Hashem instructs Moshe Rabenu that when the Jewish people settle the Land of Israel, they must set aside six cities of refuge so that "a murderer shall flee there - one who takes life unintentionally"(Bamidbar 35:11).  Three cities of refuge had been designated for the other side of the Jordan during Moshe's lifetime (see Devarim 4:41), but "as long as the three in Eretz Yisrael had not been selected, the three across the Jordan did not provide refuge" (Makkot 9b).  For whom were these cities of refuge intended?  "For the children of Israel and the proselyte and resident among them shall these six cities be a refuge" (Bamidbar 35:15).  The Torah is informing us that the laws of "ir miklat" are not limited to Jews, but a "ger toshav" guilty of accidental murder must go into exile as well.  In no other area of the Torah do we find atonement for the Noahide for accidental violation. (Rashi (Makkot 9a "lefichach") is of the opinion that a Noahide incurs the death penalty even for an accidental violation, while the Rambam (Hilchot Melachim 10:1) takes the opposite view that he is absolved from any punishment).  The one exception to this rule is accidental murder - the Torah gave the ger toshav the possibility and the requirement of atonement and in specific instances he is required to flee to a city of refuge (see Makkot 8b-9a).

For what type of murder is a person exiled to a city of refuge?  One of the examples given in the Torah is "who will come with his fellow into the forest to hew trees, and his hand swings the axe to cut the tree, and the iron slips from the wood and finds his fellow and he dies, he shall flee to one of these cities and live" (Devarim 19:5).  This does not refer to a person who had intended to kill, all he wished to do was chop down a few trees.  What happened while he was chopping the trees?  According to the Chachamim the iron axe-head slipped from its handle and killed someone, while according to Rebbi a piece of wood from the tree being chopped flew off and killed another person (see Makkot 7b).

What would the halacha mandate should a similar occurrence happen with regard to other prohibitions of the Torah?  For example, if someone was chopping down a tree on Shabbat and the axe-head or a piece of wood flew and caused a fire or cut down an electric line or caused some other violation of the Shabbat.  Would such a person be required to bring a Korban Chatat?  Certainly not!  After all "the Torah prohibited only 'melechet machshevet' - calculated labor" (Beitza 13b).  What about the prohibition against slaughtering sacrificial animals outside the courtyard of the Beit Hamikdash where the concept of "melechet machshevet" does not apply?  What would be the halacha if one were chopping a tree and the axe-head or a piece of wood flew and slaughtered this animal outside the courtyard, is such a person guilty of this infraction?  Also not! He, after all had no intent of slaughtering this animal outside of its designated area, all he wanted to do was to chop down a tree.  Such an act is not even classified as "beshogeg", it is simply a "mitasek" and is not punishable at all.

When it comes to murder, however, one who kills in such a fashion is required to flee to a city of refuge in spite of having no intention whatsoever of killing this or any other person.  Indeed, had his intention been to kill at all - even an animal, and it turned out that to be a person - his crime is deemed so severe that exile will not sufficiently atone for his sin.  Exile only applies to one guilty of the "shogeg" stated above - an act that when applied to other areas of the Torah would be considered no more than a mere "mitasek".

Let us analyze this comparison from another perspective. What would be if someone picked up an object on Shabbat with the intent of throwing it?  He is unsure if this act of throwing will result in a violation of the Shabbat or not. For example, there is a possibility that the object will hit an apple and cause the apple to fall off the tree ("kotzer") or perhaps the object will fly until the public domain.  He has no intention of violating these prohibitions but is aware that the possibility exists. Would we permit him to throw the object or not?  The answer is yes, for this is a clear case of "davar she-eino mitkaven" in which the halacha follows the view of Rav Shimon (see Rambam Hilchot Shabbat 1:5).  He is permitted to throw the object in spite of the great likelihood that a violation of the Shabbat will result, simply because his intent is not to desecrate the Shabbat.  Would we apply the same principles to murder?  Would the halacha permit me to throw an object while fully aware that the possibility existed that it may hit my fellow man standing near by and kill him?  Certainly not!  If throwing the object would in fact kill another, we would view this act as not far below intentional murder, G-d forbid.  Did you know that your fellow Jew was standing in the path?  What right then did you have to throw the object if there was even the slightest chance that it would kill him?  Even exiling him to a city of refuge would offer him no protection and the avenger of the blood would be permitted to kill him even within the borders of the "ir miklat" (see Rambam Hilchot Rotze-ach uShmirat HaNefesh 6:4).  Once again we see that we place far more responsibility on a person for his actions when it comes to murder than all other areas of the Torah.

What is the reason behind this distinction?  Why do we hold someone more responsible for an unintentional act of murder than unintentional violation of other prohibitions of the Torah?  The reason for this distinction is clear: when it comes to actions involving other areas of the Torah, Hashem does not care about the results of the action only about the action itself.  Does it really concern Hashem whether or not the apple is off the tree?  All He cares about is HOW it was taken off the tree - was it plucked by a Jew who violated the Shabbat, by a non-Jew, or by a Jew in a manner that the action does not relate back directly to him (e.g. "mitasek" or "davar she-eino mitkaven").  It is because Hashem is not interested in the result, that no atonement is required.  We can apply the same line of reasoning to our other example of slaughtering sanctified animals outside the Beit Hamikdash.  Although there is a requirement to guard all sacrificial animals and protect them from becoming disqualified (see Rashi Bamidbar 18:8), Hashem does not really care whether this particular animal should die within or without the confines of the Beit Hamikdash.  The A-lmighty has no lack of sacrificial animals.  His concern is solely that the shochet does not slaughter the animal outside.

When it comes to murder, however, Hashem not only cares about the action itself but He cares about the results - each and every Jewish soul is precious to Him.  Whether a Jew has died through an intentional act of murder, "mitasek", or "davar she-eino mitkaven", the fact remains that a Jew has been killed.  We must do our utmost to prevent such a killing from taking place. Therefore even "mitasek" is not absolved of all responsibility. He should have been more careful and therefore will incur some liability. If he could not have prevented this killing, then we say "onehs Rachmana patrei" "Hashem exempted one in extenuating circumstances" (Nedarim 27a).  Otherwise, who told you to chop down a tree with people in the vicinity?  Did you check to see that the axe-head was secure on the axe?  Did you take all the other necessary precautions?  If not, then you are responsible for the grave consequences of your actions.

The concept we have just mentioned is not limited exclusively to murder, but applies to property damage as well.  If someone were to throw a rock in an area where sheep pass by, could we absolve him from any liability by claiming that he had no intention of killing any sheep but just wished to throw a rock ("davar she-eino mitkaven")?  Of course not! As in the case of murder, the possessions of a Jew are very precious to Hashem.  Hashem does not wish for any Jewish possessions to be destroyed and thus we cannot speak of "davar she-eino mitkaven".  This liability even applies to property that would have been destroyed regardless of human intervention.  For example, if you notice a wall is about to collapse on a top of sheep, if it is within your power, to move the sheep out of the way (provided of course that it does not endanger your own life), you must do so to fulfill "hashavat aveida" (see Baba Metzia 31a).

How much more can we apply this principle to the life of a fellow Jew?  If you see a Jew in danger, whether because of a natural hazard or because a non-Jew intends to kill him, if it is within your means to save him without placing your own life in danger then you must do so.  The halacha would even require you to take a small risk for this.  (There are opinions requiring one to place himself at a great risk as well in order to save another, but many authorities reject this view - see Sm"a on Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 426:2 and Aruch HaShulchan 426:4).  A person cannot say "I refuse to cross the street to save my fellow Jew".  Crossing the street, certainly when the light is green, and even crossing carefully when it is red is the minimum risk you must take to save the life of your fellow Jew.  Hashem not only wants our actions, but He wants the results.  We must do what we can to prevent a loss of life.

The Radba"z was once asked whether a person is required to give up an organ in order to save the life of another.  For example, if the ruling authority would say "either I cut off a non-vital organ from your body, or I kill another Jew".  The Radba"z ruled that although a strict interpretation of the law would not require such an act, doing so would certainly be praiseworthy and be viewed as an act of piety.  Such piety, of course, is conditional on this amputation of the limb not resulting in hemorrhage or an infection.  We are not required, however, to give up any part of our body in order to carry out any other Mitzvah.

The Rav zt"l was once asked the following question: In the case of a particular newborn boy, the doctors claimed that performing a Brit Milah on the eighth day would not pose any life threatening danger, but may disable his legs in some way, and he would run the risk of limping his entire life. Delaying the Brit by a week or two would obviate that danger.   The Rav ruled that in such a case there was an obligation to delay the Brit. Although Brit Milah on the eighth day is of such significance that the Shabbat may be violated, nowhere does the Torah command us to impair any part of the child's body for the sake of having the Brit Milah on the eighth day.  We are not required to give up any part of our body even to save a life.

Regarding Hilchot Shabbat, many poskim are of the opinion that "grama" is permitted as the Torah states: "'you shall not do any work' (Shmot 20:9), only actual doing is prohibited but causing a melacha to occur is permitted" (Shabbat 120b).  An example of "grama" would be if the current time is 8:00 and someone adjusts the settings of the Shabbat clock to have the electricity go off at 9:00 rather than at 10:00.  Many poskim permit "grama" while others, such as the Rama (see Orach Chaim 334:22) adopt a more stringent view and claim it is Rabbinically forbidden, and this is the practice of the Ashkenazim.  Given that the prohibition is a Rabbinic one, even the Ashkenazim rule that if a great loss would be incurred by being stringent, they would permit following the lenient view.  This is because the Torah commands us "YOU shall not do any work", the main consideration is that a Jew not carry out the action.  Should the action take place in some other manner it is of no concern to us?

We cannot apply this principle of "grama" to acts of murder.  Even if man does not kill with his own hands but indirectly causes someone to die - the Torah states: "your blood which belongs to your souls I will demand, of every beast will I demand it; but of man, of every man for that of his brother I will demand the soul of man" (Bereishit 9:5).  I am not about to give a crash course in homicide, but there are ways in which one can kill another and not be liable with death at the hands of Beit Din.  For example someone can poison someone's food and the person being unaware eats the food and dies.  The murderer could then come to court claiming: "I did not kill him, he killed himself! Who told him to eat the soup?"  Although the Beit Din cannot place any liability on him (a non-Jew would be punishable for killing through "grama" see Rambam Hilchot Melachim 9:4), the heavenly courts will demand his blood (see Hilchot Rotze-ach uShmirat haNefesh 3:10).  How can a person set up this whole scenario go and then cry "grama"?!  This is precisely what the Torah had in mind when it said: "of every man for that of his brother I will demand the soul of man".  The Torah requires not only that we do not kill but that harm not befall any Jewish soul.  However, regarding Shabbat, the Torah permits acts of "grama", because the end result is not what matters but how the act was carried out.

The Brisker Rav zt"l added a further point.  "Pikuach Nefesh" is not limited to preventing an immediate loss of life.  Should there exist a danger that in seventy years a person may die sooner, this too would fall under the category of "pikuach nefesh".  A case actually happened with one of the Brisker Rav's most beloved students (out of respect I will not mention his name).  When this student died during the month of Shvat, the Brisker Rav commented "if he had only taken my advice and eaten on Yom Kippur, he would still be alive".  Eating on Yom Kippur is not only permitted to save someone from an immediate death but even from death a few months later.  This is because it is the Torah's wish that human beings, especially Jewish ones, live.

Murder is not limited to its literal definition.  Shortening an individual's life span is also tantamount to murder.  The Gemara presents the following case: "if ten people beat someone with ten clubs and he died, whether at the same time or one after the other, they are not liable.  R' Yehuda ben Beteira says: if they hit him one after the other, the last one is liable to execution because he hastened the victim's death" (Sanhedrin 78a).  In this case, the first blow was sufficiently hard that he may have eventually died from it.  Both views derive their opinions through exegesis of the same pasuk - "and a man, if he strikes mortally 'KOL NEFESH ADAM' - any human life, he shall be put to death" (Vayikra 24:17).  The former opinion reasons that the word "kol" implies "the entire life" - he has to have struck him in such a way that had he not done so, the victim would have lived.  R' Yehuda ben Beteira, as mentioned, finds the one who gave the final blow liable because "he hastened the victim's death".  He claims that "kol nefesh adam" implies "kol dehu nefesh" - anything that is considered life.  The victim may have been in serious condition prior to his blow, but he literally gave the "makeh bepatish" - the final hammer blow.

Tosafot ask the following question (see Tosafot Sanhedrin 78a "begoses"): I can understand why the last few strikers are absolved from any guilt for they did not strike "kol nefesh", what about the one who lay the initial blow?  Did he not place the victim in a state in which he would have eventually died from this wound even if not immediately?  At first glance, Tosafot's question is very difficult to understand.  Why should the first person be punished, after all it was not his blow that killed the victim.  Tosafot obviously felt that shortening one's life expectancy is tantamount to murder.  If prior to his laying the blow, the victim's life expectancy was one hundred and twenty years, and he now shortened it to ten years, he too should be punished.  The fact that the subsequent aggressors shortened his life even more, is their own sin (they are not punishable because they did not kill "kol nefesh").  The first, however, struck a perfectly healthy human being - "kol nefesh" and should be punished accordingly.  Tosafot explain that the first aggressor is exempt because there is no proof that his blow was sufficiently hard to kill his victim.  It may have been hard enough to kill most people, but a minority of people do survive.  According to this explanation, had it been certain that he would die from this blow, this person would indeed be punishable.  The definition of murder, as mentioned, is not limited to killing someone right now, but includes shortening a person's life expectancy.

I have been recently asked the following very relevant question: what would the halacha state regarding a young man studying in Eretz Yisrael in Yeshiva whose parents residing in Chutz la'Aretz are very worried about our situation in Eretz Yisrael.  We must keep in mind that people in Chutz la'Aretz are under the impression that there are terrorist acts and other terrible things going on here constantly.  May the son remain in Eretz Yisrael or must he return home to his parents?  In my humble opinion, the son must return to his parents.  There is no question that settling the Land of Israel is a great Mitzvah.  In fact, Chazal permitted a non-Jew to perform melacha for us in order to fulfill this Mitzvah (see Baba Kamma 80b).  Should the parents forbid the son from making Aliyah, then the son may defy their will because "all of you are obligated in My honor" (Yevamot 6a).  By the same token, a son is not obligated to abide by his parents wishes should they object to his learning in Yeshiva.  If the parents, however, are so worried by the situation that it actually affects their hearts, then the son's remaining in Eretz Yisrael is shortening their life expectancy. Causing the parents to die sooner, as we have mentioned, comes under the category of murder. 

From a certain perspective it is worse than the murder carried out by terrorists.  Although there is no question that terrorists are murderers, they are at least killing total strangers.  This person, however, is killing his parents who brought him into this world!  If this young man's leaving Eretz Yisrael would serve to weaken our stronghold here, we would perhaps have to view this issue differently.  Thank G-d, we are not in such a terrible state that the presence of one less American would so greatly weaken our position.

While in Chutz la'Aretz, he must do whatever possible to lengthen the days of his parents with kibud horim. This will grant him longevity - the reward promised us by the Torah for honoring our parents: "so that your days will be lengthened upon the land that Hashem, your G-d, gives you" (Shmot 20:12).  As the pasuk states, he will also merit eventually returning to Eretz Yisrael along with the entire Jewish nation.  The same applies to helping all our fellow Jews live a long life, Hashem will grant us longevity "measure for measure" (Shabbat 105b).  Chazal offer the following explanation for the Torah commandment: "and when you will make an Altar of stones for Me, do not build them hewn, lest you wave your sword over it and defile it" (Shmot 20:22).  Why should this disqualify the Altar?  "Because the Altar was created to lengthen man's life, and iron was created to shorten man's life, it is not right that what shortens should be waved over what lengthens" (Rashi ibid.).  From this we can derive that if one lengthens the days of his parents or any fellow Jew, Hashem will see to it that his life not be shortened, for "it is not right that what shortens should be waved over what lengthens".  We do not always see this reward in practice because Hashem does not always reward us in this world.

This applies even more so to one who learns Torah for the sake of a sick person, another Jew, or the entire nation.  In addition to the reward for learning Torah for its own sake, he receives another reward "measure for measure".  Given that the Torah grants us longevity: "length of days is at its right" (Mishle 3:16), if he learns for the merit of others than Hashem will certainly grant him a long life.

If we recite Tehillim today as a means of preventing terrorist acts and other terrible things, then certainly in the merit of Torah learning Hashem will aid us and protect us from any evil plots against us.  When we speak of not shortening someone's life, we must not only take care not to shorten it but must do what is in our power to increase the days of our fellow Jew.  The best way to do this is through Torah, this is a cure that has proved itself.  There was once a young man in Yeshivat Kol Torah who had the reputation of being a bit of a joker.  One day people noticed that he was not learning, when asked why, he responded that he had a headache.  His fellow students pointed out that Chazal tell us "one who feels pain in his head should study Torah" (Eruvin 54a).  The young man answered that indeed Chazal did tell us that, but later authorities had already banned use of any of the medications mentioned in the Gemara! (see Yam Shel Shlomo Chullin 8:12, and R' Akiva Eiger on Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 336 in the name of the Mahari"l).

In my humble opinion we may be lenient in this instant and use this medication for it has been tried and tested.  We must learn Torah for the sake of all the residents of Eretz Yisrael as well as our brethren in Chutz la'Aretz.  We are permitted to increase and strengthen our learning.   This applies always, but particularly during this period of the year in which we mourn the destruction of the Beit Hamikdash, after all, Chazal tell us "Yerushalayim was destroyed only because they diverted the schoolchildren in it from their Torah studies, as it states: 'to pour fury on little children in the streets' (Yirmiyahu 6:11)" (Shabbat 119b).  We must provide a "tikkun" for this as well as all sins by strengthening and increasing our learning - "length of days is at its right".  If we incidentally receive some "at its left - wealth and honor" (Mishle 3:16) (otherwise known as dollars), that is also fine.  The main thing, however, is "length of days is at its right".  May we merit with Hashem's help His salvation for His people, His Land, and His Beit Hamikdash, speedily in our day. Amen.