Supporting Torah Scholars

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June 23 2011
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MAY A KOHEN ASSIST THE ONE WHO GAVE HIM TRUMAH?


Regarding the Mitzvah of Maaser Rishon, the Torah commands the Leviim at the end of our Parsha: "You shall not bear a sin because of it when you raise up its best from it; and the sanctities of the Children of Israel you shall not desecrate, so that you shall not die" (Bamidbar 18:32).  Of what desecration are the Leviim warned to beware?  How is it possible to desecrate "maaser rishon"? After all fruits of "maaser rishon" have no sanctity and may therefore be eaten at any time and under any condition - even while in a state of ritual impurity (see Rashi ibid. 31)!  Chazal explain: "Kohanim, Leviim, and poor who help in the house of the shepherds, the threshing floors, and in the slaughterhouses, we do not give them 'trumah' or 'maaser' as a reward, if they do so they have desecrated them.  Regarding them the pasuk states: 'You have corrupted the covenant of Levi' (Malachi 2:8) and the pasuk further states: 'sanctities of the Children of Israel you shall not desecrate, so that you shall not die' (Bamidbar 18:32)" (Bechorot 26b).  The pasuk implies that should the Leviim desecrate the "maaser" in the manner stated in the Gemara they would be liable with the death penalty (see Tosafot there who explain that this "death penalty" is not to be taken literally, rather the Torah is pointing out that this infraction is almost as severe as violating a prohibition punishable by death).


We must try to understand these words of Chazal.  Why should the assistance of the Kohen and Levi on the threshing floor be deemed as profaning that which is holy?  Would it not be appropriate and even commendable for the Kohen and Levi to assist the Yisrael in his work?   Did the Yisrael not do them a favor by giving these gifts specifically to them and not to others?  In some cases the "maaser" they received may have been a very significant amount - one, twenty, or even one hundred kor - an amount that theoretically could have been divided among many Leviim.  Would it not be appropriate for the Kohen and Levi to express their gratitude?


WHAT HAPPENED TO HAKARAT HATOV?


Does the Torah not encourage us to show "hakarat hatov" - gratitude and recognition for the good done for us?  Is hakarat hatov not one of the foundations of the Torah and at the root of our service of Hashem?  Chazal, in fact, discuss the Torah's description of Pharaoh's ascent to power: "A new king arose over Egypt who did not know of Yoseph" (Shmot 1:8).  Our Sages ask: can it be that he did not know of Yoseph?  Even if he were a new king, did he not have some basic knowledge of Egyptian history?  What the Torah means is that he knew who Yoseph was, but he did not WANT to know who he was!  He lacked "hakarat hatov" for all that Yoseph had done for the Egyptian people.  Chazal comment:  "today he does not know Yoseph, tomorrow, he is destined to say 'I do not know Hashem'!" (Shmot 5:2) (Shmot Rabbah Parsha 1).  This means that one who lacks hakarat hatov for his fellow human being will eventually deny the good Hashem has done for him.


I once asked the Rav (HaGaon HaRav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l) whether I am permitted to say thank someone who has given me "maaser rishon".  The Rav answered in the affirmative.  The Rav's response was consistent with his ruling that one is permitted to thank someone who has given him a loan.  The saying of "thank you" does not constitute a violation of "ribit devarim" - the usury laws which are not limited to a payment of monetary interest on the loan, but include other areas such as doing favors for the lender.  By saying "thank you", one does not give the lender anything beyond the return of the loan.  Quite the contrary, says the Rav, "G-d forbid that a borrower should deny the good that the lender has done for him, he owes him a debt of gratitude" (Minchat Shlomo volume I, siman 27, note 1).  The same applies here, by saying "thank you" for the gifts, the Kohen or Levi has not given anything of substance to the Yisrael and this "thank you" therefore does not fall under the prohibition of assisting on the threshing floors.  (The borrower, however, is forbidden to say "yishar kochacha" or "tizkeh leMitzvot".  These expressions constitute a blessing (unlike "thank you" which is not a blessing), and bestowing a blessing falls under the prohibition of "ribit devarim" (see Tosafot Kiddushin 8b "tzdaka").  Based on this we can add that when the Levi receives his maaser, it would be forbidden for him to wish the Yisrael "yishar kochacha" or "tizkeh leMitzvot", for by blessing him he has in fact given him something of substance).  Why are the Kohanim and Leviim not permitted to express their gratitude to the Yisrael by assisting him in his needs?  Such action would appear to be not only permitted but even praiseworthy!


Moreover, a Yisrael may pay another Yisrael to give his required gifts to a particular Kohen or Levi (see Rambam Hilchot Trumot 12:20).  For example, if a Yisrael approaches his friend and tells him: "I have a grandson who is a Levi, I will pay you one hundred shekels if you would be so kind as to give your 'maaser' to my grandson", it would be permitted to agree to such an exchange.  Why is it permitted for a Yisrael to pay his fellow Yisrael in order that he give his "maaser" to a particular Levi, while the Levi himself - the recipient of the "maaser", may not offer any compensation for the gift he has received, even something as negligible as aiding the owner with some of his tasks?  Why does the Torah deem such assistance as a desecration of that which is holy almost as severe as a sin deserving the death penalty?


Some of the commentaries maintain that this prohibition is aimed at protecting the Kohanim who do not assist the Yisrael on the threshing floors.  If such assistance were permitted, the Yisrael would become accustomed to giving his maasrot only to Kohanim and Leviim who come to aid him and not to others (see Tosafot Bechorot 51b "hilkach").  The difficulty with this explanation is that this prohibition should therefore also include that of a Yisrael paying another Yisrael for giving his "maaser" to a particular Levi.  This would preclude the danger of the Yisrael becoming habituated to only giving his "maasrot" to those Leviim who have wealthy grandfathers willing to pay for the "maaser"!  Leviim who do not have rich grandfathers would then lose out.


SERVING IN THE BEIT HAMIKDASH IS ALSO WORKING FOR A LIVING


Accordingly it seems that this prohibition can be explained in a different manner. Regarding the gifts given to the Kohanim and Leviim the Torah tells us: "for it is a wage for you in exchange for your service in the Tent of Meeting" (Bamidbar 18:31).  The "matnot Kehuna" and "matnot Leviia" are not handouts being given to the "poor and unfortunate" Kohanim and Leviim who must depend upon the generosity of the community - they are compensation for the service they perform in the Beit HaMikdash.  If so, a Kohen or Levi, by assisting the Yisrael is tantamount to declaring that service in the Beit HaMikdash is not sufficient justification for receiving these gifts, they are obligated to perform some other act for the Yisrael in order to earn their pay and not be recipients of acts of chesed.  This type of behavior causes denigration and corruption of the honor required of the service in the Beit HaMikdash - "You have corrupted the covenant of Levi" - as if the service performed in the Beit HaMikdash is not worth the "maaser" they receive.


The reason we have just offered applies to the gifts given the Kohen and Levi, they serve in the Beit HaMikdash and the gifts they receive are compensation for their work.  The Gemara we quoted above, however, includes the poor in this prohibition of assisting the giver of the gifts.  The poor, after all, do not serve in the Beit HaMikdash.  Why then did Chazal include them in the prohibition against providing some form of assistance?  Perhaps we can explain as follows: Chazal tell us that the poor people are Hashem's vessels (see Vayikra Rabba 7:2).  A human king uses beautiful and whole vessels, while the King of kings specifically uses broken ones, as it states: "a heart broken and humbled, O G-d, You will not despise" (Tehillim 51:19).  If so, the poor person is also a holy vessel - for his heart is broken and depressed, and Hashem uses broken vessels.  The poor man's "maaser ani" is his compensation for the use Hashem has derived from him, similarly to the compensation received by the Kohanim and Leviim for their service in the Beit HaMikdash.  If the poor man stands at the threshing floor to help his benefactor as thanks for the maaser he received, this is a desecration of that which is holy for it is a declaration that being the "vessel" of Hashem "vessel" is not sufficient cause for receiving the "maaser".


BE PROUD TO ACCEPT THE MATNOT KEHUNA


In our Parsha the Torah states: "Hashem spoke to Aharon: and I - behold! I have given you the safeguard of My heave-offerings, of all the sanctities of the Children of Israel; I have given them to you 'lemoshcha' (for distinction) and to your sons as an eternal portion" (Bamidbar 18:8).  Rashi explains "lemoshcha" as meaning "for greatness". This implies that the "matnot Kehuna" must be eaten in the style of nobility and greatness - "the way in which the royalty eats"  (Zevachim 28a).  Tosafot (Bechorot 27a "ve-ati") explain that this halacha applies not only with regard to eating offerings or other sanctified items (e.g. trumah, kodshim), but it applies to non-sanctified objects as well (e.g. maaser rishon, maaser ani).  This is a further proof that the gifts we have spoken about are not charitable handouts that the Kohanim receive from the Jewish nation, but rather compensation for services rendered - for the important work they do in the Beit HaMikdash.  With this in mind, Chazal required these gifts to be consumed in an honorable manner.


On a similar note, the poskim rule that during the ceremony of the Mitzvah of Pidyon HaBen - redeeming of the firstborn, the father should stand while the Kohen receiving the payment should sit.  This is a further fulfillment of "lemoshcha".  Although we do not find the expression "lemoshcha" with regard to Pidyon HaBen but only with regard to gifts that are eaten (not all of them - see Tosafot ibid.), the poskim felt it was important that this ceremony be carried out in a dignified manner as well.  This serves to emphasize that the Kohen is not receiving a handout in a degrading manner, but remuneration for his services - in a dignified manner.  The firstborn is the one who should be serving in the Beit HaMikdash.  The Torah, however, appointed the Kohen to work in his stead - for this the Kohen must be compensated.


TORAH SCHOLARS ARE ALSO WORKING FOR THEIR STIPEND


The Gemara proves that Talmidei Chachamim are absolved from paying taxes (see Baba Batra 8a) from the fact that taxes were not levied upon the workers in the Beit HaMikdash (see Ezra 7:24).  What is the connection between the two?  As is the case with Kohanim and Leviim, Talmidei Chachamim are akin to those who serve in the Beit HaMikdash.  The Beit HaMikdash is the residing place for the Divine Presence - "they shall make a Sanctuary for Me - so that I may dwell among them" (Shmot 25:8).  The Kohanim cause the Beit HaMikdash to function in accordance with the laws of offerings, and in this way the Mikdash brings the Shchina to dwell among the people of Israel.  This is precisely the role of Talmidei Chachamim - to cause the Shchina to dwell among us and to bring sanctity to the Jewish nation.  The Kohanim and Leviim themselves had to be Torah scholars, as the pasuk states "they shall teach Your ordinances to Yaakov and Your Torah to Israel" (Devarim 33:10) regarding the tribe of Levi.  Yet one who is not a Kohen or Levi may still be among those who teach Torah.


The Kohanim and Leviim cause the Shchina to dwell among the people of Israel, while the Torah scholars too bring down the Divine Presence and thereby bring an aura of sanctity to the Jewish nation.  The Talmidei Chachamim, therefore, serve the same purpose as those who serve in the Beit HaMikdash.  Just as the Kohanim and Leviim are performing tasks that are in fact incumbent upon each of us, and they are duly rewarded as our representatives, the same may be said regarding the Talmidei Chachamim.  The Torah was, after all, given to all the tribes - it is "the heritage of the congregation of Yaakov" (Devarim 33:4) - the Talmidei Chachamim are therefore fulfilling that which is the responsibility of all the tribes.  For this reason they deserve to be exempt from paying taxes and in addition they must be compensated as were the workers in the Beit HaMikdash.


Apropos this idea, there are those who claim that if a Yeshiva bochur or Kollel member receives a stipend for this learning, his learning is "lo lishma" - not with the proper intent.


My response to this is twofold:


1) Even were we to claim that this type of learning is "shelo lishma", it is still good.  Chazal, after all tell us "One should always be involved with Torah and Mitzvot even if not for the proper intent, for doing it without proper intent will lead to doing with proper intent" (Pesachim 50b).  Rather study Torah "shelo lishma" than not to study at all simply because the "lishma" aspect is lacking.  If one were to refuse to accept payment for learning and instead have to go and study a profession in order to support himself, then what has been gained?  This insistence on "lishma" has caused him not to learn at all!  Is this the "lishma" Chazal were referring to?  If one has the ability to learn without compensation, that is clearly preferable, but if he is unable to learn without getting paid and because of that he leaves his Torah studies in order to support himself then we have not gained anything.


When the Chazon Ish died, during one of the eulogies the speaker  claimed that from the age of thirteen he had learned Torah only "lishma".  At this my Rebbe HaGaon HaRav Yechezkel Levinstein zt"l got up and protested that this was impossible!  A boy of thirteen cannot learn only "lishma".  Perhaps in his later years the Chazon Ish reached the level of learning Torah only "lishma", but at thirteen years old? We cannot expect young men to learn only "lishma".  Let them learn "shelo lishma" and it is our hope that through learning without the proper intent, in their later years they will reach the level of learning "lishma".  In the meantime learning "shelo lishma" is proper and even desirable - it is certainly better than not learning at all!


2) The fact is that the claim that receiving a stipend transforms the learning into "shelo lishma" is not at all true.  What does it mean to study Torah "shelo lishma"?  Torah study "shelo lishma" is when a person learns Torah as a means of earning a living.  In our situation the opposite is the case!  Bnei Torah do not learn Torah in order to earn a living, rather they are supported by pillars of Torah to enable them to learn!  The fact is that man cannot survive without food.  He therefore takes the money from supporters in order that he have more time in which to learn Torah.  Such a person is not making the Torah into "a tool with which to dig" (Avot 4:5) - to earn his keep, but quite the opposite, the livelihood he receives is a tool with which he can "dig" the Torah.  With this in mind we cannot categorize the taking of stipends from benefactors as Torah study "shelo lishma".


LEAVING THE BEIT MIDRASH AS PREPARATION FOR RETURNING


Chazal tell us "the messengers en route to performance of a Mitzvah will not be harmed" (Pesachim 8b).  There are two opinions regarding which pasuk this principle is derived from.  The practical distinction between these two derivations is whether this promise applies only to those en route to performance of a Mitzvah or to those returning from a Mitzvah as well (see Gemara there).  The Gemara then records:  "it was asked of Rav, the students of the Yeshiva who live in the villages, are they permitted to arrive in the Beit Midrash early in the morning (while still dark) and remain there late into the night.  He responded, it is on me and on my neck".  The students were worried about the potential danger in arriving at the Beit Midrash or leaving their homes during times of darkness, Rav was willing to take full responsibility for their safety.  Rav was then asked "what about the return trip home?", to which Rav responded "I do not know".


Which opinion did Rav follow?  If he followed the opinion that only one en route to performance of a Mitzvah is guaranteed that no harm would befall him, he should have instructed the students not to return while dark.  If he were of the opinion that no harm will befall them upon their return, he should have told them that they may return in the dark.  It is difficult to say that he was not sure which of the opinions was the right one.


In my humble opinion the Gemara can be explained as follows: Rav ruled according to the opinion that one is only protected en route to performance of a Mitzvah.  On the return trip their safety would not be guaranteed. A return, however, is not always only a return.  At times returning home from a Mitzvah can be viewed as traveling towards a Mitzvah.  How is this so?  One who returns home from the Beit Midrash with the attitude that Baruch Hashem the learning Seder is finished and I can now eat and go to sleep" is not en route to performance of a Mitzvah.  If, however, someone returns home to eat and sleep in order to garner sufficient strength to enable him to learn the next day, for him the return from a Mitzvah is also a trip towards performance of a Mitzvah - he is not "returning" now from one Mitzvah but is "going" to perform the next Mitzvah, to prepare for tomorrow's learning.  It was with this in mind that Rav said that when it comes to going to the Beit Midrash "it is on me and on my neck" - I will take the responsibility for your safety.  It makes no difference what your intent is - whether your learning is "lishma" or "shelo lishma" you are still on your way to performing a Mitzvah and thus your safety is guaranteed.  When it comes to your return trip home, however, that already depends on the feeling of each individual.  I cannot guarantee your safe return for it all depends on whether or not your return home is preparation for tomorrow's learning.


THE DANGERS OF ACTING WITHOUT PROPER INTENT


Korach is the classic example of acting "shelo lishma".  Let us introduce this discussion by stating that we are speaking of one of the giants of the world.  The Ar"I HaKadosh once said that combining the last letter of each of the words "tzaddiK katamaR yifraCH"  "A righteous man will flourish like a palm date" (Tehillim 92:13), "kuf", "resh" and "chet" spells Korach.  We are speaking of someone who possessed Divine Inspiration - "he saw a great chain issuing from him, Shmuel, who is weighed against Moshe and Aharon ... and twenty-four (Levite) 'watches' will arise from his son's sons, all of them prophesying with Divine Inspiration." (Tanchuma Korach Siman 5, Rashi Bamidbar 16:7).  When we speak of such a person acting "shelo lishma" it is only because we are holding him up to great scrutiny, it is a very thin line indeed.  A proof for this can be found in the Mishna: "Which was a dispute not for the sake of Heaven?  That of Korach and all his company" (Avot 5:17).  The Mishna in its quest to teach us that which is not obvious to us did not search for an example that was clearly beyond a shadow of a doubt "not for the sake of heaven".  The Mishna wanted to show that even something less obvious is also considered "not for the sake of heaven". Korach's "shelo lishma" is therefore as close as one can possibly get to "lishma" and still be referred to as "shelo lishma" (so I heard from my father-in-law HaRav Chaim Zev Finkel zt"l).


What aspect of Korach's dispute was in fact "shelo lishma"?  Rashi at the beginning of the Parsha tells us "And why did Korach choose to rebel against Moshe?  He was envious of the princeship of Elitzafan, the son of Uziel, whom Moshe had appointed prince over the children of Kehat by the express command of Hashem.  Korach said: the brothers of my father were four, as it is stated 'and the sons of Kehat, etc.' (Shmot 6:18), Amram the first born: his two sons received high office, one a king and the other a High Priest.  Who is fitting to receive the second? Is it not I, who am the son of Yitzhar, who is second to Amram?  Yet he appointed as prince the son of his brother, the youngest of all of them!  Therefore I will rebel against him, and nullify his words" [22] (Rashi on Bamidbar 16:1).


Korach's "shelo lishma" was his desire to become the Nasi - the tribal leader.  From where do we know that his yearning for the position had within it a twinge of "shelo lishma", perhaps his motives were purely for heaven's sake?  Rashi continues: "what did Korach do?  He rose up and gathered together two hundred and fifty heads of courts ... and clothed them in cloaks which were made entirely of 'tchelet'.  They came and stood before Moshe.  They said to him: 'a cloak which is entirely 'tchelet' is it obligated in tzitzit or exempt?' He said to them: 'it is obligated'.  They began to laugh at him: 'is this possible?  A cloak of a different type of cloth, one thread of tchelet exempts it, this one which is entirely of tchelet should it not exempt itself'?" (ibid.).


Korach's logic that a cloak made exclusively of tchelet should be exempt from tzitzit was meant to lodge a protest against Moshe's leadership:  Just as a tallit that is only tchelet does not require a thread of tchelet in the tzitzit, so too when speaking of "the entire assembly - all of them - are holy" (Bamidbar 16:3) there is no need for leaders such as Moshe and Aharon.  Korach therefore asked: "so why do you exalt yourselves over the congregation of Hashem?" (ibid.).


LOGIC THAT IS "CONVENIENTLY" FORGOTTEN


What did Korach want after all?  To be the Nasi or the Kohen Gadol?  Then what would happen?  He himself would be above everyone else.  What happened to his question regarding a cloak made exclusively from tchelet?  It is suddenly gone, for the entire purpose of this fabrication was bent at undermining authority, for "he was envious of the princeship of Elitzafan".  Once the source of his contention, his looking for personal gain, was satisfied then his questions and his impeccable logic also vanished.


This "svara" that Korach invented that has the power to undermine the leadership of Moshe and Aharon, yet vanishes the moment he himself is appointed as Nasi, proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that Korach's motives for becoming a Nasi or Kohen Gadol were not sincere.


Korach's "shelo lishma" is apparent in another area as well.  Korach complains: why was Elitzafan ben Uziel chosen as the Nasi of the family of Kehat and not himself.  Let us analyze this further: is this the first time Elitzafan was chosen over Korach?  No!  When the bodies of Nadav and Avihu had to be removed from the Holy, Mishael and Elzafan were summoned (see Vayikra 10:4).  Why did you, Korach, not protest over there?  Why did it not bother you at that point that the children of Uziel were called to perform this Mitzvah and not you? Because it was not the honorable position of Nasi that was at stake, but "only" the chance to do a Mitzvah!  If it is a "chevra kadisha" you are looking for, Mishael and Eltzafan can do the job quite well.  When, however, the issue is the princeship of Kehat, then suddenly Korach wakes up with a complaint - why was Elitzafan chosen and not me?  From here as well we can see that Korach's complaint that Elitzafan was chosen over him was not purely "leShem Shamayim".


There is an opinion in Chazal that Mishael and Eltzafan were the ones through whom the Mitzvah of Pesach Sheni was given (see Sukkah 25a-b).  Had Korach been meritorious and asked to join their company in removing the bodies of Nadav and Avihu, he too would have joined them in credit for this Mitzvah as well.  Korach is also responsible for a section of the Torah being written.  The difference is that Mishael and Eltzafan have a positive portion to their credit, while Korach adds a negative section.  Korach even gets credit for a negative commandment - "and he shall not be like Korach and his assembly" (Bamidbar 17:5) - a Jew may not cause rifts and disputes the way Korach did.  (Some authorities count this as one of the Mitzvot of the Torah).  Just as a Jew must strive to be like Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, and the other tzaddikim of the world, he must also strive not to emulate Korach - not to be one who causes dispute.  A dispute like the one involving Hillel and Shammai is permitted, for that is "leShem Shamayim" and very positive.  The prohibition is against causing dispute the way Korach and his assembly did.


DID KORACH ACCEPT MOSHE AS A PROPHET?


The Rambam writes that the miracles that Moshe performed in the desert were not carried out in order to prove the truth of Moshe's prophecy, for that was already proven at Har Sinai.  What then was the purpose of the many signs and miracles carried out by Moshe in the desert?  The miracles "were always done for a particular purpose.  There was a need to drown the Egyptians - he split the sea and drowned them in it.  They needed food - he brought us down the manna.  They were thirsty - he hit a rock for them.  Korach and his company denied him - the ground swallowed them, and so forth for all the signs" (Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 8:1).  We see that the Rambam lists the ground swallowing Korach's assembly among the miracles that were performed "when necessary" and not as a means of proving that Moshe's prophecy was true.


There is an apparent difficulty in this approach, for the Torah explicitly tells us that the miraculous way in which Korach and his company were swallowed up by the ground was meant to prove the truth of Moshe's prophecy: "Through this shall you know that Hashem has sent me to perform all these acts, for it was not from my heart.  If these die like the death of all men, and the destiny of all men is visited upon them, then it is not Hashem Who has sent me.  But if Hashem will create a creation and the earth opens its mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they will descend alive to the pit, then you shall know that these men have provoked Hashem" (Bamidbar 16:28-30).  How then can the Rambam claim that the ground swallowing Korach and his company was not for the purpose of proving the truth of Moshe's prophecy?


We can explain that when the Rambam gave as an example "Korach and his company denied him" he did not mean that they completely denied Moshe's prophecy.  Had they truly denied Moshe's prophetic abilities, why would they have coveted the Kehuna?  The Kehuna, after all, is serving in the Mishkan - an edifice built per the instructions of Moshe Rabenu.  If his prophecy is false, then what value does the Mishkan possess?  Furthermore, on the day of the dedication of this Mishkan that was built according to Moshe Rabenu's instructions, a fire descended from heaven "the people saw and sang glad song and fell upon their faces" (Vayikra 9:24).  Korach and his assembly witnessed this as well, they cannot deny what they saw with their very eyes.  What then does the Rambam mean when he says that Korach's assembly denied the prophecy of Moshe Rabenu?


It appears that we can answer as follows: Korach had a general belief in the veracity of Moshe's prophecy.  There was one particular point, however, in which he argued that Moshe did not act in response to a prophecy.  He felt that Hashem did not explicitly instruct Moshe to appoint Aharon to the position of Kohen Gadol, but rather told him to appoint the one most fitting for the position.  Moshe, on his own, decided that Aharon was the best person for the job.  To counter this claim, Moshe responds by saying "Hashem has sent me to perform all these acts" - I did not decide on my own who will be the Kohen Gadol.  It was rather Hashem Who instructed me to appoint Aharon as the Kohen Gadol (see Rashi there). In order to prove that Moshe's claim was correct, the ground swallowed them up.


What was the source of such a preposterous claim?  Based on our limited ability to understand, it stems that Korach was adversely effected by a desire for honor.  Had it not been for this, Korach would not have erred the way he did.


We must distance ourselves from this error of Korach's, we must strive to be givers and not those in search of honor.  We must be among those who disseminate the words of Torah among the Jewish people.  If we are able to be counted among the giants of our generation - that would be wonderful, but even if we do not we should at least teach whomever we have the opportunity to teach - our children and our students.  We must not do so, however, out of a desire for honor, but in order to truly serve Hashem.


When we do so, we will become true Bnei Torah, we will become true servants of Hashem.  When that happens we will be deserving of the support provided to those who learn Torah.  Although the government believes that we do not deserve very much, but the truth is that those who learn Torah deserve to be supported.  Claiming that they do not deserve support is an affront to the honor of the Torah, as mentioned above.  If a Kohen or Levi believes that if he does not assist the Yisrael in some manner then he is not deserving of the trumot and maasrot, then he is causing an affront to the honor of the service in the Beit HaMikdash.  We must understand that the Torah is a "worthwhile cause" for Am Yisrael to support those who study it, and we must not be embarrassed to accept this support from Am Yisrael "for it is a wage for you in exchange for your service in the Tent of Meeting".

Venue: Yeshivat Netiv Aryeh Yeshivat Netiv Aryeh

Parsha:
Korach 

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