The Mitzvah of Megillah: Reading or Listening?

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March 05 2009
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The Mitzvah of Megillah: Reading or Listening?


Megillat Esther is read twice on Purim, once in the evening and once in the morning. While we often refer to this mitzvah as "the megillah reading," in reality, there are two possible ways to formulate this mitzvah. One possibility is to formulate it as a mitzvah to read the megillah. Although only one person actually reads the megillah and everyone else listens, the principle of shomei'a k'oneh (the listener is like the responder) states that when one who listens to another person's recitation, the listener can be viewed as if he too is performing the recitation. In the case of megillah, one can potentially employ the principle of shomei'a k'oneh to achieve the result that everyone listening has read the megillah. Alternatively, one can formulate the mitzvah as a mitzvah to listen to the reading of the megillah. The shomei'a k'oneh principle is not necessary to fulfill the mitzvah. In this issue, we will explore both possibilities and provide some practical differences.


Applying Shomei'a K'Oneh to Reading the Megillah


The notion that the mitzvah is to read the megillah presents a fundamental conundrum. The Mishna, Megillah 17a, states that one can only fulfill the mitzvah by reading from a valid megillah. If there is a requirement for every person to actually read the megillah, how is it that the listeners fulfill the mitzvah through shomei'a k'oneh? Even if one grants that listeners the right to assume that it is as if they also recited the megillah, they nevertheless did not use a megillah for this recitation. How then can they fulfill the mitzvah in this manner?


R. Avraham Yeshaya Karelitz (1878-1953), Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 29:3, deduces from this question that the principle of shomei'a k'oneh does not merely consider the listener as if he recited what he heard. Rather, the principle of shomei'a k'oneh allows the listener to receive the same benefits as the one performing the recitation. When the ba'al korei (recitor) reads the megillah, all of the listeners receive the same benefits and it is as if they too read from an actual megillah.


R. Ya'akov Y. Kanievsky (1899-1985), Kehillot Ya'akov, Pesachim no. 45, notes that if one doesn't want to accept R. Karelitz's expansive explanation of the concept of shomei'a k'oneh, one can simply conclude that the mitzvah of megillah doesn't necessitate shomei'a k'oneh and the mitzvah can be fulfilled simply by hearing someone else read the megillah. However, R. Kanievski notes that even if the mitzvah is to read the megillah, one can employ shomei'a k'oneh without using R. Karelitz's expansion. He suggests that the mitzvah is not necessarily to read the megillah, but rather to recite the words as they are written in the megillah. As long as the recitation is not performed using an invalid scroll or one's memory as the conduit, one can fulfill the mitzvah. Therefore, when one hears the words as they are read from the megillah, one can fulfill the mitzvah of reading the megillah without having an actual megillah. [R. Kanievski develops this idea in Kitvei Kehillot Ya'akov, Rosh HaShanah no. 130. He admits that this concept is difficult to explain in writing.]


Do Men and Women Have Different Obligations?


There is a comment of R. Yehudai Gaon (8th century) that sheds light on the question of the nature of the mitzvah of megillah. R. Yehudai Gaon, Halachot Gedolot, Hilchot Megillah, writes that women and children are not required to read the megillah, but they are required to listen to the megillah. Tosafot, Megillah 4a, s.v. Nashim, note that according to R. Yehudai Gaon, a woman cannot read on behalf of a man because a man's obligation is to read the megillah and a woman's obligation is to listen to the megillah. Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 689:2, cites the opinion that a woman cannot read on behalf of a man. [Shulchan Aruch implies that that we follow the opinion of Rashi, Erchin 3a, s.v. L'Atuyei that a woman may read the megillah on behalf of a man (see Be'er HaGolah ad loc.). Nevertheless, some of the sources cited in this section imply that R. Yehudai Gaon's position is the accepted position.]


R. Yehuda Aryeh Leib Alter (1847-1905), Sefat Emet, Megillah 4a, s.v. Af, explains the opinion of R. Yehudai Gaon that in principle, women should be exempt from megillah because it is a time bound positive commandment, which women are generally exempt from. However, because women were beneficiaries of the miracle of Purim, the rabbis instituted for them an independent obligation to listen to the megillah. Because the impetus for the obligation is different, the nature of the obligation is different as well.


There are a number of practical differences between a man's obligation to read the megillah and a woman's obligation to listen to the megillah. First, Rama, Orach Chaim 689:2, (based on Mordechai, Megillah no. 779) writes that if a woman reads the megillah for herself, she does not recite the standard beracha of "al mikra megillah" (on reading the megillah), but rather she recites "lishmo'a megillah" (to listen to the megillah).


Second, Mordechai op. cit., cites R. Eliezer ben Yoel (Ra'aviah, 13th century) who questions whether a child can read on behalf of a woman. R. Shmuel Rozofsky (20th century), (printed in Zichron Shmuel no. 20) explains that normally a child is not inherently obligated to perform mitzvot and his obligation is only a function of his father's obligation to train him. Therefore, a child cannot perform any recitations on behalf of adults. Nevertheless, regarding the mitzvah of megillah, it is arguable that the child's obligation is not merely a result of his father's obligation to train him, but rather as a result of the fact that children were direct beneficiaries of the miracle of Purim. For this reason, Ra'aviah questions the nature of the child's obligation. If the child's obligation is merely for training purposes, he cannot read on behalf of an adult. However, if the child's obligation is an inherent obligation due to the fact that children were beneficiaries of the miracle, he would be able to read on behalf of adults. Since an obligation based on the fact that they were beneficiaries of the miracle would only produce on obligation to listen to the megillah and not to read the megillah, a child can only read on behalf of an adult woman who also has an obligation to listen to the megillah. He cannot read on behalf of an adult man who has an obligation to read the megillah.


Third, R. Yosef Y. Ostreicher (a 15th century student of R. Yisrael Isserlin), Leket Yosher pp. 155-156, writes that if a woman listening to the megillah misses a few words of the reading, she nevertheless fulfills the mitzvah. He explains that if the obligation is to read the megillah, one must read every word and those who fulfill the mitzvah through shomei'a k'oneh must hear every word. However, a woman's obligation is only to listen to the reading of the megillah and therefore, she fulfills the mitzvah even if she doesn't hear every word. This suggestion doesn't seem to be codified by Shulchan Aruch and its commentaries. (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 690:12 and Mishna Berurah 689:1)


 Can a Deaf Person Read the Megillah?


The Gemara, Megillah 19b, raises the question of whether a deaf person may read the megillah. The Gemara notes R. Yosi's opinion that one can only fulfill a mitzvah that requires recitation if he hears the words that he is saying. The Gemara states that according to R. Yosi, a deaf person is exempt from the mitzvah of megillah and therefore, cannot read it on behalf of other people. The Gemara also notes the opinion of R. Yehuda that the reading is valid even if the words are not heard by the reader and questions whether one can fulfill the mitzvah in the ideal state (l'chatchilah) in this situation according to R. Yehuda.


R. Yosef Karo's version of Rambam, Hilchot Megillah 1:2, as cited in Beit Yosef, Orach Chaim no. 689, states that a deaf person is exempt from reading the megillah and he cannot read on behalf of others. This implies that he follows the opinion of R. Yosi. [Our version of Hilchot Megillah does not mention a deaf person.] Yet, Rambam, Hilchot K'riat Sh'ma 2:8, rules that one can fulfill the mitzvah of K'riat Sh'ma even if one does not hear the words that he is saying. This implies that he does not follow the opinion of R. Yosi.


Beit Yosef resolves the apparent contradiction by suggesting that the mitzvah of megillah has a higher standard because one of the components of the mitzvah is to publicize the miracle (pirsumei nisa). Therefore, one must actually hear the words of the megillah and reading the megillah is not sufficient. R. Kanievsky, Kehillot Ya'akov, Megillah no. 4, explains that according to Beit Yosef, one must conclude that men have two obligations: to read the megillah and to hear the reading of the megillah. If one reads the megillah but doesn't hear what he is reading, he does not fulfill part of the obligation and therefore, cannot read on behalf of others.


 

Halacha:
Purim 

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