Before being sold into slavery by his brothers, Joseph is described by the Torah as having informed on them for their bad behavior: "And Joseph brought the bad reports of them to their father" (Gen. 37:2). This brief verse raises fundamental questions about the ethics of negative speech. Was Joseph justified in reporting his brothers' misdeeds? What conditions would need to be present for such reporting to be permitted—or even required?

A contemporary of the Chafetz Chaim, R. Yechiel Michel Rabinowitz, assumed that the righteous Joseph would only engage in such reporting if it was justified and permitted to do so. (It should be noted that not all commentators considered Joseph to be completely blameless; see, for example, Rashi, Gen. loc. cit; R. Moshe Sofer, Chiddushei Chatam Sofer to Parashat Vayeshev, and Tanchuma (Buber) to Vayeshev. See also Pnei Yehoshua, Shabbat 55b, s.v. Tania; and note, extensively, R. Moshe Blau, Mishnat Moshe to Shabbat, pp.74-75, concerning his comments, and see also R. Yisrael Zissel Paltin, in the journal Tevunah, 4(62), Tevet, 5706 . Also see the alternative explanation in R. Avraham Y. Munseh, Padeh Et Avraham, Genesis, II, 37:1 The Chafetz Chaim is critical of Joseph in Shemirat HaLashon, II, 14 and by implication in BMC, Hil. Lashon Hara 8:25. See also Emek HaLashon, 49.)

Accordingly, he uses this passage to determine what conditions are necessary for such justification. His analysis yields three criteria derived from this fascinating exercise in the analysis of biblical narrative (Afikei Yam, preface to volume II. See, similarly, R. Aharon Ben Samchon, Bigdei Yesha, Ma’amar Sekhar VeOnesh, p. 13.; and see also Nachmanides, loc cit. For a similar grouping of the conditions into three items, see R. Aryeh Katz, in the journal Techumin, XXVII , pp. 180-184).

 First, there must be no other way to accomplish the desired corrective. As such, one could ask why Joseph did not rebuke his brothers personally, rather than inform on them. The context reveals the answer; the previous verse identifies Joseph as a "lad" (na'ar) in the eyes of his brothers; clearly, he would not have been taken seriously by them.

Second, the language of "bringing" reports is unusual; there are many words in Hebrew for "speaking" that would be more natural. R. Rabinowitz suggests that the intent is to convey that the reports were brought in the same way that a physical item is carried: it is the same item when picked up in the original location and when put down in the new one. So too, Joseph did not embellish his reports at all, nor did he offer his opinions; the facts were identical when he spoke them as when he witnessed them.

Third, R. Rabinowitz observes another irregularity of language, in that the Torah states that Joseph brought the reports to "their father", without referencing the fact that Jacob was also Joseph's father. The intent, he maintains, was to emphasize that Joseph was thinking only about correcting the behavior of the brothers, and not at all of the fact that he may compare favorably to them in his own father's eyes. That possibility was irrelevant to his motivation, and thus instructive of the attitude necessary to justify such reporting.

These three criteria—no alternative method of correction, complete accuracy without embellishment, and pure motivation—emerge directly from the Torah's account of Joseph's actions. To fully appreciate their significance, one must understand the broader framework within which they operate: the laws of lashon hara and the crucial concept of "to'elet," or purpose.

Defining the Concept

One of the most consequential, controversial, and complex aspects of the laws of lashon hara is that known as "to'elet" or "purpose." Most importantly, this notion indicates that when the information is necessary to a third party for that individual's protection, it is not only permissible to relate the information but obligatory. More broadly, a general productive purpose, under certain circumstances, may also be considered justification for what otherwise could be termed lashon hara.

Consequential, then, in that in the presence of this idea, an action flips from forbidden to mandatory. Controversial, not in its existence, which is undisputed, but in its application. The evaluation of to'elet is resistant to generalized legislation and is often dependent on painstakingly considered judgment. One of the rabbinical court judges in 19th century Vilna, R. Yisrael Isser Isserlein (1827-1889), wrote (Pitchei Teshuvah, O.C. 156) that while so many spoke forcefully about the prohibition of lashon hara, an equally important issue is neglected: the failure to speak when innocent people are at risk of harm. Similarly, a contemporary authority, R. Moshe Sternbuch, in his responsa (Resp. Teshuvot VeHanhagot, I, 558), represents rabbinic concern of the issue when he expresses in forceful terms the pressing need to be well-versed in the intricate details of lashon hara regulation. As he observes, as severe a prohibition as lashon hara is, neglecting to inform when necessary can be a violation of equal or greater severity. Thus, as well, the complexity.

Two Perspectives on the Prohibition

Approaching the notion of to'elet at its roots may also call for a reflection upon two established perspectives. If the prohibition of lashon hara is directed at the indulgence of a negative character trait, it might be explained that a statement for to'elet is simply not lashon hara (see R. Yitzchak Hutner, Pachad Yitzchak, Iggerot UKhtavim, 59). Such an understanding emerges from one of the scriptural instructions regarding lashon hara, "You shali not bear a false report" (Ex. 23:1). The word translated as false, "shav," actually more often connotes "needless," thus referring to derogatory information that cannot produce a benefit. By definition, then, if there is a benefit, the prohibition would appear inoperative. Motivated by the protection of another, the speaker lacks the malevolence that typifies the transgressor.

Alternatively, if lashon hara is defined as an act of putting another at risk through speech, the exception of to'elet requires another explanation. The subject is still harmed, even if less so than the listener—or any potential victim—would have been. Thus, the transgression is not absent, only outweighed by a greater need. The Torah obligates protecting others from harm, as it prohibits one to "stand idly by the blood of [his] neighbor" (Lev. 19:16). This reference to the neighbor's "blood" is understood to be not only to risk of life, but to any type of harm. Accordingly, to'eletwould represent the danger to the listener overwhelming the harm to the subject.

This rationale is cited explicitly by the Chafetz Chaim as the motivation behind to'elet. Indeed, this structure flows from a direct reading of another of the primary scriptural references to lashon hara, contained in the same verse: "You shali not go up and down as a talebearer among your people; neither shall you stand idly by the blood of your neighbor: I am the Lord." The connotation is that while one is generally not to be a talebearer, this ideal should not prevent one from acting to save one who is at risk.

Thus, the license or mandate to speak "purposeful" negative speech about another has two possible models: either such speech is simply not included in the prohibition; or, alternatively, it is included, but the prohibition itself is overridden by the protection imperative. There is a major difference between the two: In the second model, as an otherwise forbidden action is being advocated, the decision must rest upon a solid foundation of necessity. In other words, the threshold for justification is higher if one value, protection of the innocent, is outweighing the other, the general abhorrence of negative speech. Alternatively, if lashon hara is needless gossip, and "purposeful" speech is simply not in that category, a lower standard may suffice.

The Conditions of the Chafetz Chaim

In the writings of the Chafetz Chaim, it seems that his premise is that "purposeful" speech is permitted because it justifies the offense, not because it is outside of it. Accordingly, he refers in his formulation of the protection mandate to definite knowledge of potential harm. It is specifically when the risk is definite that the dictum of "do not stand idly by" is understood as an obligation. When the harm is less apparent, "do not stand idly by" presents as a praiseworthy ideal, rather than a mandatory directive that can outweigh conflicting values.

It is likely with this perspective in mind that the Chafetz Chaim proceeds to mandate specific conditions under which the relaying of derogatory information becomes permissible, even beyond the opening premise of "purpose," adding as many as six other conditions. (Hil. Lashon Hara 10:2 and Hil. Rekhilut 9:2. The lists are not exactly the same in the two locations, and there are more conditions regarding lashon hara than regarding rekhilut.)

Perhaps the primary condition, particularly in light of our premises regarding the core damage inflicted by lashon hara, is that the speaker know that the information is true. However, this condition, as important as it is, is not necessarily indisputable. It is possible that there may be some possible risk to another that the speaker does not know with certainty, but the potential harm must be conveyed nonetheless to guarantee the protection of others. Accordingly, it has been cogently asserted that this condition is adaptable through proper presentation. If the speaker is able to transmit the information in a fashion consistent with his degree of certitude—in other words, to express that it is a concern rather than a certainty—this condition should be satisfied.

This requirement for accuracy parallels R. Rabinowitz's second criterion derived from Joseph's actions: that the reports be "brought" without embellishment, the facts identical when spoken as when witnessed. The Chafetz Chaim similarly requires that the information be presented in a completely straightforward manner, without any exaggeration or "spin."

Other conditions focus on the necessity of the revelation. Thus, the Chafetz Chaim requires that the misdeed under discussion is an actual, definable injustice that warrants such a step. Further, there should be no other way to address the situation: if possible and effective, the perpetrator should be spoken to directly, and in general other methods should be sought to resolve the problem. This, too, echoes R. Rabinowitz's first criterion from Joseph: that there must be no other way to accomplish the desired corrective. Joseph, as a "lad" in the eyes of his brothers, clearly would not have been taken seriously by them had he attempted direct rebuke.

Presumably, only speaking when absolutely necessary would include also ascertaining that only those who are affected are able to hear, and thus, for example, not to relay such information on the phone in a public place when uninvolved parties can listen. Similarly, even once the decision is made to speak, if possible an effort should be made to limit unnecessary damage to the subject.

This last consideration contains particularly interesting aspects. It is understandable if the preference is to solve the problem without disparaging the subject. However, it emerges from the Chafetz Chaim's presentation that even if the negative picture is painted, if it is possible to do so indirectly and without need for explicit statements, that path is also preferred. This is surprising; the damage to the subject takes place either way, despite the "clean hands" of the speaker. This value seems to be directed at the character component of the lashon hara prohibition rather than at the practical impact. If the damage is necessary, that is regrettable, but at least the corruptive effect of engaging in negative speech can be limited.

The Chafetz Chaim also requires that the negative impact that will likely result from the report not be greater than justice dictates. However, this may not be possible to control while still adequately protecting others, and accordingly this factor is also assessed in light of the potential harm threatening others.

The Challenge of Mixed Motives

One of the Chafetz Chaim's criteria poses a particular challenge to the speaker—and finds its clearest biblical illustration in the Joseph narrative. This condition mandates that the intent be purely to prevent harm, and not flow from any hatred of the subject. If indeed he is motivated by hatred, he nonetheless is not exempted from the obligation to prevent harm. Accordingly, rules the Chafetz Chaim, this standard obligates the speaker to relate the information, but only after performing the inner work necessary to dispose of his hatred.

R. Rabinowitz's third criterion, derived from Joseph's example, parallels this concern. The Torah states that Joseph brought the reports to "their father," without referencing the fact that Jacob was also Joseph's father. The intent was to emphasize that Joseph was thinking only about correcting the behavior of the brothers, and not at all of the fact that he may compare favorably to them in his own father's eyes. That possibility was irrelevant to his motivation, and thus instructive of the attitude necessary to justify such reporting.

However, the very premise of the Chafetz Chaim, that a motive of "purpose" does not by itself justify the relating of information if it is tainted by an accompanying ulterior motive, has been the subject of some debate. The ruling is based on statements of the great medieval authority Rabbenu Yonah. Once again, the serious objection can be raised from the need for protection of the innocent; it may be that the only one in a position to provide this protection nonetheless has a personal animus against the subject.

More conceptually, the premise can be challenged particularly when the question is abstracted to a broader issue in Talmudic law: the role of intent or ulterior motive in undermining the legitimacy of suspending prohibitions under extenuating circumstances. One might conclude, for example, the clearly incorrect position that one who is seriously ill may not eat on Yom Kippur, in that he enjoys the food, and thus his motive for eating is not purely to protect his health. The theoretical underpinnings of the issue are substantial enough that a later scholar devoted a book-length volume (Tokhachat Chaim by R. Gershon Robinson) to defending this premise of the Chafetz Chaim, particularly against the background of the broader talmudic issues. As the author notes, lashon hara may differ significantly from other areas where mixed motivations are present in the fact that one who eats on Yom Kippur may also enjoy the food does not affect the basics of the process. By contrast, if one has such an antipathy towards another that he is eager to speak badly about him, that bias may fundamentally affect the content that he is relaying and indeed the decision to relay it in the first place.

Practically, the issue is complex and indeed the Chafetz Chaim himself emphasizes different elements of the equation at various points throughout his writings. While the specifics of this consideration are controversial, it seems that two fundamental points emerge from the debate. First, one who is tainted by antipathy toward the subject is prone to the prevalent biases and prejudices that may skew the reliability and even the basic truth of the report, even if he believes he is motivated by the protection of another, and thus when a more objective source is available, that is greatly preferable. Second, when there is no alternative, it is incumbent upon the speaker to take any steps possible to correct for his predisposition and to present as untainted a report as is feasible.

R. Shraya Deblitsky, a prominent rabbinic author from Bnei Brak, Israel, noted (approbation to Tokhachat Chaim) that there is more latitude to account for this concern of mixed motivations when considering giving a negative report to protect oneself. However, if another person is threatened, the protection imperative takes priority and the warning must be issued. In either case, he notes, the conditions of the Chafetz Chaim are difficult if not impossible to fulfill perfectly. Rather, they should be taken as important considerations that require a good faith effort to address to the best of one's ability.

Purpose as the Determinant

Still others dispute the need for criteria at all in establishing "purpose." The Chazon Ish maintained that there is essentially one simple determinant of permitted purposeful speech: that it have a purposeful intent. As noted, the debate seems to center around the mechanism by which such speech is allowed, either as simply excluded from the lashon haraprohibition or as outweighing it through necessity.

The Core Principle

With this background, we return to the story of Joseph and his brothers. However, it must be emphasized that the core principle is not in question. Protection of the innocent is always the priority, and to knowingly allow harm or risk to come to another through the claim of lashon hara is a distortion of Jewish law. Despite the general care required not to violate Torah law, standing idly by while another suffers a risk of predatory behavior is not "erring on the side of caution," but a serious dereliction of duty. The golden rule principle of "love your fellow as yourself" is an overarching foundational concept that of course includes a sensitivity to the needs of others not to be disparaged; however, it even more obviously extends to the rights of others not to be victimized. The responsibility is a heavy one, and many factors are relevant to making a proper and wise decision; but first and foremost, the priorities and the underlying values must be established.

Joseph, in bringing reports of his brothers to his father, navigated this complex terrain. The Torah's careful language—identifying him as a "lad" who would not be heeded, describing him as "bringing" rather than "speaking" his reports, and referring to Jacob as "their father" rather than "his father"—offers instruction in the conditions necessary for such reporting to be justified: when no alternative exists, when accuracy is maintained without embellishment, and when motivation is directed solely toward correction rather than self-aggrandizement.

In the digital age, these considerations are more relevant than ever. The responsibility to protect the innocent while maintaining the integrity of speech demands constant vigilance, careful judgment, and, above all, clarity about underlying values and priorities.