The civil codes that exist and have existed throughout world history are centered largely on rectifying damage inflicted upon person or property. Verbal offenses are often included, to the extent that they carry a broader impact, such as libel and defamation of character. It is assumed, however, that the spoken word, to the extent to which it is contained at that, is beyond legal redress. “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me,” goes the adage, and the law generally shares this indifference. The right to be referred to in casual conversation as one wishes is therefore not a right actionable in court or even recognized in constitutions. This is yet another area, then, in which Torah laws transcend those of society at large. “Three descend to gehinnom and do not rise up,” states the Talmud, and concluding the list, after the adulterer and he who humiliates others in public: “one who creates a derogatory nickname for his fellow.”

The Talmud continues to note that the second category, humiliating others, would seem to include the third: addressing others in an insulting manner would apparently be a detail of the broader category of embarrassing another. To this, the distinction is offered, “even though he has become used to the name.” Rashi adds, “He has already become accustomed to that that they refer to him as such, and his face is not whitened, nonetheless he intends to humiliate him.” Some suggest that the latter detail comes to indicate that there is no difference between one who creates the sobriquet and one who perpetuates its usage, and further that the severity of the second instance is due to the negative intent, regardless of the result. Thus, there emerges a dually tiered prohibition in regards to creating a new name for another. To the extent that he bears humiliation, that larger transgression is certainly violated, and further, even once the burning embarrassment that accompanies the initial labeling is passed, a separate prohibition remains operative.

Two Dimensions of Violation

It might be possible to suggest that these two prohibitions are reflective of two disparate elements present in the distortion, or complete fabrication, of an individual’s nomenclature. The aspect of humiliation is self-evident and is treated as such in the Talmud. Addressed in a manner beneath his dignity, the recipient of such name-calling is subject to a profound degradation. As such, the extensive body of ethical and legal literature governing the embarrassment of others steps back not an inch in encountering this behavior.

However, the offense does not end there, as is clear from the Talmud’s delineation; the singling out of this transgression from the latter category of humiliation is to instruct on this element. Beyond embarrassment, a further level of emotional violation is present. A person’s name is his connection to his sense of identity, to his awareness of his own existence as an independent individual. Indeed, the rabbinical sages considered names to be deeply indicative of one’s inner character. R. Meir gleaned information about those he met from the meanings of their names, and R. Yose suffered for failing to do this. In a less spiritual sense, the name serves to identify to the individual himself his very essence. To be deprived of this name is to become disenfranchised from the reality of being a unique creation; it is to stand bereft of any evidence of individuality. The resulting alienation is profound; it clearly impacts differently than humiliation in other forms, yet apparently in as devastating a manner. The fact that the initial sense of embarrassment has abated is thus inconsequential, and a degradation all its own remains.

The prohibition of using disparaging nicknames is included in the passage discussing ona’at devarim, although it is not clear if that is the exclusive or primary transgression involved. The categorization of this offense has significant implications for understanding its scope and severity. The Zohar also includes the offense among a number of actions that impinge upon the holiness of other Jews: that it is forbidden to “call them by a name of disparagement, or to create a nickname… and all the more so with other words,” an apparent reference to calling someone “wicked” or similar direct insults.

A number of other possibilities of categorization are considered in the later literature, including humiliation and motzi shem ra. As some observe, all of these may be applicable, depending on the nature of the sobriquet. The nickname may simultaneously violate multiple prohibitions, each adding its own dimension of severity.

R. Yosef Shay Rein, in his Pnei Yosef, sees the prohibition as a hybrid of elements of all of the above, combined with an aspect of deception, in that the perpetrator maintains innocence of intent. The particular severity attached to this offense is a function of the regularity of usage (an aspect emphasized by Rambam).

R. Shimon Chirari, in his Shaar Shimon Echad, indicates an additional perspective. He cites a statement in the Talmud that conveys a severe punishment for those who use a disrespectful term to refer to the holy ark. If, he notes, such individuals are deserving of punishment, how much more so would be those who would use comparable language to refer to human beings with feelings and inherent dignity?

The impact of the comparison is to shift the locus of the transgression from the offense to the victim to the attitude of the offender, consistent with the statement in the original Talmudic passage, that the prohibition applies even when there is no experience of humiliation. This, as R. Chirari notes, is analogous to the Rabbinic association of Miriam’s lashon hara about her brother Moshe with the spies’ disparagement of the Land of Israel. The latter offense is considered comparable despite being applied to a non-human subject in that it is demonstrative of an attitude.

 A Particular Form of Humiliation

The fact that the Talmud stresses a distinction between the general prohibition of embarrassment and nickname usage may call attention to a particular quality of this transgression. In this case, there is embarrassment, or at least some degree of degradation, with a twist: the victim is expected to play along, to act as a willing participant who is consenting to the renaming. Social pressure prevents him from objecting or conveying his anguish; instead, he must pretend to enjoy it, or at minimum to accept it with equanimity, when the complete opposite may be the case.

As such, this transgression represents a particular form of humiliation, one in which the victim is socially prevented from defending his dignity and must instead become complicit in his own degradation. If this analysis is correct, the prohibition may represent a broader category of interaction that extends beyond nicknames themselves. Other behaviors that share these core qualities—such as cruel practical jokes, mock compliments, or any form of veiled hostility cloaked in apparent friendliness—may fall under the same conceptual umbrella. The common thread is forcing the victim to suppress his natural reaction to mistreatment and to perform acceptance or even gratitude.

## The Question of Intent

The halakhic authorities gave serious attention to whether even a neutral, or possibly a laudatory, designation is outlawed. The very word used talmudically to indicate a nickname, kinnui, contains an interpretational ambiguity. Tosafot offer two possible definitions: shem shafel, a “low” name bereft of dignity, or shem tafel, a secondary name. Whether the quality of being secondary, while not necessarily insulting, is enough to forbid the name is the topic of discussion.

The Talmud does use the adjective ra, “bad,” in formulating the prohibition. At first glance, this might relate to the reality that the offensiveness of any name is subjective; what might be intended as affectionate may be received as a verbal assault. R. Shraga Feivel Shneebalg considers the possibility of a name acceptable to its subject, but considered slighting by the general populace, inclining toward stringency.

However, the loss of identity that accompanies the deprivation of one’s given nomenclature does not distinguish between artificial names that are endearing and those that are contemptuous. Thus, even innocent nicknames might be restricted, as the focus is not as much on the acceptability of the new designation as on the abandonment of the original one. Tosafot considers it extra piety to avoid even innocuous nicknames, as R. Moshe Troyesh comments, “additional affection is displayed when using the actual name.” He suggests that R. Zeira, who attributed his long life to this stringency, was concerned that usage of any artificial name could result in a derogatory one being tolerated. The Meiri interprets the Talmud’s condemnation to apply even when the subject has no objection.

Alternatively, the grounds to be lenient are significant; a name that is not hurtful to its designee may become a welcome aspect of his dignity. Indeed, the adjective “bad” is adopted in the Shulchan Arukh, as in the Talmud. Rashi does not seem concerned by inoffensive nicknames, though the Rambam’s words are inconclusive.

The question of intent was addressed by R. Eliyahu Baruch Finkel, who perceived a significant difference in emphasis between Rashi and Rambam. Rashi explicitly mentions intent, while Rambam does not—an omission noted by the Maharsha. R. Finkel suggests that in Rambam’s view, the transgression emerges more as a character flaw, a middah ra’ah, rather than as an independent prohibition defined by specific intent.

R. Avraham of Kalveria takes a stringent position on Rashi’s phrasing, asserting that Rashi’s language should not be taken to mean that a nickname used with no intent to humiliate is permissible; arguing from “logic,” he maintains that even if the subject is not embarrassed, there is embarrassment that extends to his family members.

The Knesset HaGedolah interprets the Rambam as differing with Rashi: while the latter assumed that a well-worn nickname no longer humiliates, the Rambam sees it only as a matter of degree. In his view, all disparaging nicknames cause some degree of embarrassment, even when long established.

R. Aharon David Grossman discusses Rashi’s tendency toward leniency, indicated by his language, nitkavein l’hakhlimo, “he intended to humiliate him.” This implies that not only is a benign nickname permissible, but the operative factor is the intent of the user. This is evidenced by Rashi’s position on the Talmud’s identification of R. Yose as “hachorem.” To Tosafot, wary of any nickname, this had to be a reference to his city. To Rashi, the term indicates “sunken nostrils.” The lack of offensive intent apparently renders such a designation acceptable.

Nicknames in the Talmud: Resolving Apparent Contradictions

The usage of nicknames is nonetheless recorded in the Talmud, in apparent contradiction to this prohibition. The most well-known example is shin’na, which Shmuel calls R Yehudah repeatedly. The commentaries offer two definitions: “sharp one” (a compliment on intellectual acuity) or “one with big teeth” (a physical description). The Arukh records both options, challenging since only the first seems compatible with the nickname prohibition.

R. Yosef Chaim of Baghdad suggests that the matter depends completely on the culture of the times and prevailing attitudes towards such names. In some contexts, a physical description carries no negative connotation. However, this explanation is only moderately helpful; at best, the behavior remains questionable.

R. Chirari suggests that it is specifically due to the fact that there are two interpretations that this terminology is acceptable. The existence of the positive meaning saves the referent from embarrassment, as the obligation to judge favorably will lead all listeners to that understanding.

The Chida offers a resolution combining these answers. The appellation is intended as a compliment, but there is a desire to avoid unwanted negative attention (ayin hara). As such, a word is chosen that also has another, less glorious connotation. R. Neriah Gutel demonstrates how this pattern—dual meanings, one complimentary and one neutral—recurs consistently with all such appellations found in the Talmud.

R. Avraham Mann cites R. Chaim Kanievsky as suggesting that perhaps using a nickname once or twice in an affectionate context is acceptable, as this constitutes jest rather than an established appellation. Tosafot distinguish between disparagement (derekh gnai) and jest (derekh bdichuta). Even if valid, this must be approached with extreme caution; the attitude of levity must be shared by both parties.

 Practical Applications: Names and Identity

Tosafot felt that laudatory names are permissible, concluding that it is acceptable to refer to an individual using only the name of his family. R. Grossman adds that in modern society, to do so without some kind of title is often considered disrespectful. 

Responsa Ya’alat Chen feels there is Talmudic basis for not even shortening names when referring to others, reflecting sensitivity to the importance of a person’s complete name as part of their identity. R. Ya’akov Emden discusses the midrashic narrative in which King David bemoans being called “ben Yishai” rather than by his own name, noting that this treats the person as if he doesn’t have a name of his own, failing to accord him the dignity of individual recognition.

R. Avraham Binyamin Silverberg deals with a situation in which a person’s name is insufficient to distinguish him from being confused with others, concluding with midrashic proof that attaching a physically descriptive, but not derogatory, term is permissible.

R. Eliezer Raz brings sources proving that references used to specify identity rather than to disparage should be permitted. He quotes R. Chirari regarding a case of a freckled person called “gingy”; perhaps this is acceptable because it is contextual, not fundamentally degrading. However, R. Moshe Tzuriel warns against even these identifiers, unwilling to rely on the subject’s apparent acquiescence, which may come from embarrassment.

R. Raz suggests that fabricating a new disparaging name can be compared to kilayim, forbidden admixtures; just as a name is central to one’s identity, adding a foreign element is like imposing an alien graft. This suggests the prohibition operates not merely at the level of hurt feelings, but at the deeper level of ontological violation, tampering with the essential nature of another person’s existence.

Contemporary Relevance

The Shulchan Arukh codifies two conditions: that the name be disparaging in nature, and that it be the intention of the user to humiliate. However, this leaves considerable ambiguity, as the disparaging nature of a name may be subjective, and intent is often difficult to ascertain. The nickname prohibition carries a stringency that extends beyond situations involving clear humiliation, applying even without visible embarrassment, and even when not used in public.

The importance of one’s actual name for psychological well-being is supported by contemporary research. Studies cited in Alison Wood Brooks’s Talk: The Science of Conversation and the Art of Being Ourselves demonstrate that “making people feel seen and known starts with what we call them.” The Oakland study found that calling people by their names “matters tremendously. The citizens wanted to be seen as individuals, not as sheep to be herded, managed, and punished.”

The notion that usage of a nickname deprives the subject of his identity adds weight to the offense of using racial epithets or other slurs. The intentional sublimation of an individual’s personhood to a broader group classification—reducing them from a unique individual to merely a representative of a demographic category—is particularly egregious. Relevant to this point, one should not assume the prohibition is only relevant to addressing Jews. While there are sources indicating that exclusivity, there are also significant other views, in particular when there is actual anguish involved, and especially when there is humiliation that demeans the tzelem Elokim. Given the severity coupled with chilul Hashem, stringency is called for.

The work Dinei Tzava U’Milchamah addresses nicknames in military settings, noting they are only permissible if not used for embarrassment. Commanders must be extra careful, as nicknames from officers carry particular weight and tend to “stick” more firmly. What might seem like harmless camaraderie from a commanding officer can become an inescapable label.

 Conclusion

The sensitivities that lie within the human being are multileveled and beyond the range of being easily perceptible. The boundaries set by the halakhic authorities to the creation of nicknames necessitate that a thorough attempt to grasp the depths of these sensitivities precede the utilization of these appellations. Absent such analysis, this behavior is fraught with interpersonal risk of the highest order.