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Dilemmas of Military Service in Israel: The Religious Dimension

Ever since its establishment in 1948, the Israel Defense Force (hereafter the IDF) has maintained a system of universal conscription. Israeli law imposes mandatory military service for periods of between two and three years on both men and women when they reach the age of eighteen. It also permits the IDF to summons discharged service personnel (principally males) under the age of 45 for compulsory stints of reserve duty, which can total as much as thirty days per annum.

For many years, this militia-style service system was said to have endowed the IDF with the character of “a people’s army,” and the universal draft system justified the classification of Israeli society as a paradigmatic “nation in arms.” Over the past decade, however, both depictions have lost much of their force. Driven by the twin furies of severe budgetary restraints and a burgeoning ethos of “military professionalism,” the IDF has adopted a policy of more selective service.¹ Influenced by the I-centered fashions of “post-modernism,” increasing numbers of Israelis have, at the same time, signaled their satisfaction with that policy. Combined, these influences have created a situation in which military service—once considered to be the most widely shared of all Israeli experiences—is now poised to become the exception rather than the rule.

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Such is already the case with regard to reserve duty.² Figures recently released by the IDF indicate that the same situation will soon apply in the conscript segment as well. Already, the draft is clearly not universal. The vast majority of Arab youngsters are not enlisted, and growing segments of the Jewish population are also being excused from duty. All together, the proportion of male and female *Jewish* Israeli youngsters enlisted in the IDF declined from 72% in 1980 to roughly 66% in 2002, with some 20% of the latter receiving early discharges.³

One primary result of this situation is that, for all intents and purposes, military service in Israel has increasingly come to assume a quasi-voluntary character. Conscripts seriously intent on avoiding the draft, for one reason or another, can now do so with greater ease than in the past, and with less fear of social censure. The other side of the coin, however, is that those enlisting clearly do not serve solely because they are legally obligated to do so. They also attach to military service additional attributes.⁴ Some can be categorized as “utilitarian,” since they are based on a view of military service as a stepping stone to subsequent career advancement in civilian life. Other attributes are “normative,” in the sense that they reflect the resilience of the notion that the IDF constitutes Israel’s supreme “melting pot” and that enlistment consequently continues to be the principal *rite de passage* to full citizenship.⁵ In yet a third category (not necessarily exclusive of the previous two), the impulses to serve are “altruistic,” and grow out of the conviction that military duty in defense of the State and its citizens remains essential for the fulfillment of the Zionist vision.

Studies periodically undertaken by and on behalf of the IDF’s Behavioral Science Unit show that, in varying measures, all three clusters of factors influence the propensities to service of IDF draftees. Combined, they account for the fact that—notwithstanding the dire warnings of some Cassandras—neither conscripts nor reservists presently show signs of undergoing a “crisis of motivation.” On the contrary, the IDF’s elite combat formations are invariably over-subscribed, and in some units as many as three conscripts vie for every available place. This spirit now appears to permeate the entire complement. Whereas in the mid-1990s only 75% of all new recruits expressed themselves ready to serve in combat formations, in November 2003 the figure stood at 88%—an all-time record.⁶

Affirmative attitudes of that sort are especially pronounced amongst members of what is commonly termed Israel’s “national-religious” (alternatively “religious-Zionist”) community. Altogether, indeed,

where commitment to military duty is concerned, graduates of religious state high schools seem to now own the mantle of civic service and idealism to which, in a previous generation, the secular kibbutz movement claimed virtually sole proprietary rights.⁷ The signs of that transformation are easily observed.⁸ Throughout the secular kibbutz system, rates of voluntary enlistment to combat units and professional military service have sharply declined over the past decade. During the same period, however, the sight of a *kippah serugah*—the most obtrusive sign of male national-religious affiliation—on the head of an Israeli soldier on front-line active duty has become commonplace. This is particularly so in those units to which enlistment is elective and selection especially rigorous. The bleak evidence of operational casualties since 1990 indicates that the number of national-religious recruits in elite combat units (*sayarot*) far exceeds their proportion in the annual conscript cohort, perhaps by as much as a factor of two.

Where available, statistics with respect to NCOs and junior officers tell a similar tale. At a rough estimate, some 30% of all IDF combat troops at those ranks now wear a *kippah serugah*. Moreover, as many as 60% of those passing out in the first class of NCO infantry courses in recent years have been products of the national-religious high school system, one of whose graduates was in 2002 declared to be the most outstanding pupil of the prestigious pilots' training school. Furthermore, where the males have led, females seem to be quick to follow. In the past, the majority of female graduates of the national-religious school system elected to perform a year or two of civic service rather than of military duty (and, indeed, repeatedly received rabbinic instructions to that effect). Of late, however, trends have shown signs of change. In 2002, fully a third of female graduates of national-religious high schools elected to serve in the IDF, in one capacity or another.⁹

The present paper does not seek to analyze the possible reasons for such phenomena, a subject that sociologists have debated at some length in recent years, in some case rather venomously so.¹⁰ Instead, our purpose is to explore some of their possible implications. Specifically, the paper aims to examine the impact exerted on traditionally observant soldiers by the experience of military service in the armed forces of an independent Jewish state. To that end, we shall, first, outline some of the conditions of their service in the IDF. Thereafter, we shall examine in greater detail the principal dilemmas that they confront.

Conditions of Service

By any standards, traditionally observant draftees into today's IDF enter a far more congenial institution than was available to those of their grandfathers and great-grandfathers who served in the conscript armies of Europe and the United States. The latter, even if they did come into occasional contact with a Jewish chaplain (a post that was not officially recognized in most Western armies until World War II), nevertheless served in an institution whose entire ethos was, if not always avowedly Christian, certainly never in any way Jewish.¹¹ In the IDF, by contrast, strenuous efforts are made to ensure that the force, precisely because it constitutes the army of a sovereign Jewish state, is indeed endowed with a specifically Jewish ambience.

Much of the credit for that situation belongs to the late R. Shlomo Goren (1917-1994), who was the IDF's very first *rav zeva'i rashi* (chief chaplain). Altogether a man of perpetual motion and boundless energy, R. Goren was also blessed with considerable organizational talents and resounding erudition. In addition, he possessed a remarkable knack for seemingly always managing to be in the right place at the right time. These were gifts that he exploited to the full during his long and productive military career (he held the office of *rav zeva'i rashi* from 1948-1971, and by the time he retired was the longest-serving Major-General [*aluf*] in the entire Force). His prolific stream of learned publications helped to craft the practical accommodation of traditional halakhah with army life. By means of a series of arrangements worked out with David Ben-Gurion, R. Goren also ensured that the ambience of the IDF as a whole would respect and reflect Orthodox practice. Combined, these achievements made it possible for religiously observant conscripts to enlist on equal terms with their secular comrades.¹²

One obvious expression of R. Goren's achievement is to be found in the authority that IDF General Staff Regulations explicitly invest in the military rabbinate (*ha-rabbanut ha-zeva'it*). The duties of this body are not limited to maintaining an adequate supply of the materials and artifacts required by religiously observant troops on every base. In such critical areas as *shemirat shabbat* and *kashrut*, the military rabbinate is also responsible for ensuring that the military framework as a whole observes the requirements of Halakhah.¹³

Just as significant (occasionally, perhaps, even more so) are the steps taken to ensure that, in a more subliminal sense, the Jewish religion becomes an integral component of the overall cultural texture of Israeli

military life.¹⁴ Some of the mechanisms employed to that end are organizational: the inclusion of lectures on Jewish topics and festivals at every level of instruction, up to and including senior staff college. Others, however, are essentially ceremonial in form. Thus, all new recruits receive a copy of the Tanakh at their induction ceremonies, many of which are held at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. Furthermore, by convention, all troops on active service, regardless of rank or military profession, attend the annual *seder* service and the weekly Friday night meal that is preceded by the recitation of *kiddush*.

The rationale behind these and other intrusions of traditional Jewish practice into the military regimen is not simply to harmonize the particularistic concerns of the observant minority with the more general interests of the non-observant majority. Rather, in all such cases, traditional religious themes and motifs provide sources of inspiration and motivation. Quite apart from legitimizing the use of force as a last resort, they also serve as a social coagulant. They constitute vehicles for fostering the feelings of affinity and reciprocity that have always been recognized as essential criteria for military cohesion, and ultimately for effective battlefield performance.

The support made available to the religiously observant Jewish soldier by the IDF's own frameworks and practices is further supplemented by external sources. Here, too, the contrast with the situation prevailing elsewhere in earlier generations is both stark and instructive. When confronting a ritual or ethical problem, Orthodox Jewish soldiers serving in non-Jewish armed forces during the era of mass conscription had very limited access to halakhic guidance and moral instruction. Military chaplains were few and far between, communication with civilian rabbinic authorities was uncertain and far from instantaneous, and written sources of direct relevance almost non-existent. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, prior to 1948 only two texts were composed anywhere in the world with the needs of Orthodox Jewish military personnel specifically in mind. The first was Ḥafez Ḥayyim's *Sefer Maḥaneh Yisrael* (1st edition, 1881), a pioneering attempt to provide a detailed summary of *halakhot* possibly pertinent to military life. The second was *A Book of Jewish Thoughts* (1st edition, 1918), a thin volume of aphorisms and devotional passages compiled by Rabbi Dr. Joseph Hertz (1872-1946), the Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom and the British Empire during both World Wars.¹⁵ In recent years, both works have been very much superseded. So too, in many respects, have R. Goren's pioneering studies. Since the late 1970s, especially, analyses of *dinei zava u-milhamah*

have grown exponentially. As a result, a field that for almost two millennia constituted one of the great lacunae of rabbinic analysis now fills entire shelves in any respectable library of Halakhah.

Three features of this voluminous new corpus warrant particular attention. One is the range of topics covered: it addresses—often in microscopic detail—every conceivable challenge that military service might present to the observance of orthodox ritual and practice, as well as ethical and doctrinal issues of a more philosophical nature. Also noteworthy is the nature of the authorship of the literature, much of which is composed by rabbis who—unlike any previous generation of halakhic authorities known to history—often themselves possess protracted first-hand experience of military life, sometimes in combat units. Finally, there is the wide variety of formats in which the literature on *dinei zava u-milhamah* appears. Some of the relevant publications consist of comprehensive and integrated presentations of the entire subject, or of one of its aspects, in book-length form.¹⁶ Others take the form of erudite articles on a more specific issue, published either in one of the specialist journals on contemporary Halakhah¹⁷ or (especially of late) in a collection of essays compiled in memory of a fallen soldier.¹⁸ In yet a third category, the preferred vehicle is the traditional genre of *she'elot u-teshuvot* (respona), the epistolary form of which is being increasingly adapted to the abbreviated and instantaneous style required by electronic mail and internet-based chat groups, several of which now contain dedicated portals on military matters.¹⁹

Quite apart from making intellectual contributions to halakhic scholarship, such works also frequently fulfill a practical need in that they provide Orthodox religious soldiers with readily accessible and detailed guides to correct behavior and comportment whilst on service. Combined with the infrastructure of amenities provided by the *rabanut zeva'it*, they help to moderate many of the religious and ritual difficulties that military service must inevitably pose. Considering these factors and the overall Jewish “culture” of the IDF, Orthodox Jewish personnel, whatever their precise military occupation, should find it possible to be fully integrated members of the IDF, capable of performing their duties without fear of compromising, let alone contravening, their religious beliefs and traditions.

The Challenges of Military Service: Contact with the Non-Orthodox world

Central to the argument that follows is the contention that such aspirations are not always fulfilled. Beneath the surface appearance of harmony between military service in Israel and an Orthodox Jewish life-style frequently lurks a reality that is much more complex. As is indicated by the deliberately hyphenated nature of their social identities, national-religious troops in the IDF frequently live compound lives, during the course of which they often face choices that are conflicting, rather than complementary. As a result, military service imposes on them an especially large range of pressures and tensions. National-religious conscripts are not only subject to the anxieties experienced by all new recruits, secular and Orthodox alike, on being thrust into a deliberately harsh environment in which fear of “losing face” is particularly pronounced.²⁰ They also confront challenges that are specific to the social segment from which they are drawn. It is to these that we now turn.

Both written and oral evidence leaves no doubt that the most prevalent source of stress amongst national-religious troops (male and female), especially prior to and immediately after their enlistment, is the experience of close contact with conscripts who come from a secular background. That is hardly a surprising finding. After all, the vast majority of national-religious youngsters in Israel are reared in a closed environment, and one that perhaps deserves to be termed very cosseted too. Most are graduates of high-schools—some of which are residential—in which they have been doubly “quarantined,” since apart from being restricted to pupils from religious homes they are also single-sex institutions. Many have also been members of one of the youth movements (Bnei Akiva, Ezra, the Religious Scouts), which similarly cater exclusively to Orthodox adolescents. The great advantage of this multi-layered system of cocoons is that it helps to foster noticeably robust ties of association, identification and personal acquaintance amongst the graduates themselves.²¹ Its drawback, of course, is that it also creates a very introspective sociological cohort, whose members come to military service with virtually no prior contact whatsoever with non-Orthodox youngsters of their own age. This is especially so in the case of those brought up in neighborhoods or communities whose demographic composition is predominantly religious—in the case of many of the settlements located in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, almost entirely so.

Recent studies of twelfth-grade pupils in religious high schools indicate that a large minority looks forward to military service precisely because it presents them with an opportunity to abandon their Orthodox life-style. Thus, of those surveyed in a large poll in 1999, only 52% declared an intention of remaining fully observant. As many as 20% admitted that they had already decided not to do so, in the case of boys by taking the symbolic step of “removing their *kippah*.”²² Even for them, however, the experience of sustained and close contact with youngsters who have been brought up in a very different cultural milieu comes as something of a shock.

For the majority, which still retains varying degrees of attachment to an Orthodox life-style, the traumatic effects of the meeting are all the greater. This was indicated with some force in an article which two fresh conscripts published a few years ago in the official Bnei Akiva bulletin, *Zera'im*. “The IDF,” they warned younger members, “is not at all a religious institution.” Only in part did they reach that conclusion because conditions in the unit mess do not always meet Orthodox standards of *kashrut*, especially in isolated front-line postings that are too small to billet a military chaplain. Far more significant, they reported, are the challenges posed by other tests, most of which are all the more trying for being so unexpected:

Quite apart from experiencing the shock to which every conscript is submitted on entering the military framework, the religious soldier is estranged and struck dumb by the comportment of his secular comrades. Even their everyday speech contains phrases and terms that his own mouth, accustomed to prayer, is unable to utter and which his ears, attuned to words of wisdom, refuse to absorb.²³

For many years, the national-religious educational establishment seemed either to be unaware of the existence of this problem or to deny its scope. Of late, however, that situation has changed. There now exists a growing awareness, sometimes more intuitive than tangible, of the extent to which religious and secular camps in Israel are drifting apart.²⁴ As a result, an entire series of programs has been created specifically in order to prepare national-religious school graduates for the “culture shock” of contact with conscripts from backgrounds that are predominantly non-religious, and in some cases even anti-religious.

Broadly speaking, the programs now available seem to reflect two distinct schools of thought: one might be labeled “segregation,” the other “fortification.” “*Segregation*” proceeds from the assumption, albeit one that is usually left unspoken, that religiously observant troops can

best cope with the challenge of contact with the secular world when, to the extent possible, they do so as a group. The program that probably now goes furthest towards meeting that requirement is the *naḥal ḥaredi*, an infantry battalion composed entirely of Orthodox personnel. When first established in January 1999, this program was designed to satisfy the needs of the small minority of *ḥaredi* young men who chose to enlist and were consequently often ostracized by their own communities.²⁵ Of late, however, the *naḥal ḥaredi* has also attracted the interest of some in the national-religious circles. It now also accepts senior students from Zionist *yeshivot gevohot*, who have hitherto deferred their enlistment for several years whilst pursuing their studies. Largely as a result, the annual intake of the *naḥal ḥaredi* unit has more than tripled over the past three years, from 31 to 110.

A far more widespread articulation of “segregation” is provided by the network of *yeshivot hesder*, which now encompasses 33 institutions of that name, the oldest of which was established at Kerem be-Yavneh in 1964. *Hesder* students, apart from being permitted an active conscript term that is considerably shorter than the norm (18 months instead of 36), also perform their military service in a social milieu that is often largely their own. Most undergo basic training in their own companies, and many thereafter serve in formations in which they constitute a majority. From the IDF’s viewpoint, this arrangement has clear advantages: it provides the military organization with a ready-made cadre of particularly cohesive units, susceptible to very few of the inter-personal frictions that usually consume so much of a commander’s time and energies. Therein, too, lies much of the attraction of the *hesder* for individual recruits. It assures them of a notably supportive social framework, which promises to mitigate many of the psychological strains common to military life. After all, in units predominantly manned (and sometimes commanded) by *hesder* conscripts, religious observance is the norm, not the exception.

At the basis of what I have termed “*fortification*” programs lies a different philosophy. Rather than providing recruits with a collective protective framework during the course of their service, fortification seeks to prepare them for that experience before it starts. One example of such an effort is provided by a course of study entitled *Efshar la-Asot Zot* (“It Can Be Done”), dedicated to the memory of Capt. Noam Cohen, and prepared for use in religious high schools by the Ya’akov Herzog Center at Kibbutz Ein Zūrim. The basic “kit,” designed to meet the needs of both instructors and pupils, consists of a video film and three booklets, each

of which outlines an analysis of a particular theme.²⁶ Since its inception in 1999, the course has reportedly been distributed to over 200 institutions, which together cater annually to some 5,000 students. No effort is made to persuade this audience to enlist *en bloc*. On the contrary, basic to the entire ethos of the course is the conviction that religiously observant conscripts, if properly prepared, can, as individuals pass through the military experience unscathed.

Equally committed to the same principles of “fortification” are the pre-conscript colleges of Torah instruction (*ha-mekhinot ha-kedam zeva’iot ha-toraniyot*), the first of which was established under the name of *Benei David* in the West Bank settlement of Eli in 1988. Now numbering 12 institutions, with an annual intake of almost 1,000 students, the *mekhinot* also insist that preparatory instruction constitutes the key to the conscript’s survival (religious and otherwise) in the military setting. National-religious male conscripts, they insist, have to enlist on the same terms as any other conscripts: as individuals, not as a group, and for the full three years of mandatory service, if not more. However, they will best perform their duties if they postpone their induction into the IDF for a year, during which they enroll for a course that combines heavy and heady doses of both physical training and intellectual fare.

Significantly, comparatively little of the latter consists of talmudic study, which is the staple diet of the *yeshivot hesder*. Instead, the *mekhinot* place particular emphasis on Jewish philosophy and spiritualism, and especially on the writings of Rav Avraham Yizhak Ha-Kohen Kook. Thus, *Ma’amar ha-Dor* is a favored text, certainly because it is interpreted to convey the message that the individual ought to regard contact with the world of secular Israel as a primary benefit of military service, and not one of its challenges.²⁷ Not surprisingly, this approach is articulated with even greater emphasis in the half dozen “mixed” *mekhinot* that have been established since 1998, whose annual intake consists of some 300 students from secular as well as religious homes.

It is not easy to assess the overall success of what have here been termed the alternative strategies of “segregation” and “fortification.”²⁸ In their different ways, both certainly do appear to alleviate many of the difficulties that enlistment presents for religiously observant soldiers. This is particularly so with regard to the soldiers’ prospects of integration into the wider military community. Largely thanks to the various programs and schedules outlined above, increasing numbers of youngsters from religiously observant homes now feel capable of shouldering a full share of Israel’s defense burdens, without in any way being forced to compro-

mise their commitment to an Orthodox life-style. No longer does enlistment give rise to fears that the youngsters concerned will cease to be observant. Neither, by the same token, is the observance of Orthodox rituals necessarily felt to prejudice the performance of military duties. Indeed, far from being mutually antagonistic, military service and religious observance increasingly seem capable of reinforcing each other. On the other hand, however, several problems still remain. For one thing, conscription clearly does not provide the panacea to the religious-secular divide that constitutes one of Israel's most significant social faultlines. Although the shared experience of military service may bridge some of the differences between observant and non-observant personnel in the IDF, it can never entirely eradicate them all. On the contrary, in many cases it seems to exacerbate the religious-secular divide, if only because it provides tangible proof of how very different religious and secular troops can in fact be.²⁹

To this must be added a more specific consideration of particular importance to religiously observant troops. Even when most successful, neither the "segregation" nor the "fortification" programs obscure the fact that military service compels national religious troops in the IDF to confront several dilemmas that are distinctively their own. The remainder of this essay will briefly illustrate what those dilemmas are.

"And your camp shall be holy" (Deut. 23:15)

Classic Jewish sources have long been aware of the need to take special care to counter the corrosive effect that the military environment threatens to exert on morals and behavior.³⁰ Much of the contemporary corpus of *dinei zava u-milhamah* is written with those considerations very much in mind. Hence, its main thrust is to ensure that the spark of holiness is indeed kept alive, even within the military setting. But those teachings also serve the ancillary purpose of helping individual soldiers to overcome the crises of conscience likely to be induced should the performance of military duties seem to conflict with the dictates of traditional Jewish religious observance.

Both formal surveys and informal observation leave no doubt that such conflicts are indeed keenly and widely felt. This is especially with regard to the observance of *shabbat* and *kashrut*. Indeed, how both *mizvot* might be maintained in a military environment (or, alternatively, the military circumstances that might permit or obligate some modifications of practice in both areas) have long constituted subjects of con-

tention.³¹ A rough count of the recent responsa addressed to serving personnel suggests that, in terms of sheer volume, these topics continue to predominate as matters of national religious concern.³² Not very far behind are other questions that have proved to be equally persistent: How might the Orthodox male dress code (*kippah*, *zizit*) be harmonized with requirements for military camouflage? How can the regimen of military training accommodate a personal timetable dominated by the need to pray three times each day and to observe periodic fasts? Of late, moreover, circumstances have generated an even wider range of further halakhic enquiries. Can traditional Jewish attitudes towards inter-gender relations (*zeni'ut*) at all be squared with the growing determination of the IDF High Command to integrate female soldiers into combat units? Do the rules of *pikuah nefesh* apply to the need to alleviate the hardships of the Palestinian population by operating the gates of the “security fence” on *Shabbat*?³³

Equally worthy of attention is the evidence indicating the national-religious serviceman’s concern with the moral dimensions of some combat missions. Questions in this category have clamored for a growing amount of attention in recent years, especially since the outbreak of the second *intifada* in September 2000. In the main, that development must be attributed to the particularly brutal nature of the present round of violence, which has posed many of the ethical dilemmas associated with “a-symmetric” conflict in a harshly complex and concrete form. It has also compelled IDF troops and commanders to confront questions that have similarly troubled soldiers of other armies (the British in northern Ireland for several years, and now the Americans in Iraq) placed in similar non-conventional situations. Why should Jewish soldiers abide by the standard rules of military engagement if their enemies do not observe the accepted distinctions between formal combatants and civilian by-standers? Military wisdom apart, are there not sound *moral* reasons for adopting less orthodox forms of operational conduct, such as the use of potentially hostile civilians as “human shields” or the resort to “targeted killings” as a form of retaliation for a terror outrage?³⁴

Non-religious conscripts and reservists can (and do) debate the pros and cons of such suggestions within a legal and philosophical framework that reflects universal moral considerations as well as specifically Jewish ethical traditions.³⁵ But religiously observant troops expect the Halakhah to provide an additional, if not alternative, perspective. The pressure thus generated helps to account for the increasing attention currently being paid in modern Orthodox halakhic literature to the

very specifics of contemporary *jus in bello* (morality in the conduct of war) concerns. Operational issues of an ethical nature that were once considered marginal to the national-religious discourse on *dinei zava u-milhamah*,³⁶ have now moved to center-stage. As much is made evident, for instance, by the most recent issue of *Tehumin* (vol. 23, 2003). Of the eight articles in the section devoted to “Army and Security,” which opens the entire volume, at least five constitute explicit responses to combat situations that had arisen during the course of the second *intifada*: “Theft from a Gentile During War” (R. Yaakov Ariel), “Combat in Regions Containing Civilian Population” (R. Dr. Nerya Gutal), “Harvesting the Olives of Gentiles from Trees Located Within the Boundaries of a Jewish Settlement” (R. Yaakov Ariel), “The Distribution of Booty and Loot in Contemporary Warfare” (R. Shlomo Rosenfeld), and “Acquisition (*kinyan*) by Means of Conquest” (R. Gad Eldad).³⁷

Strict military etiquette might require that the ultimate locus of authority for decision in all such matters rest with the *rabbanut zeva'it*. Practice, however, is very different. As far as can be seen, the current discourse on the ethical dimensions of military operations (and, for that matter, on many other aspects of *dinei milhamah*, as well) is principally being conducted in civilian rabbinic circles. In his official capacity, the current *rav zeva'i rashi*, General R. Yisrael Weiss—unlike, for instance, the Judge Advocate-General—has passed no public comment whatsoever on whether or not current IDF operational practice accords with traditional Jewish interpretations of the *jus in bello*.³⁸ Indeed, it is doubtful whether he has been specifically asked to do so. R. Weiss openly admits that his unit wields very little influence over most national-religious servicemen, and has hitherto failed in its attempts to attract to its ranks the best and brightest of that population group.³⁹ He himself is certainly making strenuous efforts to repair that situation. Even so, few Orthodox soldiers turn to the *rabbanut zeva'it* when seeking halakhic advice. Invariably, they still approach one of the non-military authorities who they consider to be better qualified to assess such matters—a respected and approachable municipal *rav* (such as R. Yaakov Ariel, the Chief Rabbi of Ramat Gan) or the principal (*rosh*) or teacher (*ram*) of their high-school *yeshivah*, *yeshivat hesder*, or *mekhinah*.

Whom to Obey?

Situations such as those outlined above have generated charges that religiously observant troops in the IDF might be susceptible to “divided

loyalties.” In its simplest version (which is also often the most widespread), the argument runs something like this. Only nominally are secular and religious troops in the IDF subject to the same chain of command. In fact, their allegiances diverge. Whereas secular IDF troops are subordinate solely to their military commanders, Orthodox conscripts are also bound to obey the instructions of their rabbis. Should the two authorities issue mutually contradictory orders, many national-religious soldiers might prefer to follow the dictates of their spiritual mentors.⁴⁰

Such fears become particularly audible whenever some progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seems feasible. After all, it is argued, many (perhaps most) national-religious teachers speak of the retention of Jewish control over the entire Land of Israel in terms that invest it with the status of a categorical imperative. Indeed, in the wake of the Oslo accords reached by the Rabin government and the PLO in the mid-1990s, some rabbinical figures cited both Rambam and Ramban when explicitly calling upon troops to disobey whatever orders they might receive to participate in operations designed to dismantle either a Jewish settlement in “the territories” or an IDF military base located there.⁴¹ A repetition of that scenario, it is feared, might tear the IDF apart, especially in view of the growing prominence of *kippot serugot* in the officer corps. Even the suspicion that so large a body of junior commanders might subordinate their professional military duties to their ideological preferences is bound to create deep schisms within the Force.

Those anxieties cannot be entirely discounted. If anything, they are further fuelled by the regularity with which some influential rabbis continue to insist (albeit, for the most now only orally) that troops have a religious duty to refuse whatever orders to dismantle settlements that they may at some future date receive. What needs to be noted, however, is that other voices can also be heard. Largely in reaction to the trauma of Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin’s assassination by a national-religious reservist who claimed to act with (unspecified) rabbinic sanction,⁴² increasing numbers of the national-religious community’s spiritual mentors tend to exercise discretion when making public pronouncements on matters of political relevance. Specifically, in these circles it has become far more acceptable to juxtapose the integrity of *Erez Yisrael* with the unity of *Am Yisrael* as religious values, and to argue for the primacy of the latter—as expressed by cohesion within the IDF.⁴³

To judge from their current behavior, the vast majority of national-religious troops accept that argument. Most also seem to be increasingly resigned to the need to implement whatever orders they receive to par-

ticipate in withdrawal operations from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Significantly, instances of religiously-based conscientious objection in relation to this issue have been sporadic and numerically insignificant—and more often motivated by objections to the manner and timing of a specific operation than to its substance.⁴⁴ Informed observers warn against too sanguine an interpretation of the current trends, and point out the hazards of making definitive forecasts about human behavior in volatile situations capable of arousing such deep passions. Even they, however, concede that religiously-motivated resistance to military orders on the part of Orthodox IDF troops now seems to be less predictable a scenario than was once feared. Polled in the spring of 2003, around 70% of religious respondents were of the opinion that soldiers have to obey commands to remove settlers. Only 11% said they might refuse such orders.⁴⁵

“Service or Study?”

Indications of unease amongst national-religious conscripts become far more concrete, and convincing, once attention shifts away from the political dimensions of their service and focuses, instead, on the demands that it makes on their time. At issue here are not the halakhic rights and wrongs of individual military orders and actions, nor even the source of authority claimed by the persons who transmit them. Rather, what generates dilemmas is the conflict caused by simultaneous pressures to follow two very different avocations, both of which make monopolistic demands on the individual's energies and attention. One is the pursuit of traditional scholarship, as facilitated by study in a yeshivah; the other is participation in the military defense of Israel and its inhabitants against persistent acts of violence.

Although infused with various ideological implications, at root the tension between study and military service possesses clear structural features. As such, it lends itself to analysis on the lines long ago suggested by Lewis Coser's study of what he called “greedy institutions.” This term, he suggested, applied to all social structures that “seek hegemonic loyalty, and attempt to reduce the claims of competing roles and status positions on those they wish to encompass in their boundaries.”⁴⁶ The IDF certainly conforms to the typology. Even though its overall ambience is notoriously informal and characterized by the absence of a rigid insistence on parade-ground discipline, the Israeli army (like all others) nevertheless insists that its personnel adhere to a formal code of military

conduct. It also invokes the rule of “unlimited liability” when making demands on their resources of time and attention. But so, *mutatis mutandis*, do *yeshivot*. Hence, they also warrant description as “omnivorous” institutions, to use another of Coser’s terms. After all, enrollment in a *yeshivah* likewise constitutes a personal commitment to a particularly demanding timetable that grants *Talmud Torah* a position of absolute primacy over any other activity.

The monopolistic claims of Torah study—especially vis-à-vis military service—have found their most explicit expression in *haredi* circles. It is now calculated that over 80% of *haredi* males of conscript age presently claim—and receive—extensive deferments from enlistment on the grounds that “the [study of] the Torah is their profession” (*toratam umanutam*). Indeed, this particular segment of Orthodox Israeli society now posits as an article of faith the argument that the energies that its members invest in their scholarly vocation contribute as much (if not more) to Israel’s ultimate survival than do the exertions of IDF troops.⁴⁷

Mainstream religious Zionist thought has always rejected the implication that it, too, must educate towards non-service. Instead, it has consistently advocated the twinning of “the scroll” (*safrā*) with “the sword” (*saifa*), teaching that—in Israel’s present security situation—study and military service make up two sides of the same coin of religious imperatives, thereby creating a reciprocal dynamic.⁴⁸ But, for all the eloquence and erudition with which they are expressed, such efforts to harmonize the seemingly conflicting demands of two greedy institutions cannot be said to constitute the last word on the subject. On the contrary, they have themselves spawned debates about the way in which the reconciliation might best be attained, and the relative benefits and costs of whichever method is adopted—to the individual, to modern religious society, to the IDF and to Israel at large.

The ramifications of such debates can be observed at every major way-station along the young national-religious conscripts’ journey through military life. At each stage, he (for present purposes, the discussion will here be limited to males) confronts choices that are uniquely his own. Dilemmas first arise as soon as call-up papers arrive through the mail. Unlike his secular or *haredi* counterpart, whose choices of possible legitimate action in this situation are limited and stark, the national-religious conscript possesses a variety of possibilities. For one thing, each individual can decide whether or not to enlist at all, the alternative being to enroll in one of the *haredi yeshivot*, and thereby claim exemption. Even if he chooses to enlist, there remains the question of timing.

Is he to enlist straight away as a “regular” conscript, and thus forego any immediate opportunity of furthering his studies? Is he to embark, *ab initio*, on an extended program of study in a *yeshivah* which, although “Zionist,” nevertheless encourages extended deferment of service, usually for periods of up to eight years? Or is he to opt for one of the multiple programs that defer initial enlistment for just a year or two?⁴⁹ If the latter is the case, which program should he choose? And—perhaps even more agonizing—to which particular institution should he apply? After all, not all *yeshivot hesder*, nor even all *mekhinot*, are cut of one cloth. Each possesses its own individual style and atmosphere, especially where attitudes towards military service are concerned.⁵⁰

This frequently becomes apparent when, towards the end of their first year of conscript service, suitably qualified troops are invited by their military commanders to undertake officer’s training—a procedure that requires them to contract for an additional year of army service. The *mekhinot* invariably encourage their graduates to take this first step up the ladder of the military hierarchy. Indeed, a high national-religious profile amongst the IDF’s cadre of junior officers has always been integral to the entire ethos that the *mekhinot* espouse.

But such is not the case where the *yeshivot hesder* are concerned. As a rule (necessarily, provision must be made for differences of nuance), their institutional views of military service are far less enthusiastic and their emphasis on study as an end in itself far more pronounced.⁵¹ Indeed, in order to attend an officer’s training course, registered *hesder* conscripts must obtain written permission to do so from their *rosh yeshivah*, whose compliance is by no means automatic. Even then, they have to undertake to add a further year of study to their original timetable. In other words, *hesder* students who decide to become officers incur a set of *initial* (i.e. pre-reserve) combined obligations that stretch over a period of six years—throughout which time their only independent income will be the pocket money supplied by the IDF to conscript troops on active service.

It speaks volumes for the commitment of *hesder* students to their dual responsibilities that, undeterred by such costs, each year some three to four dozen do register for the IDF’s junior officers’ courses, on completion of which they return to their *yeshivot* for another year or two of study.⁵² Where available, however, the statistics also tell a more complex tale. The appeal of the *hesder* combination of service and study, they suggest, is far from universal. In recent years, it has become limited almost entirely to graduates of *yeshivah* high-schools, who for the most

part tend to come from middle and upper middle-class homes—and even there encompasses less than 30% of the annual cohort. Taken as a whole, almost half of the male graduates of Israel’s national-religious high schools (together numbering some 6,000) now declare their intention of enlisting in the IDF in the regular way. Some 20% will enroll in *mekhinot kedam zeva’iyot* and only 18.2% in *yeshivot hesder* (of whom, to judge by past experience, roughly a quarter will drop out of the yeshivah after their first year of study). The remaining 10%, most of whom also come from middle-class homes, declare their intention of embarking on a more protracted course of studies in a *yeshivah gevohah*, some in avowedly *haredi* institutions.⁵³

What these figures suggest is that, subject to pressure both to study and perform military service, most young national-religious conscripts tend to think in “either-or” terms. Hence, tracks that appear to express a clear preference for one or another of the two “greedy institutions,” the military and the academy, are preferred to those that, correctly or not, are thought to seek to straddle both. In their different ways, both the *mekhinot* and the *yeshivot gevohot* appear to fall into the former category. The *mekhinot* project the image of institutions whose prime purpose is not study at all, but the development of skills and attributes that will enable graduates to become better soldiers.⁵⁴ The “Zionist” *yeshivot gevohot*, on the other hand, satisfy the tendencies of some elements within the national-religious community to adopt a more *haredi* lifestyle, in which total devotion to scholarship is *de riguer*.⁵⁵ (In a more latent sense, perhaps, they also respond to a long-standing fear that the demands of military service could ultimately prevent national-religious Orthodoxy from producing scholars of the caliber that it needs and deserves.⁵⁶) Under these circumstances, *hesder*, in effect, becomes the domain solely of those young men who feel capable of charting a course between these two poles.

Conclusions

To outline the dilemmas that continue to challenge religiously Orthodox troops in the IDF is not, of course, to deny the enormity of their efforts to resolve them. Together with their mentors and teachers, individual servicemen and women are indeed endeavoring in several ways to harmonize their theological beliefs with their patriotic duties. The products of those efforts—both institutional and intellectual—in many respects deserve to be considered some of the most significant developments in the entire world of contemporary modern Orthodoxy.

Notes

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The author thanks the distinguished participants in the sixteenth Orthodox Forum for their comments and corrections.

1. Stuart A. Cohen, "Israel's Defense Force: From a 'People's Army' to a 'Professional Force,'" *Armed Forces & Society* 21 (1995): 237-254.
2. It has been estimated that only three of every five potential reservists have been summoned to any service whatsoever since 2000, and that 80% of the entire burden of duty is now borne by just 30% of the available reserve complement (itself only 53% of the entire male Jewish population). See Major-Gen. Gil Regev (CO IDF Personnel Branch), *A People's Army?: Reserve Duty in Israel* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 2002), 55-59.
3. *The Contract Between the IDF and Israeli Society: Conscript Service* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 2002), 12-13. Amongst males, much of the rise in the number of exemptions reflects the recent exponential growth in the number of *haredim* now being excused on the grounds that *toratam umanutam*. Moreover, the present number in this category (almost 40,000) seems set to grow still further, since the percentage of youngsters attending *haredi* schools rose from 6.6% in 1960 to some 15% in 2000.
4. Reuven Gal, "Motivation to Serve in the IDF in the Mirror of Time," *Strategic Survey* 2/3 (Dec. 1999): 11-15.
5. This consideration plays an especially important role in the "propensity to service" of new immigrants from Ethiopia and the former USSR, who now comprise 15% of the IDF's conscript intake.
6. *Ha'arets* (December 5, 2003), p. A3. Responses to summonses for reserve duty were likewise high, and frequently reached 100%.
7. Yaron Ezrahi and Reuven Gal, *General Perceptions and Attitudes of Israeli High-School Students Regarding the Peace Process, Security and Social Issues* (Hebrew) (Zikhron Ya'akov, 1995).
8. Yagil Levy, *A Different Army for Israel: Materialistic Militarism in Israel* (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv, 2003).
9. "'Almot' in a Mine-Field: An Interview with Yifat Sela," *Amudim—Journal of the Religious Kibbutz movement* (Hebrew) 674 (Summer 2003): 22-25.
10. As is evident from the tone that pervades Levy (above n.8).
11. Jewish chaplains in non-Jewish armies still await their historian. For one pioneering effort, see Albert Isaac Slomovitz, *The Fighting Rabbis: Jewish Military Chaplains and American History* (New York, 1998). For a full discussion of the dilemmas that military service in non-Jewish armies posed for Orthodox Jews in the diaspora see Judith Bleich, "Military Service: Ambivalence and Contradiction," paper presented to the 16th Orthodox Forum, New York, March 2004.
12. R. Goren's principal writings on military-related topics are: *Meishiv Milhamah* (3 vols. Jerusalem, 1983-1993) and *Sefer Torat Ha-Medinah* (Jerusalem, 1996). Many of his early halakhic rulings in the IDF were collat-

ed in Capt. Mordechai Friedlander (ed.), *Kovez Piskei Hilkhhot Zava ve-Dinim le-Hayal* (2 vols., IDF Chief Rabbinate, 1961).

13. Benny Michaelson, "Ha-Rabbanut ha-Zeva'it," in *The IDF and its Arms* 16, eds. I. Kfir and Y. Erez (Tel-Aviv, 1982), 83-132.
The IDF Rabbanut is also responsible for providing religious services to non-Jewish IDF servicemen, whose numbers have very much increased as a result of the large waves of immigration from both Ethiopia and the former USSR during the 1990s. At present some 8-9,000 new immigrant soldiers are registered as non-Jewish. To these must be added the larger complement of Druze troops, and some 5,000 servicemen drawn from Israel's Arab Christian minority.
14. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Religion and Political Culture in the Jewish State* (Berkeley, 1983).
15. *Sefer Maḥaneh Yisrael* was re-printed by the Nehardea Publishing Company of Jerusalem in 1941, primarily for the benefit of the *Yishuv's* servicemen then drafted into the Jewish Brigade. It also formed the basis for R. Moses M. Yoschor's *Israel in the Ranks: A Religious Guide to Faith and Practice for the Jewish Soldier* (New York, 1943), although this work focuses on ethical teachings and has nothing to say on practical halakhah. Hertz's *A Book of Jewish Thoughts* was reprinted several times during World War II both in Britain and the USA (e.g., New York, 1943).
16. E.g. R. Yitzchak Kaufman, *Ha-Zava ka-Halakhah: Hilkhhot Milḥamah ve-Zava* (Jerusalem, 1994). Especially popular are the paperback manuals of instruction, conveniently printed in editions that can easily fit into a battledress pocket. See, e.g., R. Shlomo Min-Hahar, *Dinei Zava u-Milḥamah* (1st edition, 1972); and R. Zechariah Ben-Shlomo, *Nohal Aḥid* (Sha'alavim, 1997).
17. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is *Tehumin*, published annually since 1980 by the *Zomet* institute of Alon Shevut, which regularly contains a section of articles on "Security and Army." Considerable material is also to be found in the leaflets, newsletters and journals produced by individual *yeshivot hesder*, specifically targeted at students on active service.
18. E.g. R. Eliezer Shenwald (ed.), *Sefer Harel: Israeli Militarism from a Torah Perspective* (Chispin, 2000); Yehiel Rozensohn & R. Azriah Ariel (eds.), *Be-Orekha Nir'eh Or: A Collection of Articles on Chanukah in Memory of Lt. Dani Cohen* (2003).
19. E.g., www.moreshet.co.il and www.kippah.co.il.
Amongst the authors of military-related responsa that retain a more traditional format R. Shlomo Aviner has been particularly prolific, publishing: *Am ke-Lavi* (1983); *Shut Zeni'ut* (1999); *Me-Hayyil le-Hayyil* (2 vols., 1999); and *Al Diglo* (2000). See also: R. Nachum Rabinovitch, *Melumedei Milḥamah* (Ma'aleh Adumim, 1994); R. Avi Rontski, *Halikhhot Zava* (Jerusalem, 1994), *Ke-Hizim be-Yad Gibbor* (3 vols., 1996-2003); R. Mishael Rubin, *Ha-Morim Ba-Keshet* (Hebron, 1998); and R. Eyal Mosheh Krim, *Kishrei Milḥamah* (2 vols., Jerusalem, 2001).
20. Amiah Liebllich, *Transition to Adulthood During Military Service: The Israeli Case* (Albany, NY, 1989).
21. Mordechai Bar-Lev, *Bi-meshokh ha-Yovel* (Tel-Aviv, 1989).
22. Avraham Laslo and Yisrael Rich, *Survey of 12th Grade Students in National-Religious High Schools –5759: Research Report* (Ramat Gan, Feb. 2001), 44. Compare with the lower figures in: Avraham Laslo and Mordechai Bar-Lev,

- The Religious World of Graduates of National-Religious Schools* (Ramat Gan, Nov. 1993).
23. Ya'akov Levi and Aaron Furstein, "It's Not Easy to be a Religious Soldier," *Zera'im* 8 (July 1995): 8-9. Similar sentiments in: Yehoram Shai, "To Expand and Deepen," *Amudim* 43/5 (March 1995):142-3.
 24. For a full discussion: Asher Cohen and Baruch Susser, *Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse* (Baltimore, 2000).
 25. Yoḥai Ḥakak, *Yeshiva Learning and Military Training: An Encounter between Two Cultural Models* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 2003).
 26. Naham Ilan and Sima Greenbaum, *Together: Meeting Non-Religious Youth ; R. Itamar Chaikin, Going to the Army—Halakhah and Military Service; Yaron, Yenah, Belief in the Army—Religious Belief and Military Service.*
 27. A new edition of this essay, first published in 1906, has been annotated by R. Binyamin Elon and was issued by Sifriyat Beit El in 1991.
 28. It would be incorrect to exaggerate the binary nature of these alternatives. Thus, most *hesder yeshivot* also provide their students with short preparatory courses ("fortification") prior to their enlistment. Many *mekhinah* graduates tend to gravitate towards the same units, thereby displaying traces of "segregation."
 29. For detailed illustrations see Stuart A. Cohen, "From Integration to Segregation: The Role of Religion in the IDF," *Armed Forces & Society*, 25:3 (Spring 1999): 387-406.
 30. E. g., Ramban's commentary to Deut. 23:10, as cited in, for instance, R. Aharon Lichtenstein, "This is the Law of the Hesder" (Hebrew), in: *Darkah Shel Yeshivah* (Alon Shevut, 1999), 20, and R. Shlomo Rozenfeld, "Distribution of Booty and Loot in Contemporary Wars," *Teḥumin* 23 (2003), 57.
 31. One of the first military trials in IDF history concerned two religiously observant cooks who refused to prepare a hot meal on *Shabbat*. See Zahava Ostfeld, *Zava Nolad* (Tel-Aviv, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 748.
 32. Mosheh Binyamin & Yair Cohen (eds), *Index to Army Halakhot* (Hebrew) (Atzmona, 2000).
 33. On the latter two issues see, respectively, *Ha'aretz*, June 19, 2002, A8 and the exchange between Rabbis Yisrael Rozen and Yoel Bin-Nun in *Ha-Zofeh* March 26, 2004, B11.
 34. See, for example, the discussions in (on the British Army) Patrick Mileham, "Military Virtues 1: The Right to be Different?" *Defense Analysis* 14/2 (1998):171-192; and (on US forces) David Kellog, "Guerilla Warfare: When Taking Care of Your Men leads to War Crimes" (1997) www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE97/Kellog97.htm and Maj. Michael Carlino, "Ethical Education at the Unit Level" (2000), 6, www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE00/Carlino00.html.
 35. Tamar Liebes and Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers and the Intifada," *Armed Forces & Society* 27 (1994):45-68. Significantly, the IDF's own Code of Ethics. (www.idf.il/hebrew/doctrine), refers to the "tradition of the Jewish people throughout the ages" as only one amongst its four main sources of inspiration.
 36. Ehud Luz, *Struggle at the Yabok River: Power, Morality and Jewish Identity* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 1998): 362-392.
 37. For earlier discussions of such issues see: the symposium on "Ethics and

- War” published in *Teḥumin* 4 (1983): 184-188; *Values in the Test of War: War Ethics in the Light of Judaism* (Hebrew) (Alon Shevut, 1984); and “Values in the Test of War—A Symposium in Memory of Ram Mizrahi,” *Alon Shevut* 18 (2003): pp. 71-87. Also relevant are: Yaakov Blidstein, “The Treatment of Hostile Civilian Populations: The Contemporary Halakhic Discussion in Israel,” *Israel Studies* 1 (1996): 27-44 and idem., “The State and the Legitimate Use of Force and Coercion in Modern Halakhic Thought,” *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* XVII (2002): 3-22; and Yitzchak Blau, “Ploughshares into Swords: Contemporary Religious Zionists and Moral Constraints,” *Tradition* 34/4 (Winter 2000): 38-60.
38. E.g., remarks by the current Judge Advocate-General, Major-General Menahem Finkelstein, at the 6th meeting of the Army-Society Project, Jerusalem, January 13, 2003 in: *Morals, Ethics and Law in Combat* (Hebrew)(Jerusalem, 2003). The example is especially interesting since Finkelstein is himself an Orthodox Jew who holds a doctorate in Jewish law.
 39. Thus, a recent course planned to train 100 IDF rabbis was under-subscribed. Weiss attributes this situation to the fact that neither the *yeshivot hesder* nor the *mekhinot* encourage their pupils to enter the IDF Rabbinate. Interview, *Ha-Zofeh*, April 11, 2003, p. 6.
 40. Uri Ben-Eliezer, “Do Generals Rule Israel?” (Hebrew) in Hannah Herzog (ed.), *Ḥevra bi-Tmuraḥ* (Tel-Aviv, 2000), 235-269. Dual loyalty is also a motif in the popular Israeli film “The Hesder” (2000).
 41. E.g., the manifesto issued by the “Union of Rabbis on Behalf of the People of Israel and the Land of Israel,” published in *Gilyon Rabbanei Yesha*, Tammuz 5795 (Summer 1995), 1. Of the 15 signatories to this document, three were principals of *yeshivot hesder* and two others taught in institutions of that name. Others, however, vigorously opposed the statement. See, e.g., R. Yoel Bin-Nun, “The Manifesto and the Law,” *Ha-Zofeh* (July 28 1995), B5 and R. Yehudah Amital, “A Political Opinion in Halakhic Camouflage” (Hebrew), *Meimad* 5 (September 1995): 3-8.
 42. “Without a halakhic decision . . . on the part of several rabbis with whom I am acquainted, I would have found it difficult to commit murder.” Testimony by Yigal Amir to the official commission of enquiry into the assassination, *Ha-Areẓ*, March 29, 1996.
 43. For recent examples, see R. Shlomo Aviner, “Do Not Refuse the IDF,” *Be-Ahavah u-ve-Emunah* (weekly pamphlet issued in Hebrew by Machon Meir), no. 364, (4th Av 5762):6, 8 and “This Army is Ours,” *ibid.* no. 429, (13th Tishrei 5764): 6, 8. Also R. Yuval Sherlow, “The Obligation to Obey,” *Ha-Zofeh*, July 4, 2003, p. 3.
 44. Such was the case with respect to the command to dismantle Ḥavot Gilad in October 2002. National-religious troops involved objected to the *hillul Shabbat* necessitated by the order, rather than to the dismantlement itself.
 45. Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2003* (Tel-Aviv, 2003), 40. See also Yair Sheleg, *The Political and Social Meaning of the Removal of Settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip* (Hebrew)(Jerusalem, Sept. 2003), esp. pp. 29-30.
 46. Lewis Coser, *Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Attention* (New York 1974), 4.
 47. For numerous citations to this effect see Charles Selengut, “By Torah Alone: Yeshivah Fundamentalism in Jewish Life,” in *Accounting for Fundament-*

- alisms*, M.E. Martin and R. Scott Appleby, eds.(Chicago, 1994), 236-263. In general, I. Sivan and K. Kaplan (eds), *Haredim Yisraeliyim* (Tel-Aviv, 2003).
48. E.g., R. Aharon Lichtenstein (above n. 30); R. Eliezer Shenwald, “*Hesder Le-Khatekhilah*”, *Sefer Harel* (above n. 18), 322-369. For the ideological and historical roots, see Eli Holtzer, “Views on the Use of Force in Ideological Movements Within Religious Zionism,” paper presented to the 16th Orthodox Forum, New York, March 2004.
 49. The *hesder* and *mekhinah* programs, although the most popular, are not the only such options. There also exist alternatives, known as *shiluv* and *gahelet*, which likewise offer combinations of service and study. These have been analyzed by my student Elisheva Rosman-Stollman in her “The ‘Joining’ of Religion and State—The Religious Kibbutz Movement’s Solution to the Religious-Zionist Dilemma of Military Service” (Heb.), *Iyyunim bi-Tekumat Yisrael* 10 (2000): 259-297.
 50. For an interesting (albeit somewhat idiosyncratic) depiction of the increasing variety of *yeshivot hesder*, see R. Shimon G. Rozenberg (Shagar), *Keilim Shevurim* (Efrat, 2003), esp. pp. 113-120.
 51. Note, however, the suggestions for reform in R. Mordechai Goodman, “Towards a Renewal of the Structure of the Yeshivot Hesder” (Hebrew), *Zohar* 8 (Autumn 1992): 151-170
 52. By way of contrast, as many as 30% of *mekhinot* graduates (i.e. some 300 soldiers per year) now register for officers’ training. See report by Amos Harel in *Ha-Areẓ*, December 11 2003, A1.
 53. Laslo and Ritch, 2001 (above n. 22), 80. For earlier years see Ya’akov Hadany, “From Alternative Purposes to Reciprocal Purposes,” *Mayim mi-Dalyo*, 11 (2000): 61-66.
 54. For this reason they are frequently accused of appealing mainly to non-scholastic types. See: Chanoch Daum, “Pre-Military Summer Camps,” *Nekudah* (monthly journal of settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza Strip) 216 (July 1998): 48-9 and the inverted compliments in R. Shlomo Aviner, “Hymn to a Mekhinist,” *Be-Ahavah u-ve-Emunah* 424 (Sep. 2003), p. 8.
 55. On this tendency, sometimes known as *ḥardal* (= *ḥaredi-dati-leumi*), and more recently still as *ḥabakuk* (= *Ḥabad+Breslav+Kuk* [+ *Carlebach*]), see Yair Sheleg, *The New Religious Jews: Recent Developments among Observant Jews in Israel* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem, 2000), 249-263.
 56. This issue generated some contention in the 1960s and 1970s, and continued to receive attention in the 1980s. See R. Zalman Melamed, “Torah Giants—That is the National Need,” *Teḥumin* 7 (1986): 330-334.