotion transcending individual mitzvot. The practical applications examined below reveal how theoretical frameworks manifest in concrete halakhic outcomes.

The Case of the Dried Lulav

A dispute between Rashi and Tosafot illuminates the relationship between hiddur mitzvah and essential mitzvah requirements (Sukkah 29b). The Talmud discusses lulav ha-yaveish - a dried-out lulav, which is disqualified for use on Sukkot.

Rashi explains the disqualification as stemming from “zeh Keli ve-anveihu” - the dried lulav lacks the beauty required by the verse. Tosafot challenges this explanation: hiddur mitzvah is not indispensable; how then can its absence disqualify the lulav?

Several resolutions emerge in the literature:

First, lulav and etrog may constitute an exception to the general rule. The Torah itself describes the etrog as “pri etz hadar” - a fruit of hadar, or beauty. The term “hadar” inherently involves aesthetic quality. Since the Torah links lulav with etrog in the mitzvah, this aesthetic requirement may extend to lulav as well, making beauty an intrinsic definitional requirement rather than mere enhancement.

Second, Rav Soloveitchik reportedly distinguished between positive and negative hiddur. Additional beautification beyond the baseline - positive hiddur - is not indispensable. However, one cannot use an object that falls below minimal aesthetic standards - what might be termed negative hiddur or active ugliness. A dried-out lulav represents not merely absence of beauty but positive aesthetic degradation, which does invalidate the mitzvah.

Third, the Shoel u-Meishiv suggested this dispute between Rashi and Tosafot reflects the broader question of whether hiddur mitzvah constitutes a Torah obligation or a rabbinic one (Mahadura Tinyana 3:33). The Sedei Chemed, however, challenged this analysis (Marekhet ha-Klalim, Marekhet Zayin, Klal 12). The underlying issue concerns whether Torah law must always be indispensable to a mitzvah’s validity - the very principle invoked by the Ritva in Part I when arguing that hiddur mitzvah’s non-essential status demonstrates its rabbinic origin. As discussed there, this assumption itself may be questioned if hiddur operates as a meta-principle rather than as a technical requirement within individual mitzvot.

Brit Milah: Can Hiddur Be Added Post-Performance?

The Talmud, in the passage that introduces hiddur mitzvah, addresses brit milah, distinguishing between essential and non-essential elements (Shabbat 133b). If after performing the circumcision one realizes that non-essential flesh constituting hiddur remains, one does not return to remove it.

Most Rishonim explain that the case involves Shabbat (Rashi, Shabbat 133b; Ramban; Tur, Yoreh De’ah 264). Since circumcision on the eighth day overrides Shabbat only for essential mitzvah requirements, one may not make an additional incision on Shabbat merely for hiddur purposes. The Pri Yitzchak offers proof that the Tur’s approach represents the primary position (1:28).

The Rambam’s formulation does not work off this premise. The Rambam presents this halakhah without mentioning Shabbat, as a rule applicable on weekdays as well (Hilkhot Milah 2:4). Multiple explanations emerge for the Rambam’s position. The Chatam Sofer suggests the Rambam’s concern involves injury to the infant - avoiding unnecessary chavala (Chiddushei Chatam Sofer, Shabbat 133b).

The Brisker Rav, explaining specifically the Rambam’s opinion, suggests that one cannot add hiddur mitzvah after separating from the mitzvah performance (Chiddushei ha-Griz, Hilkhot Milah 2:2; Hilkhot Chanukah; see also Beit ha-Levi 2:47). He uses this principle to elucidate the dispute between the Rambam and the Rama regarding Chanukah laws - specifically, who lights the additional candles representing family members. The Rambam maintains that the head of the household lights all the candles, while the Rama has everyone lighting their own set. The Brisker Rav understands these positions in light of their respective approaches to milah. Rav Shach, in Avi Ezri, challenges this extension of the explanation, questioning whether the Chanukah mehadrin represents the same type of hiddur (see also Knesset Avraham 8).

Notably, the Rambam does not record the key passages from Shabbat or Bava Kamma teaching about the core principle of hiddur mitzvah in the object at all. It is possible the Rambam recognizes hiddur mitzvah only in the action itself, not in beautification of the mitzvah object - a position that would align with the first theoretical framework outlined in Part I.

The other Rishonim, by contrast, understand that hiddur can be added separately from the primary mitzvah performance - hence only Shabbat restrictions prevent returning to complete it. This dispute reflects the theoretical frameworks developed earlier. If hiddur mitzvah represents devotion and enthusiasm in mitzvah performance - the first theory - then it must manifest during actual performance. Attempting to add beautification after completion makes no conceptual sense. The Rambam appears to adopt this conception. If, however, hiddur mitzvah concerns the final aesthetic result - the second theory - then perhaps modification after the act remains meaningful.

Rav Chaim Brisker’s Brainteaser

The notion that hiddur could be performed entirely separate from the mitzvah itself presents conceptual difficulties, as the following analysis demonstrates. Suppose on Sukkot one faces a choice between two etrogim. Etrog A is definitely kosher but of uncertain aesthetic quality (possibly mehudar, possibly not). Etrog B is definitely mehudar but of uncertain kashrut (possibly kosher, possibly not). Which should one use first?

Intuition suggests using Etrog A first - better to fulfill the certain mitzvah obligation with the definitely kosher etrog. If it happens to be mehudar as well, excellent; if not, at least the fundamental mitzvah is secure.

Rav Chaim Brisker, however, argues for the opposite sequence. If one uses Etrog A first and it proves kosher, the mitzvah is fulfilled. Even if it subsequently becomes clear that Etrog B would have been more beautiful, one cannot add hiddur after mitzvah completion. The opportunity for hiddur has passed.

If one uses Etrog B first, two possibilities arise: If it proves kosher, one has fulfilled the mitzvah with definite hiddur - optimal outcome. If it proves non-kosher, no mitzvah occurred, and one proceeds to use Etrog A, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah validly if not beautifully. This sequence, at least, avoids the situation of having fulfilled the mitzvah without any possibility of adding hiddur.

This analysis illustrates a fundamental principle: hiddur cannot be completely disembodied from the mitzvah. As the metaphor suggests, icing must be on the cake; one cannot have icing after the cake has been consumed. The enhancement must accompany or integrate with the enhanced.

Even the Rishonim who permit returning to complete hiddur on a weekday presumably distinguish between the mitzvah act and mitzvah fulfillment. All would require that the mitzvah remain “ongoing” in some sense. The dispute concerns whether hiddur must integrate with the actual performance or merely with the period of mitzvah fulfillment - a refinement that preserves the essential principle that beautification cannot stand entirely apart from what it beautifies.

A related question addresses whether one should purchase a beautiful etrog for only the first day of Sukkot versus a less beautiful etrog available for all seven days. The Mikdashei Hashem analyzes this question and concludes that the first day takes precedence, since hiddur mitzvah itself constitutes a distinct mitzvah (2:200, Agra de-Pirkara 210).

Hiddur Mitzvah and Other Halakhic Principles

The question of hiddur mitzvah’s nature affects its interaction with numerous other halakhic principles:

Overriding Negative Commandments

The question has been raised whether hiddur mitzvah, as a positive commandment, can override negative commandments. This may depend on whether hiddur becomes integrated into the mitzvah itself, thereby sharing in that mitzvah’s halakhic force. Later authorities have analyzed this issue from various angles. Rabbi Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor concluded that hiddur does not possess the power to override negative commandments (Ein Yitzchak, Even ha-Ezer 80).

Exemption from Other Mitzvot

Another application concerns whether one engaged in hiddur mitzvah becomes exempt from other mitzvot under the principle of “ha-oseik be-mitzvah patur min ha-mitzvah” - one occupied with a mitzvah is exempt from another mitzvah (Hit’orerut Teshuvah 1:22; cf. Sukkah 26a). The analysis above suggests this may depend on whether hiddur constitutes part of the mitzvah itself or a separate meta-obligation. If integrated into the primary mitzvah, it might generate exemption; if functioning as an independent directive about religious devotion, it is less likely to.

Interruption of Torah Study

The question of whether pursuing hiddur mitzvah justifies interrupting Torah study raises distinctive considerations (He’amek She’alah 34:5). Torah study operates under its own unique framework regarding exemption and interruption. The standards governing when Torah study may be suspended - given its supreme importance and continuous obligation - differ from those applying to conflicts between other mitzvot.

Blessing on Hiddur

A dispute exists regarding whether one recites a blessing specifically on hiddur mitzvah (Responsa Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Mahadura Tinyana 13, citing dispute between Pri Chadash and Eliyahu Rabbah). This question may involve whether hiddur constitutes an independent mitzvah warranting its own blessing, or whether the enhancement takes on the form of the mitzvah it is enhancing, thereby allowing the blessing from that mitzvah to attach to the extension. (Related to this, Palgei Mayim 37 invokes Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s responsum in discussing whether the principle of “ein ma’avirin al ha-mitzvot” - one should not pass over mitzvot - applies to hiddur mitzvah, which similarly depends on whether hiddur constitutes part of the mitzvah itself.)

Ma’aser Money

The permissibility of using ma’aser kesafim (charitable tithes) for hiddur mitzvah expenditures is another topic of analysis (Even Pinah 119; Shivat Tzion 25:5; Tzitz Eliezer 9:1). The Shulchan Aruch prohibits using ma’aser for mitzvot one is independently obligated to perform (Yoreh De’ah 249). If hiddur mitzvah constitutes part of the baseline mitzvah obligation, ma’aser funds should not be used. If it represents a separate enhancement, perhaps ma’aser usage is permissible. The Talmud permits using ma’aser ani (poor tithe) for extra honor beyond basic obligation in kibbud av, suggesting that enhancements beyond baseline obligation may permit ma’aser usage (Kiddushin 32b; see also Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot 2:568).

Overriding Shabbat

The passage regarding brit milah discussed above appears to establish clearly that hiddur mitzvah does not justify overriding Shabbat prohibitions. A seemingly contradictory passage, however, requires analysis. The Talmud discusses a case where one slaughtered an animal for a sacrifice and discovered it was lean rather than fat: “The second [animal] overrides Shabbat… What is the reason? ‘From the choicest of your vows’ (Deuteronomy 12:11)” (Menachot 64a). This passage, based on the verse “mi-mivchar nedarekha” - “from the choicest of your vows” - appears to permit Shabbat labor specifically to obtain superior quality. Given the principle that hiddur mitzvah does not override Shabbat, the Sha’agat Aryeh raises this as a difficulty requiring resolution (50).

Various authorities resolve this challenge by distinguishing the realm of sacrifices. Rabbi Shlomo Wahrman explains that sacrifices operate under a distinct biblical principle separate from general hiddur mitzvah (She’arit Yosef 2:1). The requirement of “mi-mivchar” for korbanot constitutes its own biblical mandate regarding sacrifice quality, not merely an application of the general concept of beautifying mitzvot.

Hiddur Mitzvah Versus Zerizin Makdimin

A compelling question addresses which principle takes precedence: hiddur mitzvah (beautifying mitzvot) or zerizin makdimin le-mitzvot (hastening to perform mitzvot). Suppose one has a mitzvah opportunity immediately available, but waiting would enable more beautiful performance. Should one proceed immediately or delay for hiddur?

The Shevut Ya’akov rules that when clearly superior beautification will be available through waiting, one should wait (1:34). Zerizin makdimin applies only when faced with uncertainty. When one knows definitively that delay will produce mitzvah min ha-muvchar (optimal mitzvah performance), waiting is itself a form of zerizut - eagerness to perform the mitzvah optimally. The good intention (machshavah tovah) during the waiting period combines with the eventual superior performance.

The Keli Chemda appears to concur (Parashat Tazria 3). The Chatam Sofer notes that Moshe Rabbeinu delayed circumcising his son until he could use iron rather than flint, following the Rambam’s ruling that iron constitutes mitzvah min ha-muvchar for brit milah implements (Shabbat 134b; Nedarim 31b; cf. Rambam, Hilkhot Milah).

Other authorities address this question extensively (She’eilat Ya’avetz 1:35; Mo’adim u-Zemanim 7:192). Addressing the parallel concept of “ein machmitzin et ha-mitzvot” (one should not delay mitzvot), the Vilna Gaon (Bi’ur ha-Gra, Orach Chaim 526:2) writes that this applies only when delay might result in losing the mitzvah opportunity or when the later version will not be enhanced. When waiting clearly leads to superior performance, delay is appropriate. The Magen Avraham’s (425:2) position seems to be that one never delays.

The Torah Temimah provides important clarification: all opinions agree one does not delay when doing so creates risk of missing the mitzvah entirely (Exodus 12:279). The dispute concerns only situations where waiting ensures superior performance without such risk.

This discussion may also relate to the nature of zerizin makdimin itself. If zerizin makdimin represents a form of hiddur - demonstrating enthusiasm through promptness - then both principles point in the same direction and the question becomes which expression of devotion takes precedence in a given situation. If, alternatively, zerizin makdimin reflects concern that the mitzvah opportunity might be lost through delay, then it would be prioritized over hiddur when such risk exists, while hiddur might take precedence when delay poses no such danger.

Internal Versus External Beauty

The question of beautifying visible versus hidden components offers another window into hiddur mitzvah’s purpose. The Rama rules that there is a mitzvah to beautify tefillin both externally and internally (Orach Chaim 32:4). In Darkei Moshe, he cites the Mordekhai regarding the obligation to beautify tefillin, noting the principle of “zeh Keli ve-anveihu” (Darkei Moshe, Orach Chaim 32:1).

Rabbeinu Tam, however, takes a different position regarding internal components, maintaining that covered elements do not require beautification (Tosafot, Menachot 32b). The underlying parchments of tefillin, which remain covered, need not be aesthetically enhanced.

The Binyan Shlomo analyzes this dispute at length, ultimately distinguishing between tefillin shel rosh and tefillin shel yad (1:6). The Vilna Gaon notes that Rabbeinu Tam’s position conflicts with the Rambam’s ruling, which appears to require internal quality standards (Rambam, Hilkhot Tefillin 1:12; Gra, Orach Chaim 32). The Kesef Mishneh explains that mezuzah requires scoring (sirtut) of the parchment even though it remains covered, suggesting internal standards matter. The Ran explains that mezuzah is checked periodically, making internal quality relevant despite the covering.

This dispute likely reflects the fundamental divide identified earlier. If hiddur mitzvah aims to create public impression and inspire observers, then only visible beauty matters. Internal beautification that no one will ever perceive serves no purpose under this theory.

If, however, hiddur mitzvah represents personal devotion and relationship with God, then internal beauty possesses significance. The fact that one knows - and God knows - that care and quality extend even to hidden components expresses a deeper level of commitment. The investment of self in the mitzvah does not depend on others’ perception.

An interesting marginal case appears in the Talmud’s list of beautiful mitzvah objects: “be-kulmus na’eh” - written with a beautiful quill (Shabbat 133b). The Minchat Machavat cites the Har Tzvi’s discussion: how does using a beautiful quill enhance the beauty of the resulting tefillin or sefer Torah (2:94)? No observer knows which quill was used; the implement itself does not remain visible in the final product.

The Sefat Emet offers a resolution applicable specifically to sefer Torah, where the writing itself constitutes a mitzvah (“ve-ata kitvu lakhem,” “now write for yourselves”) (Shabbat 133b). Since the act of writing is inherently a mitzvah act, it should be performed in a beautified manner even though this beautification does not manifest in the final product.

This explanation does not address tefillin, where no independent mitzvah of writing exists - only the requirement that they be written. Why should the quill’s beauty matter for tefillin?

The Minchat Machavat suggests a psychological insight: when a scribe uses a beautiful quill, he takes greater care to produce beautiful writing. The beautiful implement inspires beautiful results. Even if the quill itself does not appear in the final product, its quality affects the writing’s quality through its impact on the scribe’s consciousness.

According to the understanding of the Rambam suggested earlier, this explanation gains further support. If hiddur mitzvah must integrate with the mitzvah act itself - manifesting during performance rather than merely in the result - then using a beautiful quill during writing represents hiddur even though the quill itself does not appear in the finished tefillin.

A Synthesis: Public Display and Private Devotion

A passage in the Talmud regarding sefer Torah may offer a synthesis of these two approaches. The Talmud discusses bringing a sefer Torah to public gatherings (Yoma 70a). Rashi comments: “To display the beauty of the sefer Torah and the glory of its owner who took care to beautify the mitzvah, as it is stated, ‘zeh Keli ve-anveihu.’” The formulation is striking: what is displayed publicly is the beauty of the Torah scroll itself, together with the devotion of the one who invested in its beautification. The public presentation thus incorporates both elements - the aesthetic impact of the beautiful object and the personal commitment it represents (see Nachalat Zvi, Parashat Beshalach).

This synthesis suggests that the debate between focusing on personal devotion versus public impact may present a false dichotomy. Perhaps hiddur mitzvah encompasses both dimensions: the individual’s sincere investment in mitzvah performance naturally produces beauty that inspires others, while public display of that personal devotion enhances communal religious life and creates kiddush Hashem.

The Unity of Interpretations

The Talmud’s two interpretations of “ve-anveihu” - either as imitatio Dei (vehalakhta bi-drakhav) or as beautification (hitna’eh lefanav be-mitzvot) - ultimately represent facets of a unified vision. At Kriyat Yam Suf, overwhelmed by divine grace, Israel spontaneously sang in recognition and gratitude. That response models proper religious consciousness: internalizing divine goodness to the point that it transforms behavior.

The two interpretations converge rather than conflict. To beautify God through mitzvot means to perfect one’s middot in imitation of divine attributes, as the Torah Temimah explains (Exodus 15:2). The verse “zeh Keli ve-anveihu” contains both dimensions: declaring “This is my God” while simultaneously committing to walk in His ways and beautify Him through perfected character traits.

This transformation manifests both bein adam la-Makom (between person and God) and bein adam la-chaveiro (between person and person). The Talmud explains vehalakhta bi-drakhav: “mah Hu rachum ve-chanun, af atah rachum ve-chanun” - just as God is compassionate and gracious, so too should you be compassionate and gracious (Shabbat 133b; Sotah 14a). The principle extends to all divine attributes.

The Larger Vision

Whether hiddur mitzvah traces to biblical or rabbinic origin, whether it operates as an integral component of each mitzvah or as a meta-principle of religious life, the sources reveal a fundamental value: mitzvot demand more than technical compliance with minimum requirements.

The concept of hiddur mitzvah stands as an enduring call to approach divine service not with calculated minimalism but with wholehearted devotion, not with grudging compliance but with joyful enthusiasm, not with perfunctory routine but with ever-renewed commitment. Each enhancement - whether through financial sacrifice, aesthetic care, personal investment, or public beautification - echoes Israel’s song at the Sea, responding to divine grace with excellence in religious practice. Through such beautification, the individual grows in relationship with God, the community is inspired toward deeper commitment, and divine glory becomes manifest in the world.