Dear Mrs. Saks: Thanks for your engaging podcasts. I listen to them regularly and often repeat your drashot over shabbat. In particular, I like that you bring out Rashi's approach (i.e choosing and pruning the midrashim he references in order to support his understanding of the pshat). I write today about some thoughts I had about your mishpatim podcast. It's probably not on the top of your head but I thought I'd try anyway. In your drasha you noted the two different understandings that derive from the two braitot brought on the subject of when it is permissible to kill a thief that enters your house. The gmara appears to understand the braitot as referring to special cases where a father enters a son's house or vica-versa. Whne I heard you quote them, my understanding was that the braitot were using a specific example (e.g. father going into son's house) to illustrate a general category of situations in which it's clear that the thief is not going to kill the homeowner. Later in the podcast, I understood from you that the braitot were ONLY referring to that specific case and that they did not aspire to teach a more general lesson. With that background, my questions are: 1. Did I understand you correctly that the braitot were ONLY aspiring to explain the particular situations of fathers and sons? 2. Is the narrow range of the braitot explicitly or implicitly found in the braitot or the gmara that quotes them? 3. If the answers to the first two questions are affirmative, I have a more general difficulty. Is it common for a problematic phrasing in the text to be explained in Talmud as providing a solution to a very specific (and rare) occurrence? Intuitively, I would think that if Hashem were going to write something cryptically, His intention would be to teach an important and widely-applicable principal rather than add a clarification about a rare case in the application of the law. I'd be grateful if you could address these questions. Shavua tov and hodesh adar sameach Sam

Dear Mrs. Saks: Thanks for your engaging podcasts. I listen to them regularly and often repeat your drashot over shabbat. In particular, I like that you bring out Rashi's approach (i.e choosing and pruning the midrashim he references in order to support his understanding of the pshat). I write today about some thoughts I had about your mishpatim podcast. It's probably not on the top of your head but I thought I'd try anyway. In your drasha you noted the two different understandings that derive from the two braitot brought on the subject of when it is permissible to kill a thief that enters your house. The gmara appears to understand the braitot as referring to special cases where a father enters a son's house or vica-versa. Whne I heard you quote them, my understanding was that the braitot were using a specific example (e.g. father going into son's house) to illustrate a general category of situations in which it's clear that the thief is not going to kill the homeowner. Later in the podcast, I understood from you that the braitot were ONLY referring to that specific case and that they did not aspire to teach a more general lesson. With that background, my questions are: 1. Did I understand you correctly that the braitot were ONLY aspiring to explain the particular situations of fathers and sons? 2. Is the narrow range of the braitot explicitly or implicitly found in the braitot or the gmara that quotes them? 3. If the answers to the first two questions are affirmative, I have a more general difficulty. Is it common for a problematic phrasing in the text to be explained in Talmud as providing a solution to a very specific (and rare) occurrence? Intuitively, I would think that if Hashem were going to write something cryptically, His intention would be to teach an important and widely-applicable principal rather than add a clarification about a rare case in the application of the law. I'd be grateful if you could address these questions. Shavua tov and hodesh adar sameach Sam