The Mishnah in Kiddushin (דף כ"ט.) states that there are certain obligations which a father has towards his child; the Gemara (שם) specifies that one of them is the requirement to teach him Torah. The Gemara later there (עמוד ב' שם) derives this requirement from a Posuk in the Torah (דברים י"א:י"ט); the Sifrei there (פיסקא מ"ו, פרשת עקב פיסקא י') presents a similar derivation, adding that one who properly fulfills this obligation is entitled to a significant reward while one who does not will be severely punished. The Rambam (פרק א' מהל' תלמוד תורה הלכה א') codifies this obligation, as does the Shulchan Aruch (יורה דעה סימן רמ"ה סעיף א'), who indicates that this is a Biblical requirement; the Avodas HaMelech, commenting on the Rambam (שם בד"ה ומש"ר אבל), asserts that the Rambam too considers this to be a Mitzvah MideOraisa, based on the above cited Sifrei (שם), although some do claim that it is in fact a Mitzvah MideRabbanan (עיין בספר ארבעה טורי אבן על הרמב"ם שם, מובא בספר הליקוטים על הרמב"ם במהדורת הר"ר שבתי פרנקל ). Rav Yosef Kafach, in his commentary on the Rambam (שם אות ז'), suggests that this may be the view of the Lechem Mishneh (שם), but he himself writes that it is incorrect and affirms that the Rambam certainly holds that the Mitzvah is indeed MideOraisa.

In addition to this Mitzvah to teach his son Torah, a father is also obligated to train his child regarding the performance of Mitzvos in general; this requirement is commonly known as the Mitzvah of Chinuch. This Mitzvah is presented in, among other places, the Gemara in Sukkah (דף מ"ב.), which rules, using specific examples, that when a child is old enough to be able to perform a particular Mitzvah, the father must teach him and otherwise enable him to do so properly. Rashi there (שם בד"ה חייב בלולב) states that this is a Rabbinic requirement; it is indeed clear from an earlier Gemara in Sukkah (דף כ"ח:, ועיי"ש בתוס' ד"ה כאן), as well as in Chagigah (דף ד.), that this obligation is MideRabbanan, although the Shaloh (שער האותיות, אות דרך ארץ בד"ה עיקר) seems to link it directly with the aforementioned Biblical Mitzvah to teach one’s child Torah. The Chayei Adam (כלל ס"ו סעיף א') writes that this Mitzvah is in fact מדברי קבלה, meaning from the Nevi’im, and he cites as a source the famous Posuk in Mishlei (כ"ב:ו') which contains the directive to provide training for a youth according to his particular way so that when he grows old he will not swerve from it. The Ramban, in his commentary on the Chumash (דברים ו':ז'), mentions several Pesukim in the Torah which indicate that we are commanded to see to it that our children have familiarity with the Mitzvos, and the Meshech Chochmah (בראשית י"ח:י"ט) likewise suggests that there is a source for the Mitzvah of Chinuch in the Torah, based upon the conduct of Avraham Avinu.

It is evident from the Gemara in Sukkah cited above first (דף מ"ב.) that there is no one uniform age at which a child must be introduced to the observance of the Mitzvos, but that it rather depends upon the nature of each particular Mitzvah and the intellectual maturity of the child concerned; the Mishnah Berurah (אורח חיים סימן שמ"ג ס"ק ג'), among others, states this expressly. The Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת חלק ב' אות י') does mention the age of five or six as the appropriate age, on average, at which a child should be educated to observe Mitzvos, and the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (הלכות תלמוד תורה פרק א' סעיף א') indicates likewise that it is at that age that the father’s obligation to teach his child Torah intensifies, but they too acknowledge that it depends on the individual child. Indeed, it is clear from Tosafos in Erchin (דף ב: בד"ה שהגיע) that the age at which the requirement of Chinuch for most Mitzvos goes into effect depends on the child, and, as stressed by, among others, the Meiri in Chagigah (בית הבחירה לדף ב. שם בד"ה במקומות), who cites several examples, the specific Mitzvah. Rav Yaakov Emden, in his Sefer Migdal Oz (ברכות שמים תעלה ג'), writes that in general, the obligation of Chinuch for Mitzvos applies to a six year old, although he does present a list of particular cases where Chinuch depends upon the child’s ability with regard to the specifics of the Mitzvah. It should be noted, though, that as pointed out by the Bikkurei Yaakov (שם סימן תרנ"ז ס"ק ג') and others, the child must be able to perform the Mitzvah fully and in the proper fashion in order for the Mitzvah of Chinuch to be in effect.

In commenting on a subsequent Gemara in Chagigah (דף ו.) which states that there is a Rabbinic requirement to train a child in the performance of any Mitzvah which an adult must perform MideOraisa, Rashi (בד"ה קטן מיבעיא) explains that the purpose of this requirement is to accustom the child when he is young to observe these Mitzvos so that he will continue the practice when he becomes an adult, a point he makes as well in commenting on an earlier Gemara in Sukkah (דף ב: בד"ה מדרבנן). In a similar vein, the Rashba in Megillah (חדושי הרשב"א לדף י"ט. שם בד"ה ורבי יהודה) posits that the Mitzvah of Chinuch is designed to accustom the child to Mitzvos before he has any real obligation to fulfill them so that he will be used to them when he actually does become obligated. He then cites the aforementioned Posuk in Mishlei (שם) as a source for this idea; the Rambam (פרק י"ז מהל' מאכלות אסורות הלכה כ"ח) quotes that Posuk as the basis for the obligation upon a father to see to it that his son does not commit any Aveiros. The Aruch HaShulchan (יו"ד שם סעיף ה') writes similarly regarding the Mitzvah to teach one’s child Torah that one must do so because if he does not, the child will likely, upon reaching adulthood, become undisciplined and pursue bad things, not observing any Mitzvos. It is thus important as well to train one’s child in the area of Middos and dignified conduct, as the Shaloh (שם בד"ה וכתב ובד"ה כלל גדול) describes at some length.

Clearly, then, the goal of teaching Torah to a child and training him in the performance of Mitzvos is to prepare and enable him to behave properly as a religiously observant adult. Based on this idea, the Minchas Chinuch (מצוה רס"ד אות ל"ד) analyzes whether or not there is any obligation of Chinuch regarding a Mitzvah that the child may never have to fulfill as an adult. He concludes that there is, citing a Gemara in Nazir (דף כ"ח:-כ"ט.) which specifically discusses Chinuch with regard to such a Mitzvah, and the Pischei Teshuvah (יו"ד סימן שצ"ו סעיף ב') appears to agree. Others, however, disagree; the Meiri in Nazir there (בית הבחירה לדף כ"ט. שם בד"ה כשם), for example, speaks of a distinction between Mitzvos which are obligatory upon an adult and those which are not in terms of the requirement of Chinuch, and he interprets that Gemara (שם) differently, as does the Keren Orah (שם בד"ה ריב"ח). The Maharatz Chayes (שו"ת מהר"ץ סימן נ"ח) rules clearly that because the purpose of Chinuch is only to enable the child to know how to behave as an adult, the obligation applies only to those Mitzvos which he will regularly and definitively have to observe as an adult, as opposed to those that may never be relevant to him as an adult. The Kesav Sofer (שו"ת כתב סופר חלק יו"ד סימן קע"ב) concurs, and both of these authorities explain the Gemara in Nazir (שם) in a way that it presents no problem for this position. It must be noted, though, that even the Minchas Chinuch (שם), according to whom there is a requirement of Chinuch for all Mitzvos, holds this way on the assumption that there is at least a chance that the child will eventually become bound to perform any given Mitzvah.

The question is, then, what obligations of Chinuch, if any, exists regarding so-called “special needs” children who, because of their disabilities, have a more limited intellectual capacity and might never actually become Halachically required to perform certain Mitzvos. In speaking of individuals who lack the ability to clearly understand things and are thus considered mentally incompetent, and as such are disqualified from anything, whether in the realm of Mitzvos or in the realm of monetary matters, which requires lucid understanding, thought or intent, Chazal, throughout the literature of Shas and Poskim, identify the חרש and the שוטה. An earlier Gemara in Chagigah (דף ב:) states plainly, for example, that a חרש and a שוטה are exempt from all of the Mitzvos in the Torah, and the Rambam (פרק ב' מהל' חגיגה הלכה ד') rules accordingly. In terms of literal meaning, aחרש is a deaf-mute (although the term is also used to describe someone who is only deaf or even someone who is able to hear with great difficulty) and a שוטה is someone who is deranged. Certain other individuals, however, whose mental and intellectual impairment makes them similar to a חרש or a שוטה because of their inability to be properly educated and/or to comprehend and normally function in the world around them may also be classified as a חרש or a שוטה for the purposes of Halachah, as they too are not fully developed mentally and thus lack the requisite intellectual maturity for the performance of certain ritual and civil acts. The Minchas Chinuch (מצוה ה' סוף אות ד') writes that the Mitzvah of Chinuch is indeed inapplicable regarding a child who is a חרש or a שוטה because he will never become obligated in any Mitzvah as an adult; the Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת שם אות ט') appears to concur, indicating that such a child, lacking classic intelligence, can not really be taught at all.

At the same time, though, it is often very difficult to precisely categorize a mental disability or to accurately assess a person’s intellectual capacity and level of knowledge and understanding, especially in light of new and developing educational techniques that are geared for those who have severe mental and learning disabilities and which have in fact enabled such people to comprehend, achieve and accomplish much more than once thought possible. Clearly, each case must therefore be examined individually, as in fact noted by the Rambam (פרק ט' מהל' עדות הלכה י') and the Shulchan Aruch (חושן משפט סימן ל"ה סעיף י') and elaborated upon by Dr. Avraham S. Avraham, a contemporary expert in the fields of Halachah and medicine, in his Sefer Nishmas Avraham (חלק ג', בהערותיו על השו"ע שם אות א', עמוד קפ"א-קפ"ב). The Mitzvah of Chinuch may thus actually be quite relevant regarding children with various mental deficiencies, as many are capable of being taught about Mitzvos on at least some level, and will indeed become obligated to observe them upon reaching the age of Halachic adulthood. Perhaps with this in mind, the Pri Megadim himself posits elsewhere (אשל אברהם לאו"ח סימן שמ"ג ס"ק ב') that one is required to educate a child classified as a חרש because such a child does in fact have some understanding, and the Aruch LaNer in Yevamos (דף קי"ג: בד"ה גזירה) presents this requirement even more emphatically, noting that the person’s disability may improve as he grows older.

The Mishnah in Terumos (פרק א' משנה ב') states that whenever Chazal speak of a חרש, the reference is to a deaf-mute, as opposed to one who cannot hear but can speak. Rav Ovadyah of Bartinura (שם בד"ה חרש) and the Tiferes Yisrael (שם אות ט') qualify this statement, noting that it is a general, but not an absolute rule; the Sdei Chemed (כללים, מערכת חי"ת כלל ל') quotes an opinion that it holds true whenever Chazal mention a חרש together with a שוטה, and this is also how the Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת שם אות ה') learns. The Rambam (פרק ב' מהל' אישות הלכה כ"ו) rules accordingly that the term חרש always refers to one who can neither hear nor speak; the Sdei Chemed (שם, ועיין עוד שם כלל ק"ו, ק"ז) explains that he is discussing the term’s usage not only in his own work but in the works of Chazal in general.

In any case, though, in commenting on the Gemara in Niddah (דף י"ג:) where this Mishnah is cited, Rashi (שם בד"ה בכל מקום) explains that the Mishnah is referring to the use of the term to describe one who lacks typical intelligence. Rashi in Chagigah as well (דף ב. בד"ה חוץ) writes that a חרש lacks typical intelligence and is thus exempt from Mitzvos, although the Gemara does indicate in Yevamos (דף קי"ג סוף ע"א) that he does have some kind of understanding, albeit not in a manner that is comparable to other people, as Rashi there (בד"ה קלישתא) explains. The Rambam (הל' עדות שם הלכה י"א) likewise states that a חרש is comparable to a שוטה in that his intellect is impaired and he is thus not obligated in the observance of Mitzvos. The Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת שם אות א') rules clearly that a חרש who can neither hear nor speak is considered like aשוטה and is exempt from all the Mitzvos of the Torah, and he adds elsewhere (משבצות זהב לאו"ח סימן רס"ו ס"ק ד') that the Mitzvah of Chinuch does not apply regarding a child with such a disability as it does regarding other children. The reason for this seems to be that such people (as it was assumed, and as indeed was the case at one time) can not be educated; they are thus unable to comprehend certain obvious things, and their inability to speak evidences their lack of intellectual development and competence. It is conceivable that an individual who is diagnosed with a form of mental retardation, especially if he can not speak, may be classified as a חרש if he similarly can not be sufficiently educated, or if, as the Chasam Sofer points out (שו"ת חתם סופר חלק אבן העזר חלק ב' סימן ב' בד"ה והנעל"ד), he lacks even simple comprehension; as noted above, though, there appears to be room for exceptions.

As for a שוטה, the Yerushalmi in Chagigah (פרק א' הלכה א', דף א:) indicates that such a person too lacks classic mental competence, and Rashi in Shabbos (דף קנ"ג סוף ע"א בד"ה לשוטה) asserts that he has a lower level of understanding than a חרש. Chazal in this case, however, provide a more precise definition in a Tosefta in Terumos (פרק א' הלכה ג'); Rav Yechezkel Abramsky, in his commentary to the Tosefta entitled Chazon Yechezkel (באורים שם בד"ה איזהו), writes that its goal is to describe the שוטה who is exempt from Mitzvos and from punishments and whose monetary transactions are considered invalid due to his being mentally incompetent. Citing the beginning of this Tosefta, the Gemara in Chagigah (דף ג:) states that a שוטה is a person who goes out alone at night [in an uninhabited area, as pointed out there by the Turei Evven (שם בד"ה איזה)], who sleeps during the night in a cemetery and who tears his clothing. The Gemara (שם) immediately presents a dispute between Amoraim as to whether one must exhibit all three of these forms of erratic behavior in order to be classified as a שוטה or whether manifesting even one suffices, and then analyzes the manner in which these bizarre actions were performed, noting that if done in an irrational manner, one who engages in even one of these activities would certainly qualify as a שוטה, while if not done in an irrational manner, meaning, as Rav Yechezkel Abramsky (שם בד"ה היוצא) explains, that he had a good reason for doing what he did, even one who engaged in all three activities would not qualify.

It emerges from the Gemara (שם) that there can indeed be a rational explanation for erratic conduct at times, precluding even one who engages in several strange behaviors from automatically being labeled as a שוטה, but that if there is no possible rational basis for such conduct, engagement in even one strange behavior would establish a person as a שוטה. The only argument between the Amoraim, then, is in a case where there is no clear or obvious explanation for the person’s conduct, but yet some rationale may be offered; one Amora holds that in this circumstance too his engaging in even one of the strange behaviors suffices to categorize him as a שוטה, while the other holds that all three strange behaviors are needed. The Gemara there (שם דף ד.) then introduces a final characteristic of a שוטה found in the Tosefta (שם), namely, that the person destroys everything that is given to him, and concludes that engaging in this particular behavior even by itself definitively identifies one as a שוטה according to everybody. No other forms of erratic conduct, though, are subsequently mentioned.

The Rambam, however, in his formulation of these rules (הל' עדות שם הלכה ט'), lists other bizarre behaviors, such as walking around naked, breaking utensils and throwing stones, and he speaks of one whose understanding is impaired and whose mind is constantly confused about certain things (though he may be lucid about others), in describing a שוטה. The Kessef Mishneh (שם) explains that according to the Rambam, manifestation of only one form of erratic behavior is needed in order for one to be classified as a שוטה, as the Rosh in Chullin (פרק א' סימן ד') also rules, but it must be a behavior that the person engages in regularly, not just once. Noting that the Rambam does not list any of the examples of irrational conduct formulated in the Gemara in Chagigah (שם ושם), the Kessef Mishneh then explains that the Rambam omitted them intentionally, because he holds that they were not presented as absolute criteria, but as illustrations, and in truth, displaying any openly irrational behavior on a regular basis can qualify a person as a שוטה even if the Gemara does not specifically mention it. He elaborates on this further in the Beis Yosef, commenting on the Tur (אהע"ז סימן קכ"א בד"ה סימני השוטה), where he affirms that according to the Rambam (שם), the criteria found in the Gemara were not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to serve merely as examples, teaching that any form of regular erratic behavior can categorize one as a שוטה.

The Shaagas Aryeh (שו"ת שאגת אריה, הוספות, סימן ב'), in his discussion about the famous case of the Get from Cleves, understands the position of the Rambam (שם) similarly. The case itself involved a Get given to a woman by a man in the city of Cleves who exhibited certain bizarre behavior which called into question the validity of the Get, because one who is not mentally stable can not execute a Get, as stated in the Shulchan Aruch (אהע"ז שם סעיף א'). The Shaagas Aryeh ruled that this Get was in fact valid, and in the course of his explanation (בד"ה מיהו שם), he writes that whereas in the cases in the Gemara (שם ושם), there is at least some possible rationale, as presented there, for the forms of erratic behavior described, and there is thus the aforementioned dispute between the Amoraim concerning certain details, in a case where the erratic behavior can not be explained in any rational manner, all would agree that one who engages in even one such behavior would be classified as a שוטה, and that is the Rambam’s reason for saying what he said. The Perishah, commenting on the Tur (חו" מ סימן ל"ה אות ט'), also accepts this understanding of the Rambam, saying that the Rambam simply chose to give more extreme examples of irrational conduct, and the Beis Ephraim (שו"ת בית אפרים חאהע"ז חלק ג' סימן פ"ט בד"ה והנה באמת) accepts it as well, and he works out the discussion in the Gemara accordingly. The Divrei Chaim (שו"ת דברי חיים חלק א' חאהע"ז סימן נ"ג) writes that if one’s general behavior makes it clear to everyone that he is mentally incapacitated, he is considered a שוטה even if he does not do any of the things mentioned in the Gemara, and the Ohr Somayach (שו"ת אור שמח, ליקוטים סימן י"ג) states similarly that one who talks in an incoherent and disjointed fashion in the manner of one who is mentally impaired is likewise deemed a שוטה, as the specifically identified behaviors are indicators that one is a שוטה, but are not needed to determine that status.

Nonetheless, there are those who disagree with the Rambam’s entire premise that the criteria presented by the Gemara (שם ושם) are not exhaustive and are meant only as examples. The Beis Yosef (שם) refers to an earlier comment of his (אהע"ז סימן קי"ט בסוף ד"ה מצאתי כתוב) where he cites an opposing opinion, according to which one is not considered aשוטה unless he exhibits the behaviors specifically identified in the Gemara. He also quotes from the Maharik (שו"ת מהרי"ק שורש י"ט), who himself apparently learns like the Rambam that engagement in any form of irrational behavior qualifies one as a שוטה, provided that it is as significant as those brought in the Gemara, but who likewise cites an authority who rules that one is not labeled a שוטה if he does not engage in the particular activities mentioned in the Gemara. This also appears to be the position of the Rashba (שו"ת הרשב"א חלק א' סימן תשס"ה), the Mordechai in Gittin (סימן תכ"א, דף ו. בדפיו) and the Rivash (שו"ת הריב"ש סימן תס"ח), among others, and the Pischei Teshuvah (אהע"ז סימן קכ"א סוף ס"ק ב') is willing to accept that view as an auxiliary reason to be lenient in a particular case and not classify someone as a שוטה. The Shulchan Aruch, however (חו"מ שם סעיף ח'), rules in accordance with the Rambam that one who engages in any form of erratic conduct is categorized as a שוטה; the Ramo offers no dissenting comment, and in fact concurs with this in his Darkei Moshe elsewhere (אהע"ז סימן קי"ט אות ה'). While it is true that in connection with another matter, the Shulchan Aruch (יו"ד סימן א' סעיף ה') does list the specific criteria mentioned in the Gemara when describing a שוטה, the Yad Avraham (שם בד"ה ושוטה) states that this is just by way of example, as does the Beis Shemuel (אהע"ז סימן קכ"א סוף ס"ק ט'). This ruling is accepted by, among others, the Simlah Chadasha (יו"ד שם סעיף כ"ט), the Maharsham in his Daas Torah (שם ס"ק מ') and the Darkei Teshuvah (שם ס"ק קנ"ב).

There are also those who disagree with the assertion of the Rambam (שם) that one becomes classified as a שוטה only if he regularly engages in the requisite erratic behaviors. The Tevuos Shor, amplifying the Simlah Chadashah (שם ס"ק מ"ו), for example, writes that even one who exhibits these behaviors only once is already deemed aשוטה , and the Divrei Chaim (שו"ת דברי חיים שם) agrees; the Pri Megadim (שפתי דעת ליו"ד שם ס"ק כ"ג) suggests that it is proper to accept this view in order to be stringent, as does the Chasam Sofer (שו"ת חתם סופר שם בד"ה במה). Many others, however, hold that the Rambam is correct and the erratic behavior must be an established one; the Beis Ephraim (שו"ת בית אפרים שם בד"ה איברא דמה שהביא) explains that sometimes a single bizarre behavior may be the result of a specific one-time circumstance which would thus not warrant a person being considered a שוטה. This position that a pattern of irrational conduct is needed is accepted by such authorities as the Sma (חו"מ שם ס"ק כ'), the Shach (יו"ד שם ס"ק כ"ג), Rav Yonasan Eibeschutz in his Sefer Kereisi U’Paleisi (כרתי ליו"ד שם ס"ק כ"ח), the Turei Evven in Chagigah (דף ד. בד"ה כי), the Chida in in his Sefer Pesach Einayim in Chagigah (דף ג: בד"ה תנו רבנן) and others; the Kaf HaChaim (יו"ד שם אות קכ"ו) asserts that this is indeed the majority position among the Poskim.

As outlined above, the Gemara in Chagigah (דף ב:) states that a שוטה is exempt from all of the Mitzvos of the Torah and the Rambam (פרק ב' מהל' חגיגה הלכה ד') rules accordingly; Rashi earlier there (דף ב. שם בד"ה חוץ) explains that this is because such a person lacks typical intelligence. The Rambam in another source (הל' עדות שם) writes that aשוטה is removed from any connection to Mitzvos; the Maharil (שו"ת מהרי"ל סימן קצ"ו), however, seems to disagree with this, saying that in some sense a שוטה does relate to at least certain Mitzvos, and the Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת שם אות ג') appears to concur. Rav Chaim Soloveitchik (חדושי רבנו חיים הלוי על הרמב"ם פרק ה' מהל' קרבן פסח הלכה ז' בד"ה ואשר) distinguishes between different categories of Mitzvos in this regard, and the Sdei Chemed (כללים, מערכת חי"ת כלל קט"ו) cites others who offer other explanations and details. In any case, though, the Pri Megadim elsewhere, cited above (משבצות זהב לאו"ח סימן רס"ו ס"ק ד'), notes that the Mitzvah of Chinuch does not apply regarding a child who is aשוטה as it does regarding other children. In light of all of the above, it is clear that the disqualification of aשוטה from Mitzvos is based on his erratic behavior, which is indicative of his being detached from or even unaware of his surroundings, and thus lacking the requisite understanding and perception necessary for the performance of Mitzvos. It is conceivable that an individual who is diagnosed with a form of autism may be classified as a שוטה if he is similarly out of touch with his environment or lacks typical understanding of things in the world around him, but again, as noted above, there appears to be room for exceptions.

The major difficulty in terms of deciding whether and when to say that there is no Mitzvah of Chinuch regarding a particular special needs child because he is to be labeled as a חרש or as a שוטה is that there is a wide range of mental and intellectual impairments. Tremendous differences exist among people with disabilities included as part of the spectrum of mental retardation, autism and other such conditions. It is known today that the degree of such impairments varies drastically from one individual with a diagnosis of mental retardation or autism to another, as does each person’s level of intelligence and understanding. Moreover, some of these individuals may exhibit certain modes of outlandish behavior at times, but yet conduct themselves more typically some or even most of the time. Finally, as alluded to above, significant strides have been made and are still being made in the field of education for children with special needs, and many of them grow up to be functioning and productive adults. As a result, not all people with mental or intellectual deficiencies necessarily fit into Chazal’s category of either a חרש or a שוטה; parents of children with certain forms of the above disabilities are thus indeed obligated in the Mitzvah of Chinuch towards them.

One problem in precisely defining the obligations in terms of Mitzvos of people with particular kinds of developmental disabilities is that the Gemara never addresses their status clearly. Indeed, the Chasam Sofer himself (שו"ת חתם סופר שם בד"ה גם) wonders why the Gemara nowhere mentions the Halachos regarding those who are classified as a פתי, literally translated as a person who is simple-minded, which may be the proper categorization for certain people with special needs. The Rambam (הל' עדות שם הלכה י'), however, does discuss the status of a פתי, and he thus acknowledges the existence of individuals whose level of mental impairment does not qualify them as either a חרש or aשוטה , as he describes people who are especially foolish, who can not distinguish between matters that are contradictory, who don’t understand things the way other people do and who are mentally confused, impulsive and extremely mad, seemingly addressing a range of conditions. The Shulchan Aruch (חו"מ שם סעיף י') quotes the Rambam (שם) verbatim; the Sma there (שם ס"ק כ"א) presents a difference between a פתי and a שוטה, stating that a שוטה is someone whose mind is totally and completely confused and disoriented regarding certain things, even though he may be as lucid as anyone else about other things, while a פתי is someone who is not disoriented about any one thing, but simply lacks clear perception and does not comprehend things the way other people do.

The Noda BeYehudah, in his Teshuvah regarding the case of the aforementioned Get from Cleves, published in a compendium of responsa concerning that case (ספר אור הישר סימן ל' בד"ה ובזה נעל"ד), posits that a שוטה is one who engages in actual physical behavior which is irrational, whereas a פתי is one who does not do anything outlandish, but rather speaks about bizarre things. Some, however, such as the Beis Ephraim (שו"ת בית אפרים שם בד"ה והנה ראיתי עוד) and the Tzemach Tzedek of Lubavitch (שו"ת צמח צדק חלק אהע"ז סימן קנ"ד), reject this differentiation and state that one can be labeled a שוטה based on his words alone The Tevuos Shor (שם ס"ק נ"א) suggests another distinction, saying that aשוטה is someone whose mental imbalance resulted from some external circumstance (such as an illness or a trauma) while a פתי is someone who was simply born with a more limited intellectual capacity which can not change. Without mentioning the term פתי in particular, the Ramo elsewhere (אהע"ז סימן מ"ד סעיף ב') distinguishes between aשוטה and someone whose mind is clear, but whose mental ability is limited; the Beis Shemuel (שם ס"ק ד') and the Chelkas Mechokek (שם ס"ק ב') attempt to clarify the Ramo’s precise intentions there. The Darkei Teshuvah (יו"ד שם ס"ק ק"נ) summarizes some of these positions succinctly.

As for the Halachah, the Rambam (שם) writes that the people he described are in fact to be considered in the same way as those categorized as aשוטה , though he acknowledges that each case must be determined individually because it is impossible to write precise guidelines; the Shulchan Aruch (שם) rules accordingly as well. The Maharit (שו"ת מהרי"ט חלק ב' חאהע"ז סימן ט"ז) explains, however, that the Rambam is referring there only to these people’s status in terms of delivering testimony in court cases (which is the context of the Rambam’s ruling there), but in terms of other areas, if the relevant facts can be explained to the person and it is clear that he understands, he is not considered as aשוטה and his actions have absolute Halachic validity. Although some disagree with this interpretation, the Seridei Eish (שו"ת שרידי אש חלק ג' סימן ל"ה אות א' סעיף ג') asserts that it is indeed the majority view among the Poskim. The Chasam Sofer (שם), while questioning what the exact source is, accepts this position and then writes (שם בד"ה והנלע"ד) that as long as one has some perceptible clarity of thought, his actions are Halachically significant, provided that he does not display the kind of behavior that evidences mental disorientation and confusion.

This is also the view of the Maharik (שו"ת מהרי"ק החדשות סימן כ'), who notes that it is difficult in general to assess people’s level of comprehension, since no two minds are alike, as some understand things more deeply and more broadly than others and some grasp things more quickly and at an earlier age than others. Consequently, we are to rely only on the definitions of a שוטה provided by Chazal, and must consider the actions of anyone else, whose mind is not disoriented, as valid according to Halachah even if he does not perceive things in the world in the typical fashion. The Oneg Yom Tov (שו"ת עונג יום טוב סימן קנ"ג) also agrees with the Maharit, whose position he analyzes at some length, and applies it even to the case of a person who is severely disabled mentally, but is capable of some understanding; he asserts that a פתי is to be considered the same as anyone else regarding those things that he can understand when explained to him. Among others, Rav Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook (שו"ת עזרת כהן סימן ס"ח) likewise assumes as a matter of simple fact that the Rambam equates a פתי to a שוטה only for testimony purposes and not regarding the other laws of the Torah. Rav Moshe Feinstein (שו"ת אגרות משה אהע"ז חלק א' סימן קס"ד) does as well, and he writes explicitly elsewhere (שו"ת אגרות משה או"ח חלק ב' סימן פ"ח) that aפתי , even one who is extremely impaired, is obligated in the Mitzvos. Consequently, then, parents of a child classified as a פתי would certainly be required to provide proper Chinuch for him, as Rav Moshe Feinstein (שם) indeed implies.

There is actually some discussion among the Poskim even regarding someone who is indeed classified as a חרש or aשוטה , but yet displays conventional behavior in certain areas, as to whether even he is obligated in those Mitzvos not interfered with by his condition. The Noda BeYehudah, for example, in the Teshuvah cited above (שם בד"ה ולכן העולה על רוחי), writes that a שוטה is exempt only from those Mitzvos that he is unable to perform due to his mental instability. He explains that when Chazal excluded a שוטה from all Mitzvos, they were referring to a person whose other conduct is not known, but if it is clear that one is competent in certain areas, then he is bound by those Mitzvos which he is able to perform competently. The Chasam Sofer, in a subsequent Teshuvah (שו"ת חת"ס שם סימן ד' בד"ה והנה), apparently concurs. The Shulchan Aruch HaRav (שאלות ותשובות סימן כ"ה) also writes that one who is considered aשוטה because his mind is confused in one sense is not automatically excluded from all Mitzvos; the Tzemach Tzedek of Lubavitch (שו"ת צמח צדק חלק אהע"ז סימן קנ"ג אות ד') states similarly that one’s status as a שוטה in one area does not impact his obligations in other areas. In a similar vein, the Keren LeDovid (שו"ת קרן לדוד חלק או"ח סימן כ"ז בד"ה ומ"מ) rules that even a חרש who has an understanding of the nature of davening and the recitation of Kedushah and Borchu can be counted towards a Minyan. Indeed, the Ramo himself (או"ח סימן קצ"ט סעיף י') rules that a שוטה who has some understanding can be counted towards a Mezuman for Bircas HaMazon; the Mishnah Berurah (שם ס"ק כ"ט) clarifies that the person in question, though considered a שוטה by others, is not a complete שוטה, but rather has some level of perception, and he writes elsewhere in the Biur Halachah (שם סימן נ"ה בד"ה הוא) that the same is true of counting this person towards a Minyan. The same would certainly seem to be true of a פתי or another person with a lesser disability who would thus definitely be obligated in those Mitzvos which he is capable of performing properly.

There are, to be sure, those who disagree. The Divrei Chaim (שו"ת דברי חיים חלק ב' חאהע"ז סימן ע"ד), for example, indicates that regardless of how intelligent one may be in some areas, if he is labeled a שוטה, then that status impacts other activities of his as well, and the Beis Yitzchak (שו"ת בית יצחק חאהע"ז חלק ב' סימן ו' אות א') agrees. The Mahari Assad (שו"ת מהרי"א- יהודה יעלה חלק אהע"ז סימן צ"ג בד"ה ומה שסיים) compares a שוטה to a minor (as they are often grouped together in terms of being exempted from Mitzvos), noting that just as a minor who is very smart and insightful is still not considered responsible as an adult in terms of the Mitzvos, the same is true of a שוטה who may have a high level of understanding in certain areas. Regarding a חרש, the Pri Megadim (פתיחה כוללת שם סוף אות ג') rules unequivocally that it makes no difference if he is highly intelligent; his status is as established by Chazal. Rav Moshe Feinstein (שו"ת אגרות משה אהע"ז חלק א' סימן ק"כ ענף ב' ) writes in general that once one is exempt from some of the Mitzvos because of a mental impairment, he is exempt from all of the Mitzvos, because one is either obligated in the Mitzvos or he is not; there is no such thing as a partial obligation. One who is a שוטה and thus exempt from those Mitzvos affected by his condition is thus exempt from all the Mitzvos. This would seem to be the position of Tosafos in Chagigah (דף ג: בד"ה דרך), who state that one who is clearly a שוטה in terms of one type of behavior can definitely be presumed to be a שוטה regarding all matters; the Tevuos Shor (שם), though, offers an additional understanding of this view, and the matter may be the subject of a dispute among Rishonim, as presented by the Seei Chemed (שדי חמד, אסיפת דינים מערכת גט סימן א' כלל נ"ט). In any case, however, these authorities are all discussing someone who is definitively in the category of either a חרש or aשוטה ; it therefore seems reasonable to assume that someone like a פתי who functions at a higher developmental level would be obligated in those Mitzvos that he is able to do appropriately even according to them and there would, again, be an obligation of Chinuch regarding a child with such a disability.

Another important issue to consider regarding an individual with special needs is, as alluded to above, the modern methods of education which have been and are being utilized to raise the level of understanding of people with various mental and intellectual disabilities and “tap in” to their particular minds and abilities in order to develop them in a maximum fashion. Many of these techniques have indeed enabled people with special needs to comprehend and function in a more typical manner; this kind of training may also impact such a person’s obligations regarding Mitzvos. The Shevet Sofer (שו"ת שבט סופר חלק אהע"ז סימן כ"א) reports that his father, the Kesav Sofer, after visiting a school for hearing and language impaired people in Vienna, was pleasantly surprised and impressed by the accomplishments of these individuals as a result of their special training and remarked that he was unsure whether the Halachic exemption from Mitzvos of those classified as a חרש would apply to them. The Shevet Sofer then writes that he thinks that his father asked for Tefillin to be provided for these students, indicating that he held that even if one were to have been exempt from Mitzvos because of a mental or intellectual disability, if the disability has been significantly overcome by special education, he indeed becomes bound by the Mitzvos. The Halachos Ketanos (שו"ת הלכות קטנות חלק ב' סימן ל"ח) clearly concurs, though he leaves the matter in doubt in terms of Halachah. It is noteworthy that the Rashash in Gittin (דף ע"א. בד"ה גמרא) also mentions this school in Vienna in demonstrating that a חרש can indeed be educated. Rav Yitzchak Isaac HaLeivi Herzog (שו"ת היכל יצחק חלק ב' סימן מ"ז) likewise writes that because of these modern methods of education, a חרש may no longer be considered to be mentally incompetent. The same would likely be true of people with other conditions for whom special education and training can be provided.

There are, however, a number of authorities who disagree with the above assertion, and hold that if a person is exempt from the Mitzvos because of any mental or intellectual impairment, he maintains that status regardless of any education or training that he may receive. The Tzemach Tzedek of Nikolsburg (שו"ת צמח צדק סימן ע"ז) thus rules regarding two different people who had the status of a חרש and had achieved great success and proficiency in a number of areas, including, in one case, in terms of the ability to daven, indicating that they were highly intelligent and had clearly become educated, that they nevertheless are each still to be classified as a חרש because the Halachah presents no basis for distinguishing between different people who are in this category. The Maharam Schick (שו"ת מהר"ם שיק חלק אהע"ז סימן ע"ט אות ד') also writes that the education and training of a חרש does not change his Halachic status, noting that what he has learned may well be superficial and mechanical and thus not indicative of a sufficient change in his perception and comprehension, and the Keren LeDovid (שו"ת קרן לדוד שם) raises this point as well. The Maharsham (שו"ת מהרש"ם חלק ב' סימן ק"מ) accepts this position too, although he is willing to be lenient and consider the חרש to be Halachically competent if he has actually learned to speak, as opposed to his having learned other means of communication similar to those which the Gemara in Gittin (דף ע"א.) already discusses and indicates do not change the person’s status. The Tzitz Eliezer (שו"ת ציץ אליעזר חלק ט"ו סימן א' אות א' סעיף ג') thus states that the status of such an educated חרש is the subject of a major dispute among the Poskim, and he concludes that the matter is still in doubt

This latter point that the attainment of the ability to speak, even if the speech is not completely clear, removes one from the status of a חרש for at least some purposes is agreed to by the Divrei Chaim (שו"ת דברי חיים שם סימן ע"ב) as well as by Rav Yaakov Emden, in his Siddur Beis Yaakov (מוסך השבת,הלכות קריאת התורה, דיני הוצאת ס"ת וכו' סוף אות כ'), where he allows a חרש who has learned to speak, who understands what he is reading and knows that Hashem is the Creator to be called to the Torah. Rav Moshe Feinstein (שו"ת אגרות משה אהע"ז חלק ג' סימן ל"ג) also writes that one’s status as a חרש is removed if he learns how to speak, regardless of how he came to this ability. Rav Ovadyah Yosef (שו"ת יחוה דעת חלק ב' סימן ו') rules that one may rely on the lenient opinions and count a חרש who has been taught to speak towards a Minyan for Kaddish and Kedushah and the like, though he still considers the matter to be in doubt, and thus instructs what should be done practically if this person is needed for the Minyan. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (שו"ת מנחת שלמה חלק ב' סימן ד' אות ל') states simply that if one is able to answer Amen with the congregation, he may count towards the Minyan. It would thus stand to reason, despite the view of those authorities who hold that the Halachic exemption from Mitzvos of certain categories of people is absolute and can not change, that if a person with some other mental or intellectual impairment has been educated to the point that his impairment has been overcome, he becomes obligated in the Mitzvos that he can perform, as this seems to be the more prevalent ruling.

It is reasonable to conclude from all of the above that there does indeed exist a Mitzvah of Chinuch regarding special needs children in most situations, because many such children can not be classified as either a חרש or a שוטה, but rather as a פתי, and because even one who is to be classified as a חרש or a שוטה is not necessarily excluded from all Mitzvos. Moreover, many of these children, especially if educated and trained with modern methods and therapies which help them overcome some of their disabilities to an extent, will develop more typically, at least in some areas, and will thus become obligated in most, if not all, Mitzvos as adults. Rav Moshe Feinstein (שו"ת אגרות משה יו"ד חלק ד' סימן כ"ט) thus rules regarding individuals with a more limited perception and who don’t comprehend things fully, but who do have some level of intelligence, that they certainly are obligated in the Mitzvos as adults and that they must be taught as children at the appropriate age. That age, of course, is not necessarily the same as the age at which Chinuch becomes relevant for a typically developing child, and the pace of teaching will be different, but the Mitzvah of Chinuch clearly is in force so that these children too will know about davening, learning, Kashrus, Shabbos and the like. He also discusses the responsibilities of the community to help fund the education of special needs children, and adds that it is incumbent upon people to make these children feel welcome in Shul and encourage them to participate there to the extent that they can.

The Tzitz Eliezer (שו"ת ציץ אליעזר חלק י"ד סימן ס"ט) writes similarly that individuals whose intellect is underdeveloped and do not understand anything the way other people do are nonetheless not in the category of aשוטה (other than for testimony purposes) and are certainly subject to the Mitzvos. Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (שו"ת מנחת שלמה חלק א' סוף סימן ל"ד) states that as long as one has the level of understanding and perception of at least an average child and he knows that Hashem gave us the Torah and that we fulfill His Mitzvos, he is considered to have sufficient intelligence to be obligated in the Mitzvos, and is thus viewed as an adult upon reaching the age of Bar Mitzvah; there is thus indeed a Mitzvah of Chinuch regarding this person when he is a child. He also rules there that aחרש who has learned to communicate in certain ways can be considered the same as any other adult in terms of his Halachic requirements if he manifests sufficient intelligence, adding that Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv concurs; this is indeed the ruling of Rav Elyashiv in one of his Teshuvos (קובץ תשובות להגרי"ש אלישיב חלק א' סימן י'). Rav Shlomo Zalman then stresses that the educational methods employed today which enable people with learning disabilities to reach intellectual heights are clearly superior to those which some of the Poskim cited above were aware of and that people with these disabilities today are thus certainly bound by the Mitzvos; he concludes by asserting that although there are disputes, such as some of those cited above, regarding certain details of these complex laws, it is very difficult to exclude people with intellectual and mental impairments from the Mitzvos.