The Tenth of Tevet commemorates the start of the Babylonian siege of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar, which led to the destruction of the First Temple and the Babylonian Exile. It is possible that its tragic associations go back even earlier: R. Shlomo Fisher (Derashot Beit Yishai, 30) and others suggest that this was also the date of the sale of Joseph into slavery by his brothers, an act which stands as the paradigmatic violation of the commandments governing relationships between human beings (see Meshekh Chokhmah, Lev. 16:30). Parashat VaYechi, which contains Joseph's final reassurance to his anxious brothers, calls attention to the unique nature and demanding character of interpersonal mitzvot.

When Joseph's brothers feared retribution after their father Jacob's death, Joseph offered them extraordinary comfort: "You intended me harm, but God intended it for good" (Gen. 50:20). This statement has generated considerable halakhic and philosophical discussion, particularly through the lens of a controversial comment by the Ohr HaChaim (R. Chaim ibn Attar), who explained Joseph's words with a striking comparison: one who attempts to murder another but is unsuccessful bears no liability, even in the eyes of Heaven. According to this reading, because God transformed the brothers' malicious intent into beneficial results—ultimately saving the family and the entire region from famine—they bore no responsibility for their original sin.

This position immediately raises profound questions. The Talmud (Nazir 23a) explicitly states that one who attempts to eat non-kosher food, but inadvertently discovers that the food he has taken is actually kosher, nonetheless requires atonement (see also Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 12:18). If failed intentions toward ritual violations require expiation, how could the Ohr HaChaim suggest that failed malicious intentions towards another person bear no consequence?

Some scholars have attempted to resolve this difficulty by proposing a fundamental distinction between ritual commandments and interpersonal ones. (See Arvei Nachal; Kli Chemdah, VaYechi, 4; Pardes Yosef, Genesis 50, # 67; R. Mordechai Elefant, Zehav Mordechai to Genesis; R. Elisha Horowitz, Bei Chiya to Genesis (and see also his different approach in Numbers 30:6); and see the discussions in R. Chaim Shlomo Abraham, Birkhat Shlomo, 3 [where he offers extensive alternative textual sources]; Responsa Heishiv Davar, 33;  and Dvar Torah to Genesis.)  In this view, interpersonal commandments focus primarily on results rather than intentions, while ritual commandments emphasize intent. The logic follows from a basic premise: interpersonal mitzvot are defined by their impact upon actual human beneficiaries, making practical outcomes paramount. Commandments geared towards God, in contrast, can receive credit for intent, as God is able to consider that factor even though it does not benefit human beings.

However, this resolution itself generates further complications. The emphasis on results in interpersonal commandments functions as a stringency, not a leniency. If the focus on results serves to make interpersonal commandments more demanding—requiring extra effort to ensure positive outcomes—why should this same principle excuse malicious intent? The first point does not prove the second: heightened attention to consequences should intensify responsibility, not diminish it.

Moreover, the unique characteristics of interpersonal mitzvot should actually increase the importance of intentions, not reduce it. Maimonides, in his introduction to Pirkei Avot (Shemoneh Perakim), makes a crucial differentiation regarding the extent to which one's instincts should correlate automatically with the Torah's mitzvot. In issues of ritual, it is commendable that one bend one's will to that of the Torah; however, in areas of basic morality, whose underpinnings are readily apprehended by the human psyche, one must strive to develop a perspective that is on its own consistent with the Torah's commandments. The rational accessibility of interpersonal commandments means they are particularly bound up with character development and moral formation.

This distinction may be relevant in understanding an instructive story involving R. Yisrael Meir Kagan, author of the Chafetz Chaim, and R. Yisrael Salanter, founder of the Mussar movement. A businessman requested to purchase all of R. Kagan's many books, with the glaring exception of the book “Chafetz Chaim”, which deals with the laws of lashon hara. When questioned, the man admitted that the pressures of his business made it difficult to avoid saying derogatory things about the people he came into contact with, and he would rather not purchase a work whose directives he felt compelled to ignore. R. Kagan prevailed upon him to buy it anyway, relating a comment made to him by R. Salanter. When the work Chafetz Chaim was completed, R. Salanter told its author, "If all you accomplish is to evoke one sigh from one Jew [who becomes aware of the prohibitions and cannot observe them], the work is worthwhile."

While poetic, R. Salanter's comment is actually slightly surprising. The Talmud generally recommends, "better they be inadvertent sinners than intentional ones." If education will have no effect on practice, it is perhaps better not to disturb the excuse of ignorance. Therefore, why would R. Salanter advocate "evoking a sigh"?

It may be that it is appropriate to distinguish between commandments that are ritual in nature and those that are given over more readily to human understanding. In those mitzvot whose themes are beyond us, if practice is not possible, it may be preferable to remain ignorant, as the theory will remain outside the boundaries of comprehension as well. However, in those areas where the rationale is apparent, and the laws, even in theory, will automatically display their contribution to the personality of "the right and the good," even study alone is valuable. As the Netziv (R. Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin) comments, while one may not add to the observance of mitzvot, this applies to those commandments not given over to immediate understanding; however, these principles of social behavior, readily understandable, are therefore amenable to being added onto through human initiative. Thus, the Mishnah says of personal kindness that it "has no set measurement"—that is, no limits.

This connection to character development makes intentions paramount. If interpersonal mitzvot are meant to shape who we are morally, not merely what we do mechanically, then the internal disposition with which we act becomes central to their fulfillment. The focus on results does not compete with this; rather, it complements it, demanding both proper intention and successful outcome.

Indeed, the severity of holding people accountable for results stems precisely from the reality that human beings experience pain and benefit concretely, while God is both all-knowing and without personal needs and can count good intentions as achieving the same effect as an actual deed. Human beings are not in the same position and understandably take a result-based perspective to their own suffering. The Tanakh tells of Peninah, the other wife of Chanah's husband. Apparently a woman of some cruelty, she teased Chanah about her initial barrenness. The Talmud (Bava Batra 16a) comments that actually, she had been well-intentioned; she hoped to prod Chanah into more fervent prayer that would eventually provide her with children. R. Chaim Shmuelevitz observes that the Talmud is offering no mitigation of Peninah's guilt. Rather, it is expressing that when dealing with the genuine pain of other individuals, good intentions are no defense; the end result is just as anguishing. As he puts it, if one places a person's arm in an oven, even if one means well, it is no less burnt. This principle—that human suffering cannot be excused by intentions—heightens accountability for outcomes, but it says nothing about relieving one of responsibility for malicious intent that fails to cause harm.

More nuanced approaches to the Ohr HaChaim have therefore emerged. R. Yitzchak Shmelkes, in an extensive responsum (Responsa Beit Yitzchak, Yoreh Deah I, 8:8) addressing moral and legal liability for intent, draws a crucial distinction between sinful intentions that were merely unsuccessful and those that actually yielded a positive result for the intended victim. The brothers' case falls into this second category—their actions, despite malicious motivation, produced Joseph's elevation and the family's salvation. Furthermore, it is possible that while intentions certainly matter in interpersonal relations, in situations where there is no perceptible negative effect on the other individual, the only responsibility for repentance exists between the perpetrator and God. This may be what Joseph's comment reflects—not complete absolution, but recognition that the interpersonal debt has been erased by the positive outcome, leaving only the vertical relationship with the Divine to address.

These debates illuminate a broader truth: the interpersonal commandments constitute their own realm with distinct rules, not only equal to the ritual commandments of the Torah but in some ways considered more demanding. The statement of the Rosh (Commentary to Peah 1:1) that God is more desirous of the interpersonal commandments than He is of those between Man and God has led to multiple explanatory theories.

One approach is simply cumulative: as the interpersonal commandments address both God, who mandates all commandments, and people, who are their beneficiaries, their fulfillment is doubly productive. This theory can be found in the writings of Maimonides (Hilkhot Geneivah 7:12, citing Bava Batra 88b). This reality complicates the effort of repentance, in that a dual process is necessary, seeking forgiveness both from Man and God; and this in itself intensifies the significance of the interpersonal commandments.

Other thinkers introduce an additional philosophical element: God's essence is to be benevolent, and some go so far as to understand the world as being created for this reason (see R. Yonatan Eibshutz, Ya'arot Dvash, I, drush 5). Accordingly, the performance of commandments which themselves benefit human beings is a particular cause of Divine satisfaction.

One practical application of this premise is that when confronted by two mitzvah opportunities, the interpersonal one should be prioritized, a position taken by many authorities. This notion in turn impacts other principles that are built upon dictating prioritization. For example: involvement in a mitzvah between Man and God does not exempt one from interrupting to attend to an interpersonal mitzvah, despite the general rule that one engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from other mitzvot (the principle of osek b'mitzvah patur min hamitzvah; see Responsa Shem Aryeh, Yoreh Deah 64).

Similarly, the general rule prioritizing a positive commandment over a negative one when the two are in simultaneous conflict (aseh docheh lo ta'aseh) may not apply if one of the commandments is an interpersonal one. This can be explained through two of the above points: the interpersonal mitzvah is prioritized to actually take place, while the ritual mitzvah can be credited for effort; and the interpersonal mitzvah is also a mitzvah for the sake of God, while the ritual mitzvah is only the latter, and will still prevail in a conflict due to its dual nature. (See Chiddushei R. Shimon Yehudah HaKohen (Shkop), Nedarim, 1; Chiddushei R. Meir Simcha, Chulin 138b, sv yatza; Zekher Asah and Responsa Ya’alat Chen, Choshen Mishpat, 1:6. See also Levavo Ne’aman, pp. 509-510.)

Likewise, the rule dictating that one should not pass up an immediate mitzvah opportunity for one in the future (ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot) may not apply when the second opportunity involves an interpersonal commandment. This principle also contributes to the extreme and hotly debated position that even life-threatening emergencies do not override interpersonal prohibitions.

The primacy of interpersonal mitzvot is also enhanced by the fact that their impact is felt in the human world, where perceptible results alone are acknowledged, in contrast with mitzvot done for the sake of God, who can credit intentions through the rule known as ones rachmana patrei—"God excuses that which is impossible." Human beings cannot credit excuses or intentions; they only know their own realities of pain or benefit. (See R. Yosef Engel, Atvan D’Orayta, klal 13;R. Chaim Pilagi, Nefesh Kol Chai, ma’arekhet ha-alef, 34 (who explains accordingly the rule “adam mu’ad l’olam”);  R. Aharon Levine, Birkhat Aharon, Berakhot, ma’amar 27; Zekher Asah, 1:4 in fn. Interestingly, R. Yehoshua Baumol, Responsa Emek Halakhah, I, 45:2, questions the logic but notes that it does explain some sources such as the Ran to Nedarim 9a. See also Responsa Avnei Nezer, OC 401:3, explaining in a similar fashion why mitzvot that require communicating to others must be performed even at great expense.) This distinction has multiple implications in halakhic principles.

Thus, for example, one would prioritize the basic performance of an interpersonal mitzvah rather than delaying it so that it may be performed with extra enhancements (hiddurim), and would similarly not emphasize personal execution of the mitzvah rather than performing through an agent (departing from the usual rule of mitzvah bo yoter m'shlucho; see Responsa Achiezer I, Even HaEzer 28:16).

Some suggest that another affected area may be within Maimonides' attitude towards indeterminate situations (safek). In his view, the Torah did not make demands under uncertain circumstances, only imposing its rules when they are definitely called for. However, the priority placed on accomplishment in the area of interpersonal mitzvot may mean that one is required to account for even the possibility of obligation or prohibition in this realm (see Responsa Ya'alat Chen, I, 7).

The question of intentionality in interpersonal mitzvot merits deeper examination. The Noda BeYehudah (R. Yechezkel Landau; cited by his son R. Shmuel Landau in Ahavat Tziyon, Drush 10), referencing Talmudic passages regarding charity, posits that while ritual commandments may require intent in order to be credited as a mitzvah, interpersonal mitzvot are result-based and are therefore inherently meaningful even when performed for personal motivations or unintentionally.

However, this point is complex. The real-world impact of interpersonal commandments may indeed place urgency on the result, but it does not necessarily follow that it negates the role of intent. To an extent, the Noda BeYehudah acknowledges this, observing that in the opposite circumstance—one who separates funds for charity which then get lost or stolen before reaching the needy—the donor should also be credited with a mitzvah. R. Moshe Feinstein (Darash Moshe, Genesis 18:4) makes this point explicitly, asserting that the Torah tells us that Abraham "rushed" to attend to the needs of guests to refute the "mistake" of those who believe that in the area of interpersonal relations, it is only the result that matters; here, we find that personal enthusiasm (zrizut) is credited as well.

The points of prioritization and focus on results in interpersonal commandments are joined homiletically by the Reisher Rav (R. Aharon Levine, HaDrash VaHaIyun, Parashat VaEtchanan, ma'amar 44), discussing the symbolism of tefillin. He suggests that the tefillin of the arm represent the interpersonal commandments, as their focus is on practical accomplishment. The tefillin of the head, by contrast, represent the commandments between Man and God, as they require proper intent in order to be meaningful. He proceeds to explain that the tefillin of the arm are put on first because they take priority in a conflict. Likewise, this means they will always be already on the body when the tefillin of the head are put on, emphasizing that the ritual commandments cannot exist in isolation from the interpersonal commandments.

One application of the focus on practical impact is the question of whether interpersonal mitzvot require dedicated actions or can overlap with other mitzvot. Building on the above logic, R. Chaim Yehudah Levitan (Responsa Sha'arei De'ah, I, 57) argues that interpersonal mitzvot can be performed simultaneously with other mitzvot, despite a rule generally preventing such doubling up. This has both negative and positive implications. The Maharal (commenting on the mishnah, Shabbat 2a) maintained that the defense granted to one who accidentally commits a transgression in pursuit of a mitzvah (ta'ah b'dvar mitzvah) does not apply if the commandment is an interpersonal one. R. Levitan (Responsa Sha'arei De'ah, II, 17) suggests this is for a related reason: intent does not provide an excuse, as intent is not necessary for the fulfillment of the commandment. This is, arguably, a debatable expansion; one may instead distinguish between situations where the action is being performed with intent and when it is not, even if both accomplish the goal.

This concept is developed in an extraordinary fashion by R. Chaim of Kraz (Responsa Pe'er Etz Chaim, III, 28) in explaining why interpersonal commandments generally are not preceded by blessings. He begins by suggesting that the purpose of blessings is to rouse the individual with a spirit of joy in the performance of the commandments, and that this itself is a biblical directive, as indicated by the verse: "Because you did not serve the Lord your God with joy and with gladness of heart" (Deuteronomy 28:47). However, he posits, this verse refers only to the ritual commandments. This can be discerned from the fact that it speaks of "serving" God, which one does out of obedience, while the interpersonal commandments are understood rationally and thus fulfilled for that reason. He then explains that this distinction flows consistently, as interpersonal commandments are defined by their impact upon the beneficiary, and thus the joy of the giver is irrelevant. It is only the ritual commandments that are impacted by intent and thus subject to blessings.

The real-world impact of interpersonal mitzvot, together with their perceived rational accessibility, also yields the position that details in this realm can be ascertained through principles of logic.

Another major distinction that may exist between the two categories is that the interpersonal commandments may be defined by their impact as far as their underlying theories as well—that is to say, they are consequentialist in nature. This is a position that has been advanced by R. Elchanan Wasserman (Kovetz He'arot to Yevamot, #70), who asserted a broad formulation of to'elet, the concept of "purpose" that permits and even requires speech otherwise prohibited as lashon hara. He maintains that to'elet essentially justifies the overriding of any interpersonal commandment, in that they are all, in his understanding, defined by malicious intent, and thus permitted when the purpose is constructive.

More recently, R. Asher Weiss (Minchat Asher al HaTorah, Lev. 56) has argued similarly, maintaining that the interpersonal commandments operate differently than the ritual commandments in that they are guided by the principle of "the right and the good" (yashar v'tov); accordingly, their purpose defines their function.

In Parshat VaYechi, Jacob blesses his sons, creating the foundation for the Jewish people. Joseph reassures his brothers, completing the process of reconciliation that began with their reunion in Egypt. The interpersonal healing within this family becomes the prerequisite for national destiny. On the Tenth of Tevet, we fast not only to mourn national catastrophe but to acknowledge that interpersonal breach—brother against brother—stands at the root of our exile. The path to redemption must therefore run through the realm of interpersonal mitzvot, performed with both proper intent and successful outcome, elevating both our souls and our society toward the ideals the Torah demands.