Chesed v’Emet is interpreted in a strikingly different, in fact, even contrary way, by Rabbi Moshe Shmuel Glasner in a comment printed in Shevivei Eish. He asserts that the claim, asserted by Rashi, that one who attends to the burial needs of another cannot anticipate any repayment seems inaccurate. The Talmud (Ketubot 72a and Nedarim 83b) explicitly states, commenting on the verse, “and the living should take it to heart,” (Ecc 7:2) that “one who eulogizes others when they die will in turn be eulogized when he himself dies; one who weeps for others will be wept for when he himself dies; and one who buries others will himself be buried upon his own death”. This is a sort of validation of Yogi Berra’s maxim that “if you don’t go to other people’s funerals, they won’t go to yours”. As such, it seems that Joseph's act of kindness towards Jacob was similarly impacted by recompense, and in fact, we find at the end of the parashah that he does request the same treatment for himself. There should be no difference, R. Glasner asserts, whether the reward comes from the beneficiary himself or from others who repay the kindness after the beneficiary himself has passed on.

Accordingly, maintains R. Glasner, were it not for Rashi's explanation of Chesed v’Emet, he would have put forward a completely opposite interpretation. The word “Chesed” by itself means a kindness that expects no reciprocity. Emet, by contrast, is an action that is reciprocated. This, then, is what Jacob was saying to Joseph: Perform on my behalf what is, right now, an act of kindness; but understand that it is also “Emet”, in that your brothers will do the same for you when the time comes.

However, perhaps it is possible to take a different approach, and to indeed maintain a significant distinction between a benefit that comes from the original recipient and one that comes from society as a whole. When one can expect a reciprocal benefit from the individual he is assisting, that is a simple expression of the social contract. This is not a bad thing per se; it is a fundamental of civilization. Nonetheless, it is not the highest manifestation of chesed.

In contrast, the idea that one who attends to the funeral needs of others can hope to have his own final needs taken care of is a manifestation of a different principle. This point is more moral-philosophical, and goes in the other direction. It is an expression of “Love your neighbor as yourself”, known universally as “the Golden Rule”. No one who hopes to be cared for in death can, in good conscience, fail to do so for others. This is not transactional, but is in fact the opposite: it is responsible morality, and it is arguably what infuses the act with objective meaning. It is specifically because the “living has taken to heart” his own anticipated needs that he comes to realize his obligation towards others who will not themselves be his direct benefactors.

In fact, as some have noted, the very phrase Gemilut Chasadim, by including a form of the word “gemul” - the very word Rashi uses in his commentary on Chesed v'Emet to exclude from its definition -  suggests reciprocity as part of its concept. (See Nefesh HaChaim 4:15 in note, and Uri V’Yishi, Gen. # 29.)

In this reading, Chesed shel Emet would mean a kindness that has no upside in this action, but reflects the moral responsibility of the actor who expects to be treated the same way by others who are, by definition, not the beneficiaries of his act. Thus, once again, but in the opposite way, this final kindness becomes a unique example of the fundamental principle of chesed.